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ABSTRACT
Focusing on national politics and America’s long road to
civil war, this dissertation presents a history of the “free
land” idea that culminated with the passage of the Homestead Act
of 1862.

Using primary sources such as the published papers of

notable political figures and records of congressional debates,
this work presents the full political history of homesteading
from before the Revolutionary War to its ultimate approval
during the Civil War.
Politicians debated how best to use and distribute public
lands for decades before the Civil War.

While many took

inspiration from Thomas Jefferson and called for the government
to provide small tracts of land to settlers for free, others
remained convinced that sales of public lands should be used to
grow the national treasury.

Beginning with the Missouri

Compromise in 1820, debates about land distribution reflected
the nation’s growing sectional tensions.

Southerners came to

gradually oppose any form of free land distribution as
threatening to the expansion and survival of slavery.
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After the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, advocates of free
land distribution were among the earliest adherents to the new
Republican Party.

The homesteading idea was critical to

providing cohesion within the new party at a time when many
Republicans held differing opinions on how best to confront the
South on slavery expansion.
This dissertation argues that the homesteading idea was a
much more important national political issue than historians
have heretofore expressed.

It was a critical element to debates

about the expansion of slavery into the West decades before the
Civil War and, therefore, stands as an important issue that
contributed more to the coming of that conflict than most
historians have recognized.
By tracing the idea’s earliest expressions by Jefferson to
its ultimate approval by a Republican-dominated Congress and
president during the Civil War, this work provides a
comprehensive history of the Homestead Act’s genesis,
development, and impact on a century of American politics and
life.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the now-defunct political magazine George
published an article listing what it viewed as the ten most
important legislative acts in American history.

Landmark

laws such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the G.I. Bill
claimed spots on the list, as did the enactment of Social
Security and the creation of the interstate highway system.
The Homestead Act of 1862 landed at number three on
this list, beaten out only by the Louisiana Purchase and
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.1

This seems an appropriate place

for the Homestead Act to fall on such a ranking.

The

United States first acquired much of the land eventually
opened to settlement via the Homestead Act in the 1803
Louisiana Purchase, which more than doubled the size of the
nation and claimed most of the today’s Midwest as American
territory.
Like the Homestead Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act was
not intended to be controversial.

Rather, it merely sought

to establish and administratively organize the two
territories of Nebraska and Kansas.

Only when Senator

Stephen Douglas of Illinois inserted a measure calling for

1

Steven M. Gillon, “Top Ten Legislative Landmarks in U.S. History.” George, December 1997, pp. 4850.
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popular sovereignty on the slavery issue into the KansasNebraska Act—thereby negating the 1820 Missouri Compromise—
did it become a major event on the road to the Civil War.
Kansas and Nebraska both later saw huge numbers of
homesteading settlers emigrate and settle within their
borders.

More importantly, however, the Homestead Act,

like the Kansas-Nebraska bill before it, became politicized
as North and South marched toward war.

Southerners who

might otherwise care little about western settlement under
the Homestead Act instead came to vehemently oppose it,
seeing it as nothing more than a Northern plot to populate
the western territories with free soil settlers and prevent
the expansion and survival of slavery.

Concurrently,

Northerners far removed from the West who might otherwise
care little for that region’s settlement and concerns came
to view homesteading as a critical measure that would
provide genuine opportunity to the homesteader while
limiting the South’s chances to expand slavery.
The provisions of the Homestead Act were relatively
simple.

The law offered a qualified settler the

opportunity to select a piece of public land up to 160
acres in size, though claims in some prime areas were
limited to 80 acres.

Once selected, the prospective

homesteader paid minimal administrative costs to the
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government, which usually totaled about eighteen dollars,
and had to take up residence on the land within six months.
At least ten acres of the land had to be placed into
cultivation, and the homesteader had to stay on the
property for five consecutive years.

Once that time had

elapsed and all legal requirements of the Homestead Act
were met to the government’s satisfaction, title to the
property was permanently transferred to the homesteader.
How and why did a relatively straightforward bill
aimed at settling the nation’s vast interior become
political fodder for both pro- and anti-slavery forces in
the years preceding the Civil War?

What role did the

homesteading idea play in the creation of the Republican
Party and, eventually, the coming of the Civil War?
are the questions this work seeks to answer.

These

There is no

question that issues surrounding the Homestead Act played a
major role in the political debates leading up to the Civil
War.

Most historians, however, have treated the Homestead

Act as a minor sideshow to the main act of arguments about
slavery.

While I do not go so far as to ridiculously argue

that the Civil War was actually fought over homesteading, I
do propose to demonstrate that issues of land settlement,
expansion, and homesteading played much larger roles in the
conversations leading up to the conflict than has
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previously been considered.

Hence, the George ranking of

legislative acts may very well have gotten it right.

The

Louisiana Purchase acquired the vast middle of the
continent for the United States; the Kansas-Nebraska Act
brought to the forefront the debate over whether that vast
middle would be settled as free or slave territory; and the
Homestead Act provided the means by which much of it was
eventually settled.

This work, while focused on

homesteading, necessarily deals with all three acts (and
many others) and demonstrates just how closely related they
are. Earlier ideas and debates about various land
distribution ideas are examined as well, including: cash
sales; credit sales; graduation (reducing prices of public
lands available to settlers based on quality); preemption
(allowing so-called “squatter’s rights” for those living on
lands with no legal title to purchase the land outright in
order to prevent anyone else from making a claim on it);
and others.

The Homestead Act was also a critically important
issue to the fledgling Republican Party in the 1850s and
early 1860s, and I examine this aspect of the Act’s history
as well.

Of course, this is directly related to the coming

of the Civil War.

As more abolitionists joined the
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Republicans’ ranks, more Southerners came to oppose
homesteading on principle alone—guilt by association with
Republicans, if you will.

Early Republicans consisted of

abolitionists, disaffected Whigs and Democrats, former
Know-Nothings, and the castoffs of other regional parties.
Homesteading, even more so than outright abolition of
slavery, was one issue on which most of them agreed from
the beginning.

Therefore, the homesteading idea was an

important one for cementing cohesion among the first
Republicans.
Later, the Homestead Act became a central piece in a
series of western bills Republicans rammed through Congress
during the war while no Southerners were present to object.
This represented Republicans taking full advantage of a
prime opportunity to pass what the party viewed as
important legislation, and the homestead bill was a
critical law that Republicans used to determine the future
of the West and the nation as a whole.

Republicans used

homesteading, a transcontinental railroad, new taxes,
national banking, and other radical ideas to completely
change the nation’s financial system, settlement patterns,
commerce, economy, and social structure.

In fact, the

Homestead Act represented a foundational piece of a
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legislative agenda that had as much impact as the New Deal
nearly seventy years later.

Modern politicians of both major parties are quick to
claim themselves as the rightful heirs to the political
traditions of such luminaries as Thomas Jefferson and
Abraham Lincoln.

In fact, many credit Jefferson with

developing the idea that eventually morphed into the
Homestead Act.

The so-called “Jeffersonian ideal” hoped

for America to forever remain a nation of small,
independent farmers, tied to the land and personally
invested in democracy’s success.

Later, Lincoln and his

Republican colleagues saw the Homestead Act as a means by
which to provide genuine opportunity to the masses while
accomplishing the political goals of keeping slavery out of
the West and determining the future settlement and economic
success of that region.
The Homestead Act not only affected national politics,
but also initiated great changes to American society.
Homesteading was used to provide new levels of opportunity
to many not accustomed to it.

Women, still unable to own

land in their own names in many parts of the country, were
free to claim and own homesteads.

After the Civil War and

the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment making African
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Americans citizens, thousands of former slaves and free
blacks went west to seek homesteads.

Immigrants from most

areas of the world were welcomed and free to make claims.
One aspect of homesteading history that I do not
examine but that is of great importance is the effect this
law had on American Indian populations and cultures.

I

have deliberately chosen not to look at this only because
my study ends with the passage of the Homestead Act.

The

impacts of the law on natives were, of course, not known
until many years after my study ends.

However, it is

critical to understand that while homesteading offered
great opportunity to many, it represented more land and
cultural loss for American Indians.

Indian displacement

and removal had, of course, been occurring for decades
before the homestead bill was passed, but there is no
question that the Homestead Act represented yet another in
a long line of acts that served to further remove natives
from their ancestral homes and, eventually, force them onto
reservations.

Anyone wanting more information on this

aspect of homesteading history can choose from a number of
excellent studies, including David J. Wishart’s An
Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska
Indians (University of Nebraska Press, 1995) and Richard
White’s “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New
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History of the American West (University of Oklahoma Press,
1991).

David A. Nichols’s Lincoln and the Indians: Civil

War Policy and Politics (University of Illinois Press,
1978) provides a critical assessment of Abraham Lincoln’s
and the Republican Party’s attitudes toward natives and the
federal government’s actions toward them during Lincoln’s
presidency.

What follows is a history of the so-called “free land”
idea, from its earliest beginnings in the mind of Thomas
Jefferson to its ultimate success a century later through
the pen of Abraham Lincoln.

The homesteading idea changed

and evolved over time, just as the nation and its politics
changed.

This work seeks to explain how the homesteading

idea first developed and why it remained in the forefront
of so many peoples’ thoughts and hopes for so long.

It

also hopes to demonstrate that debate over the Homestead
Act was a much more important political issue in the years
leading up to the Civil War than historians have previously
understood or explained.

9
CHAPTER ONE
JEFFERSONIAN BEGINNINGS: ACQUIRING AND ORGANIZING THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN
In July 1774, thirty-one-year-old Thomas Jefferson, a
member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, published a
pamphlet outlining American colonists’ grievances against
the British crown.

He titled it A Summary View of the

Rights of British America, Set Forth in Some Resolutions
Intended for the Inspection of the Present Delegates of
the People of Virginia, Now in Convention.

It came to be

known simply as A Summary View of the Rights of British
America, and it was the young Jefferson’s first real
encounter with the political fame he would maintain for
the rest of his life and beyond.

The Declaration of

Independence would come two years later, but many of the
ideas articulated in that more famous document first
flowed from Jefferson’s pen—and subsequently took hold in
the minds of many of his countrymen—in the Summary View.
Amidst the complaints of various British monarchs
having interfered with the Americans’ seaborne trade,
suspended colonial legislatures, and levied unreasonable
duties on paper and tea, Jefferson included this
statement:
The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object
of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state. But previous to the
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infranchisement of the slaves we have, it is necessary
to exclude all further importations from Africa. Yet
our repeated attempts to affect this by prohibitions,
and by imposing duties which might amount to a prohibition, have been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s
negative: thus preferring the immediate advantages
of a few British corsairs to the lasting interests of
the American states, and to the rights of human nature
deeply wounded by this infamous practice.2

Here Jefferson first articulated an argument not only
against American slavery but also the African slave
trade.

Jefferson was, of course, a slaveowner, but it

seems clear that even at this early stage of his public
career he worried about the long-term political effect
the institution would have upon his country.
Jefferson also expressed a worry that the crown was
making it nearly impossible for American colonists to
acquire new lands.

He offered a brief history of the

feudal system in Britain, then commented that the king’s
policies made acquiring lands “difficult.” Jefferson
wrote that, “It is time…for us to lay this matter before
his majesty, and to declare that he has no right to grant
lands of himself….Each individual of the society may
appropriate to himself such lands he finds vacant, and
occupancy will give him title” if that society’s elected

2

Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America”, in Julian P. Boyd, editor, The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume I: 1760-1776. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 130.
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representatives had not allotted the land in any other
manner.3
Within the relatively brief Summary View, Thomas
Jefferson outlined two major controversies that came to
dominate the United States for nearly the next century:
what to do about slavery, and how and to whom to distribute
the lands of what became the public domain.

These issues

were somewhat intertwined from the nation’s earliest days,
and they grew more so as the years progressed.

Jefferson

and the next few generations of American political leaders
alternatively argued about, ignored, and compromised over
these issues until the Civil War of 1861-65.

When the dust

settled at the conclusion of that traumatic event,
legislation was in place that theoretically solved both
issues.

As evidenced in Jefferson’s Summary View, American
colonists considered land issues at least somewhat
important in their dispute with King George III.

The first

shots of the American Revolution occurred nine months after
the publication of the pamphlet and continued for the next
eight years.

In addition to the many writings Jefferson

produced during the war articulating the colonists’
3

Ibid., p. 133.
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argument for independence, Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) also
influenced colonial thought on the need to break from
England.

Smith addressed several land issues in his work,

writing that, “In a fertile soil and happy climate, the
great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance
common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an
advantage, as to compensate many defects in civil
government.”4

Many colonists looked at the seemingly

unlimited vastness of North America and felt sure that a
new nation could survive on the basis of “the great
abundance and cheapness of land” alone.

Others, including

Jefferson, were confident that they could also establish a
functional civil government that would guarantee individual
rights, including ownership of land.

In Jefferson’s mind,

such ownership was essential in order to create a nation of
small, independent agrarians.
Like many of his cotemporaries, Jefferson was born
into farming, and it was the pursuit he claimed to love
above all others.

“No occupation is so delightful to me as

the culture of the earth,” he wrote in 1811.5

Though he

lived most of his life on plantations where slaves
4

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III, edited by Andrew S. Skinner. New York: Penguin
Classics, 1986, p. 308.
5
Thomas Jefferson to Charles Willson Peale, August 20, 1811, quoted in A. Whitney Griswold, Farming
and Democracy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948, p. 24.
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performed the actual farming labor, Jefferson took a keen
interest in such subjects as adapting foreign crops,
livestock breeding, and agricultural technology.

Later in

life, he insisted on the inclusion of scientific
agriculture in the curriculum at the University of
Virginia, a school he founded and designed.6
Jefferson’s interest in agriculture was not merely
reflective of his personal enjoyment of it.

He also

strongly believed that the United States must remain an
agriculturally-based society and economy.

During most of

Jefferson’s life, approximately ninety percent of Americans
farmed for a living; “To champion the people, therefore,
was to champion agriculture, a political theorem no
politician could deny.”7 The common man in America during
the colonial and early national periods worked the soil.
Though he fancied himself a farmer, Jefferson was no common
man: he was born into the Virginia aristocracy, had a
college education and legal training, and owned slaves.
But he saw the political and economic potential for a
nation with a seemingly unlimited supply of tillable land,

6
7

Griswold, Farming and Democracy, pp. 24-25.
Ibid., p. 25.
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“…room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and
thousandth generation.”8
Many early political figures, including several of
Jefferson’s fellow Virginians, sought to sell unsettled
land in order to raise revenue for the national government.
This was especially true during the Revolution and
immediately after it, when leaders recognized the crushing
debt the nation incurred to shake off British rule.

Even

in this early period, however, Jefferson expressed his
opposition to selling land to settlers.

On August 13,

1776, he wrote from Philadelphia to Edmund Pendleton:
I am against selling the lands at all. The people who
will migrate to the Westward whether they form part of
the old, or of a new colony will be subject to their proportion of the Continental debt then unpaid. They ought
not be subject to more. They will be a people little
able to pay taxes. There is no equity in fixing upon
them the whole burthen of this war, or any other proportion than we bear ourselves. By selling the lands to
them, you will disgust them, and cause an avulsion of
them from the common union. They will settle the lands
in spite of everybody.9

Economic issues must certainly be recognized when
considering Jefferson’s idolization of the small farmer.
As the American Revolution approached, Jefferson and the
entire colony of Virginia suffered serious economic
difficulties. The widespread debt of the planter class,
declining land values and tobacco prices, and the lack of
8

Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801,” from The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.
Princeton: Princeton University, accessible at http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/inaugural/infinal.html.
9
Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776, in Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Volume I: 1760-1776, p. 492.
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an adequate specie supply combined to create a crisis
mentality among the colony’s landed aristocracy.

Like

many, Jefferson blamed the British colonial system for
these difficulties.

The English had closed off fertile

western lands to American settlement, prevented Virginia
from issuing paper money, and passed the Navigation Acts.
These Acts gave British merchants a monopoly on the
lucrative tobacco trade, which they used to force colonists
to sell their crops cheaply.

Combined with high prices for

manufactured goods, these conditions left Virginians in
perpetual debt.10
Jefferson’s own lifelong struggle with debt has been
well documented by historians.

His own dire financial

straits and those of Virginia certainly made Jefferson more
open to the idea of revolting against the British.

They

also further convinced him of the nobility of the small
farmer who owned, lived on, and tilled his own piece of
ground, indebted to no one.

His negative interactions with

commercial agriculture made him something of an
agricultural innovator, always looking for new crops,
fertilizers, and equipment to make Virginian farming more

10

Richard E. Ellis, “The Political Economy of Thomas Jefferson,” in Lally Weymouth, ed., Thomas
Jefferson: The Man, His World, His Influence. New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973, p. 82.
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stable and self-sufficient and less beholden to the ebbs
and flows of market economics.11
Jefferson served a tumultuous two years as governor of
Virginia from 1779 to 1781.

His election to that position

was partially facilitated by his skillful leadership and
eloquence in speaking about the use and future of the West
during an October 1776 dispute over bills intended to
divide Fincastle County, Virginia into two separate (and
later three separate) counties.

During this debate,

according to historian Julian P. Boyd, he spoke for
“…justice, for liberal land tenure, and for the use of the
West for settlers and not for exploiters.”12

Boyd argued

that Jefferson established a following during this debate
that responded to his articulate speeches and legislative
leadership, and this following helped him win the
governorship three years later.
During his gubernatorial tenure, British troops
invaded the state and forced Jefferson and the state
government to flee the capital of Richmond.

Jefferson took

refuge at Monticello; redcoats eventually chased him from
there as well.

When his term expired, Jefferson, exhausted

and stung by criticism of his actions while in office,

11
12

Ibid.
Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume I, p. 569.
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vowed to leave public life forever.

In September 1782, his

wife died following childbirth, and Jefferson descended
into a deep depression.

The public life he claimed to

despise actually came to his rescue, and he ended up in
Congress.

It was also during this period that he wrote his

only published book, Notes on the State of Virginia.
Historian Merrill D. Peterson described the book as “a
guide to Jefferson’s mind,” revealing him as a “man of
science eager to possess nature for the mind, but also the
man of almost romantic sensibilities enraptured by the
grandeur of the American environment in his quest for
useful knowledge.”13
Notes on the State of Virginia offers a revealing
glimpse into Jefferson’s mind, and his thoughts on
agriculture, land ownership, slavery, and political economy
are on full display within its pages.

The book, written in

response to several inquiries from the secretary of the
French legation in the then-national capital of
Philadelphia, “gave voice to an incipient American
nationalism” and “ensured Jefferson a scientific and
literary reputation on both sides of the Atlantic.”14
also proved to be another forum for him to extol the

13
14

Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson, p. xxiii.
Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv.

It
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virtues of agriculture and education and express suspicion
of industry and manufacturing.
Jefferson made clear his affinity for agriculture and
distaste for industry and manufacturing.

Of course, the

nation followed a different path over the next two or three
decades, and Jefferson eventually qualified these
statements and slightly softened his stance on
international commerce.

However, he clearly had grand, if

unrealistic, expectations for the agricultural potential of
his fledgling nation and its citizens.

He maintained this

vision into his presidency, when he made the Louisiana
Purchase and fully expected no one but small farmers to
inhabit the more than 800,000 square miles bought from
Napoleon.
In response to Query XIV, “The administration of
justice and description of the laws,?” Jefferson sounded
off on slavery, stating that “The improvement of the blacks
in body and mind…has been observed by every one, and proves
that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their
condition of life….The opinion, that they are inferior in
the faculties of reason and imagination must be hazarded
with great diffidence.”15

15

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 269. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Library
Electronic Text Center, accessible at http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefVirg.html.
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Jefferson’s comments must be taken with the proverbial
grain of salt since he was, after all, a slaveowner his
entire life and, as modern evidence suggests, may have
engaged in sexual relations with at least one of his female
slaves.

However, his comments here, relatively early in

his career, demonstrate again that he did not wholly
subscribe to the theory of blacks’ absolute inferiority
despite their “condition of life” (slavery)—though he does
offer “mixture with the whites” as the reason for blacks’
“improvement.”

Jefferson here also seems to have

presciently described the slavery issue’s major role in the
onset of party politics in his statement that “…many other
circumstances will divide us into parties.”

No one

suffered more at the hands of party-affiliated politicians—
or played their game better—than Thomas Jefferson.

Lastly,

in his opinion that freed blacks cannot be “retained and
incorporated into the state,” Jefferson appears to endorse
the idea of colonizing blacks outside the United States.16
This controversial plan for simultaneously ending slavery
and removing blacks from American soil claimed a number of
influential advocates from Jefferson’s age to the Civil
War.

Abraham Lincoln once endorsed the idea on the basis

that free blacks had no real future in the racially-charged
16

Ibid., p. 264.
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atmosphere into which they would be thrown if slavery
ended.
Notes on the State of Virginia allowed Thomas
Jefferson to write about a number of issues important not
just to his own state but to the others as well.

In it, he

explained his preference for agriculture over industry and
rural communities over urban ones.

He clearly demonstrated

his famously conflicted mind on the issue of slavery—the
slaveowner who claimed to despise slavery.

Questions about

land distribution, agriculture, and slavery persisted for
nearly the next hundred years, and Jefferson’s words were
never far from the minds of many political figures who
attempted to answer them.

Though the nation eventually

urbanized and industrialized rapidly and enthusiastically,
the Jeffersonian vision was a powerful and important one
for decades to come.

As one historian noted, “The

Jeffersonian type of agricultural fundamentalism has
persisted…and is still frequently pressed with great vigor,
particularly by writers whose idealism outweighs their
knowledge of economics.”17

17

Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950: A Study of Their Origins and
Development. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966, p. 4.
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At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the new
United States of America possessed massive western land
tracts outside the boundaries of the thirteen states.

This

included the territory east of the Mississippi River, south
of the Great Lakes, and north of the modern northern
boundary of Florida.

These territories eventually became

the modern states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and parts of Minnesota, Alabama, and
Mississippi.

These areas became what one historian called

“…the nucleus of the public domain.”18

A Congressional

resolution passed October 10, 1780, stated that any
unappropriated lands ceded by the states would be formed
into news states eventually intended to join the Union.
The same resolution stated that Congress would regulate
granting and settling of these lands.19

This was, according

to historian William Goetzmann, “…the new government’s most
significant power.”20
The existing states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia
claimed large chunks of these western lands based on
language in their original colonial charters.

This meant

that the remaining six original states—New Hampshire, Rhode
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Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland—
had no western land claims.

Led by Maryland, these six

states pressed that the western lands “…wrested from the
common enemy by blood and treasure of the Thirteen States,
should be considered as common property, subject to be
parceled out by Congress into free, convenient and
independent governments in such manner and at such times as
the wisdom of that Assembly shall direct.”21

Of these six,

only Pennsylvania was considered a large state, and the
smaller states must surely have feared the increased power
of larger states like Virginia and New York should they be
permitted to retain their western claims.

Maryland even

refused to ratify the Articles of Confederation until the
seven states with western land claims agreed to cede them
to the national government.

Governor Thomas Jefferson of

Virginia lobbied his state’s leaders to agree to the
cession so that the Articles of Confederation could pass.
In a September 26, 1780 letter to George Washington, he
wrote, “I am informed the ratification of the Confederation
has been rested on our Cession of a part of our western
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Claims, a cession which…I verily believe will be agreed to
if the Quantity demanded be not unreasonably great.”22
On March 1, 1781, New York became the first state to
cede its western claims; Maryland signed the Articles the
same day after receiving assurances that the other six
states would soon follow suit.

They did so at various

times from 1781 to 1802.23
New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina made
unconditional cessions of their western lands.

The

cessions of Virginia, Connecticut, North Carolina, and
Georgia had conditions placed upon them, often intended to
reserve certain western areas for possible future use by
the respective states or, in the case of Georgia, an
attempt to have the national government pay the state for
land sales in its cession.

Virginia’s western land were

the largest and included modern Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and part of Minnesota.
Virginia’s initial and largest cession occurred March 1,
1784; later cessions took place as well.

Connecticut ceded

its western claims on September 13, 1786 with a few
reservations, including an attempt to hold a piece of land
located in modern Pennsylvania.
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North Carolina made its cession with reservations “…more
detailed and far reaching than those made by any other
state.”24 Modern Tennessee was eventually created from North
Carolina’s cession.

Georgia’s aforementioned cession

occurred April 24, 1802.25
Historian William Goetzmann gave Jefferson a great
deal of credit for convincing his Virginia colleagues to
agree to the western cession, arguing that Jefferson
“prevented…the Balkanization of America” and guaranteeing
that “the United States would be a large, potentially
powerful continental nation that could not easily be
divided and conquered….The undeveloped West had made this
possible….The West served as the cement of Union at a
critical time.”26
With the western cessions held as “common property,”
as originally demanded by Maryland, a bond developed among
all the states that played a part in holding them together
since the Articles of Confederation gave little real
federal power to the national government.

In this manner,

Goetzmann’s statement that the West was the “cement of
Union,” while perhaps somewhat overstated, does have
credence.
24
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this, as do the Marylanders who demanded fair treatment in
the matter of western lands in the first place.

In 1784, Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson to two
separate committees dealing with western lands.
“Jefferson’s thoughts were never far from the West, and
now, in 1784, he sought to fix its future.”27

The first

committee was to determine the proper governmental
organization of new western territories, the second to
devise a method for disposal of public domain lands.
Several pressing issues made the work of these committees
extremely important.

Revolutionary War veterans clamored

for their promised land bounties; under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress had no means by which to raise
revenue, and selling public land was seen as a possible way
to raise money; no one was sure how best to defend the
Northwest from American Indians; fear existed that Kentucky
and Tennessee might fall under British or Spanish
commercial control; those who wished to emigrate to the
West pressured the government to hurriedly organize the
various territories; and more.

Congress needed to act

quickly but carefully.
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Report of a Plan of Government for the Western
Territory was written in Jefferson’s hand and submitted to
Congress on March 1, 1784.

Following the lead of the

Congressional act of October 10, 1780, Jefferson’s report
recommended that “…the territory ceded or to be ceded by
Individual states to the United states [sic] shall be
formed into distinct states.”28

The report recommended the

creation of ten new states and suggested boundaries and
even Latin-style names for them, including Michigania,
Cherronesus, Illinoia, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia.
Next, the report stated that “free males of full age”
in the new states should meet to establish a temporary
government, adopt a temporary constitution and laws, and
establish counties or townships “for the election of
members for their legislature.”29

Such temporary

governments were to continue only until 20,000 free
inhabitants lived in the state, when, subject to
Congressional approval, the states could call conventions
to establish permanent constitutions and governments.

When

a new state had obtained enough free inhabitants as the
least populous state of the original thirteen, the new
state would have delegates admitted to Congress.
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The legality of both the temporary and permanent
governments was subject to five conditions:

that the

states “shall for ever remain a part of the United States
of America;” the new states would always be subject “to the
government of the United states [sic] in Congress
assembled;” like the original thirteen states, the new ones
would be responsible for their fair share of the federal
debt; all new state governments “shall be in republican
forms, and shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds
any hereditary title;” and, lastly and most
controversially, “that after the year 1800 of the Christian
era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude in any of the said states.”30

This last measure

proved to be a sticking point, and Congress ultimately
rejected the committee’s report.

Jefferson amended it,

dropping the slavery clause and the Latinized names for the
new states, and Congress adopted it on April 23, 1784.31
His attempt to keep slavery out of the Northwest was a
precursor to the 1787 Northwest Ordinance and an early
manifestation of the “empire of liberty” to which he had
first referred in the Declaration of Independence.
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Jefferson presented his second committee report,
focusing on proper disposal of western public lands, on May
7, 1784.

It recommended that lands be surveyed before

settlement, and that surveyors be appointed by Congress.
The report also stated that lands should be purchased, not
seized, from American Indians.

The clauses in this report

seemed particularly important as the Continental Army
demobilized and thousands of former soldiers demanded the
land bounties promised them as rewards for service.
Various factors delayed the government’s ability to grant
these lands, including the slowness in getting them
surveyed and the continued presence in many areas of
American Indians hostile to encroachment.

As historian

Paul Wallace Gates noted, “Many veterans swarmed into the
West, especially from Virginia, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania ….They rushed across the Ohio and into
Kentucky and Tennessee where Indians still claimed the land
and threatened to bring on renewed warfare.”32
The designers of the Articles of Confederation had
tried to place Indian affairs under the purview of the
national government, but the overall weakness of the
document led many states to continue to deal with natives
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however they chose.

The Confederation government was

unable to prevent intrusions into Indian lands “…and to
show at the same time both generosity and military might to
the natives.”33

Indians in many areas became more and more

distressed as squatters and speculators streamed into their
traditional lands.

In the Ohio country, the national

government had already begun the long and shameful process
of negotiating and then ignoring treaties with American
Indians.
The continued presence of the British at Forts Oswego,
Niagara, Detroit, and Mackinaw also contributed to American
difficulties in dealing with natives.

The British still

sought domination of the fur trade and continued to supply
Indians with weapons, manufactured goods, and other items
in return for furs.

The presence of the British and their

continued alliance with many local tribes angered American
settlers as well as many in the Confederation government.
Eventually, the Americans realized that only a resounding
defeat of the Ohio country Indians would make settlement
there safe.

This defeat occurred at the battle of Fallen

Timbers in August 1794.

The British offered the Indian

forces no assistance, and soon afterward agreed to Jay’s
Treaty, which called for the surrender of British posts on
33
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the American frontier by June 1, 1796.

With the Indians

defeated and the British gone, American settlement in the
Ohio country proceeded rapidly.34

Jefferson’s May 7, 1784 report recommended survey
before settlement and combined the two major survey systems
in use in the United States: the New England and Southern
systems.

In the New England system, used for decades

before independence, residents lay out and surveyed new
areas prior to settlement.

They prepared plats and

recorded them with colonial officials before anyone was
permitted to settle.

Towns were organized based on

neighborhood allotments, and no one was able to claim all
the best lands for himself.

As the town grew, its

residents shared in divisions of unappropriated land.

This

system worked well in New England because it promoted
tight, compact communities, which benefited all by offering
protection from native attacks and mutual aid during harsh
winters.

As historian Benjamin H. Hibbard noted, “Little

republics—townships—of convenient size were organized,
placing the civil and political power in the hands of those

34

Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, pp. 60-61.

31
who own the country, at the same time making provision for
the moral and educational wants.”35
The second major survey system Jefferson incorporated
into his report, and the one with which he was certainly
more familiar, was the Southern system.

A warmer climate,

fewer native attacks, and plantation agriculture resulted
in much more scattered settlements in this region than in
New England.

Formal surveys rarely preceded settlement;

land was distributed according to the location of warrants,
which granted the holder the right to select his land in
any unappropriated area.

As a result, many settlers simply

walked into the wilderness and staked their claims, often
giving themselves a monopoly on a given area’s best land.
Of course, without surveys, claims often overlapped and
many errors occurred.

However, Hibbard observed, “with all

its disadvantages this practice expressed the spirit of the
frontiersman and, in spite of logic, persisted as an
important incident, even assuming the dignity of a
policy.”36
Jefferson’s report led to the Ordinance of 1784, which
was then carried over into 1785 and sent to committee.

The

members reported a new and updated ordinance in April 1785;
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Congress adopted it on May 20.

This was the blueprint for

the rectangular survey system still in use, with the 640acre section and the township as the basic units of
measurement.

Jefferson recommended ten-by-ten section

townships, though this was later reduced to six-by-six
sections.

The 1785 ordinance also reserved section 16 of

each township for public schools, one section for religious
purposes, and sections 8, 11, 26, and 29 “for the future
disposition of Congress.”37

Lands for settlement under this

ordinance would be sold for one dollar per acre to raise
money for the general treasury.

Public auctions would be

held to make land available before it could be sold to
individuals.
In March 1785, Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson
U.S. Minister to France, a position he held until 1789.
Jefferson therefore missed several important debates about
land policy (as well as the Constitutional Convention).
However, his friends and colleagues kept him informed of
important events, and Jefferson continued in his beliefs of
the moral and economic virtues of agriculture.

On August

23, 1785, he wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John
Jay, responding to a question from Jay regarding “whether
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it would be useful to us to carry all our own productions
[meaning manufactures], or none?” Jefferson answered:
We have now lands enough to employ an infinite number of people
in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most
valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most
independant [sic], the most virtuous, and they are tied to their
country and wedded to it’s [sic] liberty and interests by the
most lasting bands. As long therefore as they can find
emploiment [sic] in this line, I would not convert them into
mariners, artisans, or any thing else.38

A few months later, in October 1785, he lamented the
inequality of European property distribution in a letter to
James Madison.

He noted that the vast majority of wealth

in France was concentrated in the hands of a very few and
that the poor masses owned no property.

His experiences in

France seemed only to strengthen his conviction that
America should remain a primarily agricultural economy.
“The earth is given as a common stock for man to
labour [sic] and live on,” he wrote Madison.

“The small

landholders are the most precious part of a state.”39

He

wrote to the Frenchman Brissot de Warville on August 16,
1786 after reading an excerpt of a book Warville was
writing about commerce between the United States and
France.

Jefferson informed de Warville that his favorite

passages in the book were those in which the author proved
to Americans “that they will be more virtuous, more free,
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and more happy, emploied [sic] in agriculture, than as
carriers or manufacturers.”40
Jefferson watched from Paris in 1787 as the
Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia and the
Continental Congress revisited one of his old projects:
developing a plan for governmental organization in the
West.

Unlike in 1784, however, when he made

recommendations for the United States’ entire western
territory, Congress took up only the issue as it related to
the Northwest.

An organized government there was critical

to the successful initiation of land surveys as well as to
fighting American Indians angered by unfair, dishonestly
negotiated treaties.
The simultaneous meetings of the Congress debating a
government for the Northwest and the Constitutional
Convention is interesting.

Those meeting in Philadelphia

originally intended only to amend the Articles of
Confederation to make the central government stronger.
This was particularly important for the future of the West
since the weak Confederation government could do little in
reality to defend and govern the Northwest Territory.
However, they soon scrapped the Articles of Confederation
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completely and turned instead to drafting a new, stronger
document.

As historian Jack N. Rakove noted, “Only by

endowing the national government with the means to act on
its intention could the Federal Convention redeem the
promise that the Northwest Ordinance held out.”41
Jefferson’s 1784 report served as a starting point for
the depleted Congress, many of whose members were at the
Constitutional Convention.

As Rakove observed, the primary

questions that needed to be answered had to do with how the
Northwest territories could be fairly integrated into the
United States.

“Would their residents enjoy the same

political rights as their countrymen closer to the
Atlantic?”42

Yes, according to Jefferson in 1784: “…Such

state shall be admitted by it’s [sic] delegates into the
Congress of the United states [sic], on an equal footing
with the said original states.”43
The role of the West came up time and again during the
Constitutional Convention.

Many delegates argued that new

western states should not be permitted to enter the Union
on equal terms with the original thirteen.

Gouverneur

Morris of New York worried that Congressional
41
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representatives from the West would not be “equally
enlightened” as those from the original eastern states and
proposed a number of plans to guarantee the old states’
superiority.

These plans drew sharp responses from the

likes of James Madison, George Mason, and others.

Madison

demanded to know if Morris “determined the human character
by the points of the compass.”44
Madison clearly believed that the western states’
allegiance to the Union could be secured by granting them
equal political rights under the new Constitution.

To do

otherwise—to bring new states in as inferiors—risked
angering and alienating them, which was unwise at a time
when the British and French still had designs on the
Northwest.

The Philadelphia delegates could not allow the

new Constitution to drive Americans into the arms of the
European fur traders, merchants, and soldiers who longed
for opportunities to undermine and perhaps destroy the
young American nation.

Equality of the new western states

was a main idea of the Northwest Ordinance, but that
document would have been worthless without the political
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Fair treatment of Native Americans was another issue
for the framers of the Northwest Ordinance.
44
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1784 report on proper disposal of western lands, Jefferson
called for the purchase of lands from natives.

The framers

of the Northwest Ordinance agreed, and stated in the
document’s third article that Indians’ “lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and
in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress.”45
By the time of the Ordinance, many tribes in the
Northwest had already grown weary of Euroamerican promises
and treaties and had become determined to give up no more
land to the Americans.

In fact, despite Jefferson’s

ordinances of 1784 and 1785, many of the lands affected by
those laws remained in native hands in 1787.

If Congress

truly intended to treat natives with “the utmost good
faith” and not forcibly take native lands, then the 1784
and 1785 laws could be argued to have been ineffectual at
best and wishful thinking at worst.

However, while the

modern observer may view these laws and the Northwest
Ordinance’s statement on the treatment of natives as
hypocrisy (or at least greatly ironic), they were quite
realistic to the majority of early white Americans.
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historian Bernard W. Sheehan observed, “From the very
beginning colonial authorities had assumed that European
society would displace the Indians in America.”46

Many

whites hoped to assimilate natives into American society;
others cared little where Indians went as long as they
vacated lands to make room for white settlement.

Either

way, “…in no case was it assumed that Indian society would
remain intact and in possession of any substantial segment
of the continent.”47

There was not, therefore, at least in

the minds of most white Americans, any incompatibility
between displacing American Indians from their lands and
still treating them with “the utmost good faith” as
promised in the Northwest Ordinance.
While the Northwest Ordinance was the beginning of a
more philanthropic attitude toward natives, it has already
been observed just how long that philanthropy lasted: until
about 1794, when the Americans defeated natives at the
battle of Fallen Timbers.

This battle came about largely

due to a shift in the attitude of the Americans, who had
come to realize that most natives had no interest in being
assimilated or giving up more of their traditional lands.
Only military defeat and treatment of the Indians as a
46
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conquered people would allow for the seizing of native
lands and mass settlement of them by Americans.

While the

Northwest Ordinance may have had good intentions in how it
proposed to deal with Indians, those intentions were not
realistic or in line with the general American attitude
about the continent’s racial hierarchy.
The Ordinance’s third article did not just offer lofty
language about treatment of Native Americans.

It also

raised the issue of education in the Northwest: “Schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”48
This was another area in which Jefferson’s influence on the
future of the West was clear.

Long before he founded the

University of Virginia, Jefferson articulated the need for
some organized American system of higher education and
governmental support of that system.

In an August 13, 1786

letter to George Wythe, he wrote: “Preach, my dear Sir, a
crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law
for educating the common people….The tax that will be paid
for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part of
what be paid to kings, priests and nobles who will rise up
among us if we leave the people in ignorance.”49

Jefferson

viewed education as he did land distribution and
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agricultural innovation: they were means to strengthen and
improve American democracy by giving his so-called “common
people” genuine opportunities to improve their social and
economic standing.
Jefferson, who opposed the spread of sectarianism and
religious bigotry in education, regarded federal support
for schools as something to encourage, as did others who
felt similarly.

The education clause in the Northwest

Ordinance “…reminded Americans that they could ill afford
to let their common commitment to republican principles and
democratic procedures be undermined by sectarian rivalry
and intolerance.”50

The federal commitment to education

first proposed in the Northwest Ordinance eventually led to
the creation of the land grant college system under the
Morrill Act of 1862.
The Ordinance’s sixth article is surely its most wellknown and oft-debated.

Again looking to Jefferson’s 1784

report as a guide, the Continental Congress wrote that
“There shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude
in the said territory otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes.”

The article also included a statement that

fugitive slaves could be returned to their owners.
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An interesting and frequently ignored fact about the
Northwest Ordinance is that half of the states present when
it came to a vote were southern: Virginia, North and South
Carolina, and Georgia.
present as well.
were absent.

Delaware, another slave state, was

Three New England states and Pennsylvania

At first glance, it seems curious that

Article Six made it into the final version of the Ordinance
considering the supposed threat it posed to the expansion
of slavery.

However, the Ordinance passed with the assent

of all eight states.

How did a prohibition on slavery

survive a 1787 vote dominated by southerners who had
rejected Jefferson’s 1784 suggestion to end slavery in the
West by 1800?
A closer look reveals the South’s possible
motivations.

First, Jefferson’s 1784 report proposed a ban

on slavery in the entire West.

Article Six of the

Northwest Ordinance affected only lands located north of
the Ohio River, so perhaps many Southerners took comfort in
knowing that slavery was still permissible south of it.
Some historians have speculated that Article Six was
accepted because prohibiting slavery north of the Ohio
would deter the planting of crops there that would compete
with important southern cash crops such as tobacco. (The
climate there would have surely prohibited this regardless

42
of the presence or exclusion of slavery.)

Others have

theorized that southerners were sure that most migrants to
the Northwest would come from the South, leading to a
political alliance between the Northwest and the southern
states that would weaken the strong states of New England,
New York, and Pennsylvania.

Still others have proposed the

possibility that Congress and the representatives at the
Constitutional Convention had a secret arrangement to
protect slavery in the existing states and exclude it from
the Northwest.51
Historian Paul Finkelman suggested that the South
likely viewed Article Six as strengthening the institution
of slavery, not weakening it.

He agreed that the South

must have been happy that the article only affected the
lands north of the Ohio River but also asserted that it was
actually a gain for southerners because it contained a
fugitive slave cause.

The Articles of Confederation

contained no such clause, and one had not yet been added to
the proposed Constitution being debated in Philadelphia.52
Article Six also did not decree that all slaves
already in the Northwest be immediately freed.

It was not,

in Finkelman’s phrase, “…an emancipation proclamation for
51
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the Northwest.”53

In fact, slavery continued to exist in

parts of the Northwest for decades.

Blacks were held in

slavery in Indiana through the 1830s; slavery was on the
books in Illinois until 1848.

Though Article Six did lay

the groundwork for the eventual creation of five free
states (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin),
slavery did not simply disappear from the Northwest when
the Ordinance was approved on July 13, 1787.

Such

paradoxes and complexities justify Finkelman’s use of the
term “an ambiguous article” to describe Article Six.54

The

adoption of the sixth article “…illustrates the difficulty
of ending a powerful institution merely by constitutional
dictates and without the support of legislative enactments
and executive enforcement.”55
As sectional tensions rose over the decades and the
nation marched toward civil war over the slavery issue,
many antislavery politicians, including Salmon P. Chase and
Abraham Lincoln, began to refer to Article Six of the
Northwest Ordinance as some sort of sacred text.

However,

their perception of the article simply did not correspond
to the reality of it, which was much more complex.
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the issues the Northwest Ordinance raised would continue to
be argued for nearly another century.

Thomas Jefferson was not part of the debates over the
Northwest Ordinance or the Constitution.

However, his

presence and influence were felt as both important
documents were conceived, written, debated, edited, and put
to votes.

His work, beginning with the Summary View and

continuing forward to the 1784 and 1785 land ordinances,
influenced not only legislation but also the ways in which
Americans viewed land use and ownership.

His views on

agriculture, expansion, education, and slavery were cited
as near-gospel for the next hundred years and beyond.
Moreover, in 1787, the year that both the Northwest
Ordinance and the Constitution were written, many of his
greatest contributions were yet to come.
On December 20, 1787, Jefferson wrote to James Madison
from Paris.

This letter encapsulated many of Jefferson’s

ideas that so influenced the development and future of not
only the West, but also American government, history,
institutions, and character:
After all, it is my principle that the will of the Majority
will always prevail. If they approve the proposed Convention in all it’s [sic] parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall
find it wrong. I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agri-
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cultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant
lands in America. When they get piled upon one another in
large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in
Europe. Above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; convinced that on their
good sense we may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.56
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CHAPTER TWO
LAND ISSUES FROM THE CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE
MISSOURI COMPROMISE
The first Federal Congress under the new Constitution
met in New York beginning March 4, 1789.

Almost

immediately, issues involving the public domain in the West
came to the forefront.

On May 28, Representative Thomas

Scott of Pennsylvania rose and presented a speech
explaining the situation to his colleagues and demanding
that action be taken on behalf of those seeking western
lands.
Scott lamented that land surveys, mandated by Thomas
Jefferson’s 1785 ordinance, had not yet been completed and
estimated that 7,000 Americans currently lived on lands
that had not yet been surveyed and for which they had
therefore not yet paid the government.

“There are,” Scott

stated, “a great number of people on the ground, who are
willing to acquire by purchase a right to the soil they are
seated upon.”

He then struck a Jeffersonian tone: “Allured

by its fertility, the agreeableness of the climate, and the
prospect of future ease to themselves and their families,
they would not seek a change.”

This was the first real

articulation by a Congressional figure of what came to be
known as “squatter’s rights:” that those occupying land,
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even without legal right or title, should have the
opportunity to buy that land from the government rather
than be automatically evicted from it.

The argument Scott

began with this idea was destined to last another fifty
years.
Scott also warned that if the United States government
did not soon act, it was possible that other governments
would.

If settlers could not be accommodated within U.S.

boundaries, they could move into Spanish territory, “where
they are not altogether uninvited, and become an accession
of power to a foreign nation forming to us a dangerous
frontier.”

They might also simply remain on lands to which

they had no title and never pay for it.
Scott argued that the current proposals for disposing
of the public domain called for the lands to be sold in
quantities much too large, telling the House, “It is very
difficult to form a company for the purchase of a million
acres.”

He proposed selling land in much smaller

quantities and opening a federal land office to “grant the
soil in such quantities as may suit the applications.”57
On July 13—the second anniversary of the passage of
the Northwest Ordinance—Scott again took the floor of the
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House of Representatives to speak about western lands and
argue for the creation of a land office.

He estimated the

western territory he spoke of to be a thousand miles long
and five hundred miles wide and capable of holding two
million farms, but “…for greater caution, say it will
contain one million.”

If each farm had an average of six

people living on it, then the western territory could
potentially have six million inhabitants in the future,
double the number living in America in 1789.
Scott spoke of the great fertility of western soil,
the excellent waterways, and a climate with “…a salubrity
that accommodates it to the emigrant from both Northern and
Southern States.”

He insisted that the nation observe and

honor the treaties made with American Indian tribes, for
“…if the country is settled by a lawless banditti, they
will keep the nation in a perpetual broil with the
savages.”

Scott also rather dramatically read a

translation of a proclamation issued by the Governor of the
Spanish posts at the Illinois, which offered free land,
exemptions from taxes, civil and religious freedom, and
farm implements to Americans who settled in Spanish
territory:
It may be said, that Americans will not venture to live
under the Spanish Government, or settle a Spanish colony. To this it may be replied, that when people, from
their necessities or inclinations, are determined to em-
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igrate, in order to mitigate their distresses, they
think little of the form of Government; all they care for
is relief from their present or approaching wants or
troubles.58

Why, Scott asked, send our countrymen into the arms of
a foreign government when the United States could easily
provide to them everything the Spanish could if it would
simply create a land office and make western lands
available for purchase?

To emphasize the point, Scott

explained that the government was owed nearly five million
dollars for completed surveys and land purchases; $771,310
of the sum had been paid into the treasury and $4,165,553
was still outstanding, paying a daily interest of $684.25.
“This, gentleman, is what we actually lose every day, for
want of establishing some regulations on the subject.”59
Despite that seemingly persuasive financial argument, the
Committee of the Whole came to no resolution that day.
However, Scott’s speeches and arguments well encapsulate
many of the important western land issues that faced the
early Congresses and that would continue for many years to
come, including Indian relations, squatter’s rights, and
methods of distribution.
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The First Congress debated a number of land issues,
including whether prices should be fixed or graduated;
whether to accept only cash or also credit; the number and
locations of land offices; and more.

However, few

decisions appear to have been reached.
When a foreign national, Hannibal W. Dobbyn, applied
for a contract to purchase more than 50,000 acres of
western land in January 1790, Congress was unable to come
to a decision on several questions.

These included whether

or not to sell American lands to foreigners, even though
Dobbyn stated his interest in becoming an American citizen.
There was also discussion of extending him credit: he
planned to put one-third down immediately, another onethird down in seven years, and pay the balance within
twelve years.

Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, the Chairman

of the House of Representatives Committee on the Whole,
“…presumed that the House could not proceed understandingly
in the business upon the information now in their
possession.”60

Boudinot stated that someone in the

Executive branch should prepare a report explaining what
had already been done in the area of land sales and
recommending how Congress should proceed in the future.

On

January 20, 1790, Congress requested that Secretary of the
60
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Treasury Alexander Hamilton submit a plan for the
disposition of the public domain.61
Hamilton submitted his report six months later, on
July 22, 1790.

His “Report of a Uniform System for the

Disposition of the Lands, the Property of the United
States” stated that two main objectives existed: to
facilitate “advantageous sales according to the probable
course of purchases” and “the accommodation of individuals
now inhabiting the Western Country, or who may hereafter
emigrate thither.”62

Hamilton was a financier and the

Secretary of the Treasury, so raising revenue for national
use was his primary concern.

However, he made clear that

he was not ignorant of the need to ensure “the satisfaction
of the inhabitants of the Western Country.”63

According to

his report, it was possible to do both.
Hamilton wrote that purchasers of western lands fell
into three categories: individuals and companies with money
that would buy land in order to re-sell it to others;
associations of people who would buy land with the
intention of settling it themselves; and individuals and
families either already on western lands or intending to
“emigrate thither.”
61
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large tracts of land, while the third would generally buy
smaller quantities.

Priority must be given, he wrote, “to

obtain all the advantages which may be derived from the two
first classes.”64

Hamilton recommended that the main land

office be located at the main seat of the national
government, where those wishing to make large purchases
could most easily find agents.

To accommodate those making

smaller purchases, he recommended two satellite offices,
one in the northwest and another in the southwest.

No land

was to be sold “…except such, in respect to which the
titles of the Indian tribes shall have been previously
extinguished.”65

The entire land sale program would be

administered and overseen by a board of three
commissioners.
In order to attempt to satisfy the three classes of
purchasers he imagined, Hamilton also called for the
establishment of three different types of land tracts.

The

first was to be available in increments of 500 acres or
more and would be available to subscribers to the federal
loan then being considered by Congress.

The second type

was to appeal to those seeking small family farms; these
tracts would be limited to no more than 100 acres.
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Finally, the third designation was for very large purchases
of entire townships, which under this plan would be ten
miles square.

It was assumed that those making such

sizeable purchases would subdivide them.

Hamilton

recommended that the lands be sold for thirty cents per
acre and that no credit be extended to anyone except those
falling into the third category.

The law required those

receiving credit to put down one-quarter of the price
immediately as well as provide some other security for the
balance, which was due in no more than two years.
Purchasers would be responsible for the expenses of
conducting government surveys, though survey before
settlement was not required.66
Hamilton’s July 1790 report basically ignored the
Ordinance of 1785 in a number of ways.

Jefferson called

for survey before settlement; Hamilton did not.

The

Secretary of the Treasury recommended townships of ten
sections by ten sections (interestingly, the original
recommendation of Jefferson) rather than the six-by-six of
the Ordinance of 1785. Hamilton also made no mention of
setting aside land for schools, a main tenant of the 1785
law.

He inserted no public auction clause in his report.

Hamilton clearly gave preference to those wishing to
66
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purchase massive land tracts, while Jefferson hoped to
populate the west with small family farms.

Ironically,

Hamilton’s system, though it clearly favored speculators
awash with cash, was actually more favorable to small
settlers than Jefferson’s.

Under the 1785 Land Ordinance,

land was more expensive—one dollar per acre—and the
smallest parcel one could purchase was a 640-acre section.
Few had $640 to spare, and the government raised little
revenue from this land system.

The lack of success of the

1785 law was a prime motivation for Congress to request
Hamilton’s 1790 report in the first place.
It must be noted that when Congress received
Hamilton’s report in July 1790, it was simultaneously
debating Hamilton’s “Report on the Public Credit,” which he
had submitted in January 1790.

This report was Hamilton’s

plan to liquidate the approximately $50 million national
debt.

In it, Hamilton made clear his financial and

political philosophy: that the government must take an
active role in creating wealth and making sure that it was
placed into the hands of those who could best take
advantage of it.

As historian John C. Miller observed,

“Hamilton was primarily concerned with those individuals
who possessed a disposable surplus of capital which could
be devoted to the support of the government and to the
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furthering of economic enterprise.”67 These speculators were
the people Hamilton was sure would buy massive chunks of
western land, especially considering the cheaper price of
thirty cents per acre over the one dollar per acre charged
under the 1785 law.

His philosophy dictated that they be

given preference just as Jefferson’s agrarian-centered
philosophy caused him to prefer small farms.

Though at

this time the two men were not yet political enemies,
Hamilton’s two 1790 reports certainly pointed them in that
direction.
To complicate matters further, Congress in January
1791 requested that Hamilton submit another report, this
one on the state of American manufacturing.

His report,

submitted to Congress on December 5, 1791, put him further
at odds with Jefferson on the issues of agriculture and the
promotion of a farming economy in the United States.
Hamilton’s report was, in the words of one of his modern
biographers, “…the first government-sponsored plan for
selective industrial planning in America.”68

Few things

could have placed Hamilton more at odds with Thomas
Jefferson.
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The origins of this report were actually military and
strategic in nature.

In his first annual address to

Congress, on January 8, 1790, President George Washington
told those gathered in the Senate chamber:
A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined;
to which end a uniform and well digested plan is requisite: And their safety and interest require, that they
should promote such manufactories, as tend to render
them independent on others for essential, particularly
for military supplies…The advancement of Agriculture,
Commerce and Manufactures by all proper means, will not
I trust need recommendation.69

Hamilton had served in the Revolutionary War and well
remembered the Americans’ scarcity of nearly everything:
food, clothing, ammunition, gunpowder, and more.

He noted

in his report, “The extreme embarrassments of the United
States during the late War, from an incapacity of supplying
themselves, are still matter of keen recollection.”70

Now,

as Secretary of the Treasury, he knew that reliance on
foreign manufacturing would likely prove disastrous for the
nation at some point in the future.

In order to better

prepare himself for drafting this important paper, he had
U.S. marshals and customs collectors gather information and
statistics on U.S. manufacturing as well as send him
samples of manufactured goods to see and touch.
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showman’s flair, he laid many of these samples out in the
House of Representatives’ committee room for elected
officials to see.

As Ron Chernow noted, Hamilton proceeded

“…as if operating a small trade fair, an altogether new
form of lobbying.”71
As he researched and prepared the report, Hamilton
must have surely known that he would face great resistance
from Jefferson and other agriculturally-minded politicians.
Hamilton stated from the outset that he did not seek to
replace agriculture but merely to add manufacturing.

“In

every country,” he wrote, “Agriculture is the most
beneficial and productive object in human industry.

This

position…applies with peculiar emphasis to the United
States, on account of their immense tracts of fertile
territory.”72

However, Hamilton realized that if everyone

produced farm crops, supply would soon outpace demand, and
massive stocks of surpluses would create unemployment and
dismal economic conditions.

He also worried that the

United States would face difficulties in selling its farm
products abroad since most of the great European nations
with which America hoped to trade had economies tightly
controlled against foreign products so as to build up
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domestic markets.

To Hamilton, all of these considerations

made having the majority of the nation’s populace working
in agriculture a weakness, not a strength as envisioned by
Jefferson.

As one historian noted, “If, as Thomas

Jefferson supposed, a nation of farmers was the closest
approximation upon earth to paradise, Hamilton was of the
opinion that the time of exodus was at hand.”73
Throughout his report, Hamilton took issue with the
opinions of the Physiocrats, French economists who, like
Jefferson (who had become acquainted with several of them
during his five years in Paris), revered agriculture and
resisted any governmental attempts to steer a national
economy.

Hamilton argued that mechanization would make

manufacturing more productive and less expensive.

He also

proposed government support for internal improvements such
as roads and canals, which would serve to unify several
regional markets into a single American economy.

He called

for moderate tariffs, bounties on some products, patent
protection for inventors, government inspection of
manufactured goods, and many more regulations and
incentives to make manufacturing an important aspect of the
American economy.

In short, the report was a call for

governmental activism to stimulate and grow the nation’s
73
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economic diversity and power.

It was a report that foresaw

America’s future, though it was a future that would not
completely take hold until decades after Hamilton’s—and
Jefferson’s—death.
Again sensing that Jefferson and others would oppose
him, Hamilton invoked authority for his manufacturing plan
in the Constitution:

“The National Legislature has express

authority ‘To lay and Collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the Common
defense and general welfare’….”74
Hamilton was right: Jefferson and others of like mind
were aghast at his report.

James Madison lamented that

Hamilton had overstepped the bounds intended by the
Constitution’s “welfare clause” and that if Hamilton’s
advice were followed, Congress would amass far too much
power in deeming what was or was not appropriate for the
nation’s welfare.

“If not only the means, but the objects,

are unlimited,” Madison wrote to Henry Lee, “the parchment
had better be thrown into the fire at once.”75

Jefferson

agreed, telling President Washington that Hamilton read the
welfare clause much too broadly, which permitted “…Congress
to take everything under their management which they should
74
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deem for the public welfare.”76

Fundamental and decisive

differences were beginning to appear among some of the
nation’s most influential and powerful political figures,
and the first party system was close at hand.

The

differences between followers of Jefferson and Hamilton
over issues such as manufacturing, agriculture, the
national debt, and land distribution played key roles in
the birth of American political parties.

Though Hamilton’s

report on manufactures was shelved and subsequently ignored
by Congress, its contents and recommendations reverberated
in American society and politics for years to come.

Despite Hamilton’s 1790 report on public lands made at
the request of Congress, not until 1796 did that body again
seriously examine the nation’s system of distributing and
selling public lands.

The issue remained basically the

same: how could western lands best be sold to provide funds
to retire at least some of the national debt but also
provide for inexpensive settlement by farmers?
With a bill before Congress proposing a land office
for selling lands northwest of the Ohio River, DemocraticRepublican Robert Rutherford of Virginia spoke before the
House of Representatives on February 15, 1796, striking a
76
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Jeffersonian (and anti-Hamiltonian) tone in calling land
speculation a “hydra” that had “done the country great
harm.”

He called speculators “monsters” and feared that

those in Europe were ready to join those in the United
States to establish a land monopoly.

He continued, “This

tract of country should be disposed of to real settlers,
industrious, respectable persons, who are ready to pay a
reasonable price for it, and not sold to persons who have
no other view than engrossing riches.”77

Rutherford was

vehemently opposed to the proposed bill, which he felt
would line the pockets of the hated speculators and do
little for those who wished to settle western lands.

He

concluded by stating that he loved his country and all
honest men and hoped the proposed bill would fail to pass.78
On February 17, Democratic-Republican Albert Gallatin
of Pennsylvania spoke at length on the proposed bill.

He

made clear that in his mind, no issue was of greater
importance to the nation than the eradication of the public
debt, and no group would gain more from retiring the debt
than the country’s poor.

It was possible, he stated, to

pay off the entire debt within ten years, but in order to
do so the country must raise revenue from land sales.
77
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Gallatin, then, speculators, distasteful as they might be,
had a role to play, and some large land tracts must be sold
to them.

“If the whole were to be divided into small

tracts,” he stated, “persons would choose here and there,
and prevent men of property from purchasing large tracts
lying together.”79

To counter domination by speculators and

opposition from some of his Congressional colleagues,
Gallatin also proposed that smaller tracts be available for
those with little or no money to spend on land.

The

majority with no capital could buy on credit from those
that had it.

He recommended that half of the land affected

by the proposed bill be sold by townships; the other half
was to be sold in 640-acre sections.

Though Gallatin

considered himself a friend of small settlers, he advocated
a land price of $2.00 per acre, in contrast to the 30 cents
per acre recommended in Hamilton’s 1790 report.

Gallatin

appears to have worried incessantly about paying off the
federal debt.
Debate on the bill continued, and on March 3,
Federalist John Williams of New York suggested a settlement
clause be placed into land sale contracts requiring that at
least one settler be located on every quarter-section
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purchased within two years of the sale.
eventually failed.)

(This amendment

Gallatin advocated this clause, though

he conceded that it would likely reduce the number of sales
made to speculators.

Gallatin now seemed to favor the

government absorbing speculative profits on its own rather
than having them go to the speculators themselves, and the
easiest way to accomplish this was for the government to
sell more land directly to settlers.

Gallatin’s earlier

support for a minimum price of $2.00 per acre was sure to
make this difficult, and Gallatin’s reversal is difficult
to fully understand.

As Paul Wallace Gates noted,

“Gallatin seemed to be on all sides of the issues revolving
around speculators and settlers.”80

Perhaps Gallatin’s

change of heart in favor of reducing speculation may have
reflected pure political pragmatism since James Madison,
then a Virginia representative and an acolyte of Thomas
Jefferson, was one of those in Congress who agreed with
Gallatin’s revised stance.

Gallatin and Madison began to

work closely together on a number of issues, and when
Jefferson became president in 1801, he brought both into
his cabinet.
During the 1796 debate, House members favoring making
land available in smaller tracts tended to be those from
80
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states and specific districts closest to the actual
frontier, including such districts in Kentucky, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and New York.81 One powerful
opponent, however, was Federalist William Cooper of New
York, who owned vast tracts of land in his state and had
spent years in the land business.

Cooper argued against

distributing land in small tracts, since “…in the States of
Pennsylvania and New York, where, though land was sold in
small plots, there were not twenty instances of farmers
buying it.”82 The “moneyed men,” as Cooper called them—
speculators—always bought the land and then sold it to the
small farmers.

Cooper insisted that poor men never

attended land sales at which he had been present, so he
found the idea of Congress debating over dividing land and
selling it to small farmers to be a waste of time.
Senate records record little debate about this
proposed land bill, which passed on May 18, 1796.

The

final version created the position of Surveyor General and
a surveying corps.

The rectangular survey system was

retained; half of the available townships were to be
divided into sections of 640 acres and sold in tracts of
that size, while the other half of townships were left
81
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undivided to be sold in quarters.

The bill established the

two-dollars-per-acre price, of which one-twentieth was to
be paid in cash at the time of sale.

Thirty days of credit

was extended for the balance of the first half; the
purchaser was permitted one year of credit on the second
half.83
By 1800, it was clear this bill was a failure.
sales had been made by settlers or speculators.

Few

Less than

50,000 acres had been sold over the course of four years,
and in 1800 Congress realized that it had to again reassess
the nation’s system of distributing public lands.

Another

bill, commonly called “Harrison’s frontier bill” after Ohio
Congressional delegate William Henry Harrison, its main
sponsor, passed in 1800 but also did little to increase
sales.

It also lacked a preemption measure, which was of

great importance to many in the West.

The law retained the

price of two dollars per acre.84
Those hoping for cheap western lands for farming must
surely have rejoiced when Thomas Jefferson won the
presidency in 1800.

In his first inaugural address,

Jefferson promised a “wise and frugal government” that
would not “take from the mouth of labor the bread it has
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earned” and would undertake the “encouragement of
agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid.”85
Jefferson’s presidency would prove to be an important
one for the history and expansion of the West for one major
reason: the Louisiana Purchase.

Jefferson knew that in

order to ensure free American navigation of the Mississippi
River the United States must acquire the city of New
Orleans.

At the same time, he worried over reports that

Spain was considering retrocession of the Louisiana
Territory back to Napoleon Bonaparte’s France, a
possibility Jefferson called “…an inauspicious circumstance
to us.”86

The Spanish empire had long been in decline and

viewed Louisiana as an expensive liability.

Napoleon

coveted the massive territory as a place to reassert a
major French presence in North America.

“There is on the

globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our
natural and habitual enemy,” Jefferson wrote to Robert
Livingston, his emissary in France.

“It is New Orleans.”87

Though himself a strong Francophile, Jefferson feared
a French presence on the North American continent and knew
that such a presence would force him to ally the United
85
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States with England.

“The day that France takes possession

of N. Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her
forever within her low water mark,” he continued to
Livingston.

“From that moment we must marry ourselves to

the British fleet and nation.”

Acquiring New Orleans,

“through which three eighths of our territory must pass to
market” became imperative.88

If he could do that, as well

as acquire the Floridas, which he mistakenly believed the
French controlled, he could at least temporarily avoid the
need for the alliance with Britain.89
Something had to be done.

Westerners, whom Jefferson

admired and who returned that admiration with political
support, worried about their lands and the commerce down
the Mississippi.

Jefferson also worried that Federalists

in Congress would soon clamor for an ill-advised war with
France.

War with Spain seemed a possibility as well,

especially after the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans
closed the right of deposit there in October 1802 in what
was likely an attempt to halt American smuggling.90
In January 1803, Jefferson sent James Monroe to France
to work with Livingston and convince Bonaparte to sell New
Orleans.
88
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governor of Virginia and was immensely popular with
westerners, whose rights, including the free navigation of
the Mississippi and inexpensive access to farmland, he had
long championed.

Westerners were by and large not fond of

Robert Livingston, a New York native, so Jefferson likely
sought to reassure those in the West that he had their
interests in mind by appointing Monroe.

The appointment of

Monroe was approved by Congress on January 13, 1803, though
it would be three months until he set foot in Paris.91

For

his part, Livingston resented Monroe’s appointment and
presence.
Unknown to the American negotiators, Napoleon had
already given up on his dream of reestablishing France in
North America.

His expedition in St. Domingue (now Haiti)

was a disaster due to the generalship of the rebel leader
Toussaint L’Ouverture and the tropical diseases that
ravaged his army’s ranks.
there of yellow fever.

His own brother-in-law had died

These setbacks led Bonaparte to

believe that he should abandon Louisiana, which he now
expected eventually to lose to the British, whose navy had
twenty ships in the Gulf of Mexico.

Better to sell it to

the United States than allow the English to have it.
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only ask of me one town in Louisiana,” he told several of
his advisors, “but I already consider the colony as
entirely lost.”92

The next morning, he summoned his

minister of finance, Francois Barbe-Marbois, and told him,
“I renounce Louisiana….I renounce it with the greatest
regret.

To attempt obstinately to retain it would be

folly.”93

Bonaparte directed Barbe-Marbois to immediately

begin negotiations with Livingston for the purchase of all
Louisiana.

He wanted fifty million francs for it.

That same morning, April 11, Livingston was called to
the home of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the French
minister of foreign relations with whom he had discussed
the New Orleans situation for months.

Livingston wrote to

James Madison later that day, “M. Talleyrand asked me this
day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have
the whole of Louisiana.”

Livingston was shocked, of

course, but also aware that he had no authority from
Jefferson or Congress to negotiate for the entire Louisiana
Territory.

Livingston reported, “I told him no; that our

wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas….He
said that if they gave New Orleans the rest would be of
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little value.”94

Over the next few days, Livingston began

to realize the value of the offer.

Soon he, Monroe,

Talleyrand, and Barbe-Marbois defined the general outline
of the purchase.

The final price was 80 million francs,

which included money to settle certain French debts.
The purchase treaty’s third article stated that the
inhabitants of Louisiana would be incorporated into the
American Union as citizens as quickly as allowed by the
Constitution, “and in the mean time they shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and the Religion which they profess.”
This article could have been written by Thomas Jefferson
himself, since it included elements of both his 1785 plan
for western government (that all states enter the Union as
equals) and the Declaration of Independence.

The treaty

was dated April 30, 1803; two months passed before anyone
in the United States, including Jefferson, knew of it.

In

a July 5 letter to his son-in-law, Jefferson lauded the
treaty:

“This removes from us the greatest source of

danger to our peace.”

Of the size of the purchase, he

wrote, “It is something larger than the whole U.S.,
probably containing 500 millions of acres, the U.S.
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containing 434 millions.”95
529 million acres.

The purchase actually contained

The price was $15 million, though by

the time all interest was paid that figure increased to
$23.5 million, or about four cents per acre.96
Even Jefferson’s old adversary, Alexander Hamilton,
thought the Louisiana Purchase a mostly positive
occurrence.

However, he was loath to give Jefferson any

credit for it.

In a July 5, 1803 editorial in the New-York

Evening Post, he credited the climate of St. Domingue for
defeating Bonaparte’s army there and forcing him to rid
himself of Louisiana.

“The real truth is,” wrote Hamilton,

“Bonaparte found himself absolutely compelled by situation,
to relinquish his darling plan of colonizing the banks of
the Mississippi.”

Just to reinforce his point that

Jefferson had little to do with the successful purchase, he
added, “…the Government of the United States, by the
unforeseen operation of events, gained what the feebleness
and pusillanimity of its miserable system of measures could
never have acquired.”

Hamilton also argued that New

Orleans alone would have been plenty, since Louisiana was
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“…not valuable to the United States for settlement.”97

How

wrong he was about that. The Louisiana Territory contained
the lands that eventually made up all or part of fifteen
American states containing millions of acres of land for
settlement and, perhaps most important to Jefferson and his
followers, cultivation.

Jefferson now had territory across

which he could spread his so-called empire of liberty.

On November 25, 1803, the legislators of Mississippi
Territory submitted a memorial to Congress on the subject
of land settlement in their territory.

They argued that

many who might come to Mississippi could not afford to pay
the two dollars per acre the government currently charged
for land there and that settlement was therefore greatly
retarded.

To rectify the situation, they suggested that

Congress should, instead of selling the lands, “…grant them
in small tracts to actual settlers, who should continue to
live on, and cultivate the same for five successive years.”
The Mississippians asked for this provision only for three
years in order to “accelerate the settlement and ensure the
prosperity of the territory.”98

This was one of the

earliest proposals for the free distribution of land by the
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U.S. government.

Though it would take another six decades

to germinate, the seeds of the Homestead Act had been
planted.
Over the next 15-20 years, the federal government
experimented with various systems of land distribution,
including credit and cash sales.

During much of this

period, sectional differences toward the administration of
the public domain were quite pronounced.

Northerners

generally favored higher prices for western lands and
slower settlement of them.

Those favoring this system

sought to raise revenue for the national government but
also prevent too many workers—mainly young people and
recent immigrants—from abandoning the North all at once.
Many Southerners, however, wanted to limit the
government’s power and maintain a political balance with
the North.

Cheap western land prices that siphoned off

northerners to the West helped them accomplish these goals,
so the South was happy to support low land prices that
encouraged western migration.

This all changed, however,

with the 1819-1821 Missouri controversy.

From that point

forward, western land distribution became forever entwined
with the political debate over the western expansion of
slavery.
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The United States acquired what became the territory
and eventually the state of Missouri via the 1803 Louisiana
Purchase.

Slavery existed in the Louisiana Territory

during its ownership by both the Spanish and French, and
the United States government agreed in the purchase treaty
to protect Louisianans’ free enjoyment of liberty,
property, and religion.
included slaves.

Most assumed that “property”

When Missourians initially requested

permission to begin the process of joining the Union, in
April 1818, their petition to Congress said nothing of
slavery.

Most likely, they saw no need to mention it:

slaves made up one sixth of the territory’s population of
66,000.99

Most assumed that slavery would continue to exist

and prosper in Missouri, and there was little reason to
believe that it would not.
Representative Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire,
however, threw up an unexpected roadblock.

On the very day

the Missouri petition was reported, he proposed in the
House a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery in any
future states admitted to the Union.
Missouri.

This would include

“The resolution was read,” according to the

Annals of Congress, “and, on the question of proceeding to
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its consideration, it was decided in the negative.”100

The

issue lay dormant for the next seven months.
In November 1818, a resolution for the admission of
Illinois as a state was presented to Congress.
Representative James Tallmadge, Jr., of New York spoke
against it on the grounds that the Illinois constitution
was not sufficiently anti-slavery: “The principle of
slavery, if not adopted in the constitution, was at least
not sufficiently prohibited.”

Tallmadge argued that the

1787 Northwest Ordinance forbade slavery from the area now
known as Illinois and referred to the Indiana constitution
“to show how carefully and scrupulously it had guarded
against slavery in any shape, and in the strongest terms
reprobated it.”101

With their insistence on legislating

anti-slavery, Livermore and Tallmadge laid the groundwork
for the controversy over Missouri’s admission.
Speaker of the House Henry Clay presented to the House
a resolution from the Legislative Council and House of
Representatives of Missouri on December 18, 1818.

The

Missourians sought permission to adopt a constitution and
form a state government.

In February 1819, when the House

began debate on bills to enable Missouri and Alabama to
100
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form state governments, Tallmadge struck again.

He moved

that the bill to admit Missouri include a provision
stipulating that “the further introduction of slavery or
involuntary servitude be prohibited…and that all children
of slaves, born within the said state, shall be free” upon
reaching twenty-five years of age.102

Enraged at efforts to

legislate emancipation, Georgia Representative Thomas W.
Cobb thundered at Tallmadge, “If you persist, the Union
will be dissolved.

You have kindled a fire which all the

waters of the ocean cannot put out, which seas of blood can
only extinguish.”

Tallmadge replied, “Sir, if a

dissolution of the Union must take place, let it be so!

If

civil war, which gentlemen so much threaten, must come, I
can only say, let it come!”103

Tallmadge’s proposed

amendment ignited the Missouri controversy that consumed
Congress for the next two years.
The real issue over Missouri was not slavery in that
state or any other, but rather whether or not Congress
could prohibit slavery in certain territories.

After more

than a year of debate and suggestions of compromise,
members of Congress agreed that it could.

By restricting

slavery to areas below the 36 degrees, 30 minutes line
102
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(excluding Missouri itself) Congress took an unprecedented
step and allowed itself to determine where slavery could
and could not exist.

Though the Compromise held for over

three decades, it also completely changed the North-South
dynamic in Congress.
Prior to the Missouri controversy, American politics
were dominated by the party system of Federalists and
Republicans.

However, Federalists all but collapsed after

the War of 1812 and were basically extinct by the time
Missouri attempted to enter the Union with slavery.

As

historian Robert Pierce Forbes noted, “The Missouri
controversy marked the end of the old Jeffersonian
alliances created to fight the centralizing and repressive
tendencies of the Federalists.”104

The desire to combat

Federalism had produced strange and often uneasy Republican
alliances between southern agriculturalists and northern
industrialists, artisans, and small farmers.

The Missouri

controversy ended these alliances, and the South knew it.
Southern Republicans complained that without the
Federalist threat to unite them, their northern colleagues
were more than happy to abandon them over the slavery
issue.
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slavery, so vital to their economic and social structures,
was now under attack.

Shrinking and limiting the power of

the government was the only way to make it less threatening
to the slave system.

If that meant opposing measures like

roads and canals that would benefit the people and commerce
of the nation, so be it.

“If Congress can make canals,”

said North Carolina’s Nathaniel Macon, “they can with more
propriety emancipate.”105

Historian Don Fehrenbacher noted

that after 1820, “It became increasingly difficult for a
defender of slavery to support the expansion of federal
power.

John C. Calhoun managed to do so for just a few

more years.”106

Another historian, George Dangerfield, put

it even more simply: “In a sense, the Tallmadge Amendment,
with its train of town-meetings, pamphlets, editorials, and
debates, summoned the South into being.”107

Sectional

differences, both between ordinary citizens and members of
Congress, increased in frequency and ferocity after the
Missouri controversy.
Thomas Jefferson, nearly eighty and long retired at
Monticello, weighed in on the unpleasantness over Missouri.
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He wrote to Maine Representative John Holmes on April 22,
1820:
But this momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night,
awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at
once as the knell of the Union….But this is a reprieve only,
not a final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with
a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and
held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and
deeper…. I regret to say that I am now to die in the belief,
that the useless sacrifice of themselves by the generation
of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness to their
country, is to be thrown away by the unwise and unworthy
passions of their sons, and that my only consolation is to
be, that I live not to weep over it.108

The expansion and limitation of slavery were destined
to be the preeminent, but not the only, political issue of
the next forty years.

Politicians, speculators, poor

farmers, immigrants, and others continued to argue and
debate the best ways for the government to distribute
public lands (if at all).

The geographic line between

slave and free territories established by the Missouri
Compromise was critical to these debates, as was the new
post-Missouri political reality.

From this point on, few

southerners supported the government distributing public
lands in small tracts cheaply or freely because they knew
that many who claimed it would take lands north of the
Missouri Compromise line, build up populations, and
eventually attain statehood.
108
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feared, it would be far outnumbered in Congress, and surely
the North would then set it sights on emancipation.
free homestead bill could be allowed to pass.

No

Better to

leave the West unpopulated and barren than permit free soil
settlers into it.

This remained the policy of many

southern politicians for the next forty years, and for that
entire period they succeeded in blocking passage of several
free land bills that came before them.

In the meantime,

the Second Party System arose, and issues of land and
improvements continued to be of great importance.

The period between the Constitutional Convention and
the Missouri Compromise was an important one in the history
of American land policy and the march toward the Homestead
Act.

It was during this period that the nation more than

doubled in size via the Louisiana Purchase; millions of
homesteads would eventually be claimed throughout the more
than 800,000 square miles of the Purchase.

Hamilton and

Jefferson became arch enemies during this period as well,
and at least part of their animosity toward one another
came from their differing philosophies on how best to
manage and distribute the public domain.

With the Missouri

Compromise, land distribution became forever linked with
the expansion of slavery.

If the Missouri controversy did,
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as Dangerfield claimed, “summon the South into being,” then
land distribution and, eventually, the push for a homestead
bill can be definitively identified as an important source
of sectional tension for the next forty years and a major
cause of the Civil War.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NATIONAL HOMESTEADING DEBATE EMERGES

As the 1820s began, Jefferson’s old Republican Party
had succeeded in ousting the Federalists from power and
becoming the nation’s only truly national party.

However,

despite this period being labeled “the Era of Good
Feelings,” factionalism and sectionalism in Congress had
never been more pronounced. Disagreements over land
policies and distribution played major roles in producing
and prolonging these conflicts.

Though the recently

reelected President James Monroe extolled “the prosperous
and happy condition of our country,”109 in 1820 definite
battle lines were being drawn over a number of issues
important to the future of federal land policies.
Hamiltonian attitudes regarding several land-related
issues made a brief comeback in the 1820s, mainly in the
form of Henry Clay’s so-called American System of internal
improvements.

Clay and his Whig allies sought to build up

manufacturing interests and create a home market for the
agricultural products of the South and the burgeoning West.
One important aspect of this system was a protective tariff
to shield manufacturers from foreign competition, and one
109
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passed Congress in 1824.

The passage of this tariff and

the beliefs and influence of notable political figures like
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams gave credence to the
rising strength of Hamiltonian forces.

Adams viewed the

public domain as a great national resource from which
profits should flow for the benefit and education of
Americans.

Elected as president, he noted in his First

Annual Message to Congress in 1825 that “The purchasers of
public lands are among the most useful of our fellow
citizens….The tide of wealth with which they replenish the
common Treasury may be made to reflow in unfailing streams
of improvement from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.”110
Adams’s belief that proceeds from the sale of public lands
should be distributed among the states for educational
purposes found support in state legislatures, especially in
the eastern states that expected to receive the largest
shares.
Adams also believed, however, that lands in the West
should be distributed without causing any economic injury
to the real estate and manufacturing interests of the East.
“The bee that robs the hive of his neighbor,” he stated,
“becomes idle and improvident—and is never known to profit
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even by the flowers in his own garden, and the outrage
usually results in the death of the robber and the
robbed.”111

Here Adams demonstrated that he and his allies

wished to make maximum profits from western land sales but
use those profits to benefit the manufacturing interests of
the East.

This angered those in the West who believed that

any profits from selling land in their region should be
used to benefit their own agricultural interests, not
eastern capitalists.

Adams’s stance also angered the

South, which received no real benefit from the high
protective tariff Adams and his allies supported.

With no

major manufacturing interests to speak of, the South bore
the burden of the protective tariff without receiving any
advantages from it.

During the argument over the tariff

that eventually passed in 1824, Virginia Representative
John Randolph angrily exclaimed, “If…you draw the last
shilling from our pockets, what are the checks of the
Constitution to us?

When the scorpion’s sting is probing

us to the quick, shall we stop to chop logic?”112
Many from the South and West agreed with Randolph, and
a powerful alliance of those two regions arose to oppose
Adams, Henry Clay, and the political faction of Republicans
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that eventually became known as Whigs.

This alliance

organized itself during Adams’s presidency and eventually
became the new Democratic Party.

Andrew Jackson became the

Democrats’ first national hero, based largely on his
standing as a popular military commander and his 1824
electoral defeat at the hands of John Quincy Adams despite
Jackson’s victory in the popular vote.

Agricultural

interests and disagreements over federal land policies
played a major role in the rise of Jacksonian democracy and
the short-lived return of Hamiltonian policies championed
by Adams and Clay.

In the long and constant struggle over the direction
of federal land policies, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of
Missouri became one of Congress’s foremost authorities on
and advocates for liberal land distribution.

He was highly

regarded by his colleagues and his constituents, and he
spoke on western issues as a westerner who understood and
represented his region’s economic and social interests.
While the controversial tariff was debated in Congress
in 1824, Benton proposed a bill calling for graduation in
the price of land.

He thought it unfair that $1.25 per

acre was the set price for the purchase of any acre of the
public domain, regardless of the land’s quality.

“It is
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unjust to the people,” he said, “because it prevents them
from getting the inferior land at a fair price; unjust to
the states, because it checks their population and deprives
them of their right of taxation; unjust to the nation,
because it prevents the public treasury from receiving the
money which such land is worth and for which it would
sell.”113

Benton’s bill established 50 cents per acre as a

minimum price for poorer lands and gave away the worst
lands to people willing to live on and cultivate them.
Though the bill received little attention amidst the
furious tariff debate, it was notable for establishing in
Congress the possibility of distributing public land for
free.
In the four years between 1824 and 1828, the South and
West brought forward several measures to counter President
Adams’s proposal to distribute profits from land sales
among states for education and internal improvements.
These proposed measures included graduation, donation, and
preemption (giving “squatter’s rights” to those living on
land they did not own).

All of these ideas greatly

concerned the conservatives of the North and East.

Adams

recorded in his diary on December 31, 1828 that he had
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spoken with Henry Clay, who expressed “great concern…[over]
the prospects of the country—the threats of disunion from
the South, and the graspings after all public lands, which
are disclosing themselves in the Western States.”114
Eastern newspapers published editorials lamenting
Congress’s agrarian tendencies and the perceived rush to
distribute public lands.

The Canal of Intelligence of

Norwich, Connecticut, called for “a little Yankee
management” of the situation, adding that the government
should “make fair bargains, give credit only where payment
can be reasonably expected, and then hold the parties to
strict accountability.”115
Some in the East agreed with agrarian sentiments,
however.

A major labor newspaper, The Mechanics’ Free

Press, implored Congress to make all public lands
immediately available to the people by right of a title of
occupancy only.

“The present state of affairs must lead to

the wealth of the few,” an editorial read.

“All men have a

natural right to the soil, else they will be deprived of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”116
Despite the East’s misgivings about agrarianism and
the West’s growing political influence, the alliance
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between the South and West made possible the rise of the
new Democratic Party.

This party elected Andrew Jackson

president in 1828, and the East had no choice but to
recognize the importance of the West.

By 1830, when

approximately one-third of Americans were westerners, their
priorities increasingly shaped the nation’s agenda.

The

region’s population and influence were growing, and its
residents’ opinions about land distribution and agrarianism
could no longer be ignored or denigrated by the politicians
of the East.

In the words of historian Frederick Jackson

Turner, Jackson’s 1828 electoral victory and the rise of
the new Democrats “meant that an agricultural society,
strongest in the regions of rural isolation…, had triumphed
for the moment over the conservative, industrial,
commercial, and manufacturing society of the New England
type….

A new, aggressive, expansive democracy…had come

into control.”117
Issues of land availability and distribution were
necessarily important to the West, which had no major
manufacturing interests but possessed great agricultural
potential and the ability to accommodate countless new
settlers.
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public domain made available for settlement and cultivation
had reason to expect that the newly-elected Jackson would
look favorably upon them.

As Thomas Hart Benton stated,

“The manufacturers want poor people to do the work for
small wages; these poor people wish to go to the West and
get land; to have flocks and herds—to have their own
fields, orchards, gardens, and meadows—their own cribs,
barns, and dairies, and to start their children on a
theater where they can contend with equal chances for the
honors and dignities of the country.”118
Many Southerners recognized that both the South and
West opposed the economic policies of the East, albeit for
different reasons.

Westerners desired low prices and

liberal access to public lands for the purposes of
settlement and cultivation.

Southerners wanted a low

tariff, opposed by many easterners because it meant
increased foreign competition and a likely reduction in
profits.

Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina

recognized these differing motivations and suggested that
the South and West work together based on their common
enmity toward the East.

Though such a partnership would

become inconceivable later as the spread of slavery into
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the West became the South’s main concern regarding public
lands, that aspect of sectionalism was not yet fully
ingrained into the minds of most in the South or the West.
Ultimately, Hayne’s proposed partnership between
southerners and westerners accomplished little besides
infuriating politicians of the North and East, including
Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts.

In an attempt to

defend New England’s position, Webster answered many of
Hayne’s statements in a long Senate debate that captivated
many but produced no real solution.

Benton’s graduation

bill passed the Senate in May 1830 but was allowed to die
in the House of Representatives.
East voted against it.

Every senator from the

Though the West-South partnership

succeeded in pushing it through the Senate, it was not
strong enough to ensure the bill’s passage.

Removal of American Indians from western lands was
another critical land issue on which those living in the
West demanded action.

This was also an issue in some

southern states and therefore represented another
opportunity for partnership between those two sections.
Being of both the West and the South and a former Indian
fighter to boot, Andrew Jackson sought to quickly and
decisively remove Indians from lands on which they had
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lived for generations but, in his mind, would better serve
white American farmers.

Many in Georgia, the Carolinas,

Florida, Alabama, and even Illinois implored Jackson to
act.

They had waited for years for federal lawmakers to

deal with their perceived “Indian problems,” and they
sensed an opportunity with Jackson in the White House.
With many states, especially Illinois, threatening to
deal directly with removal of natives, Jackson became
convinced that something must be done immediately.

He

noted in his Annual Message to Congress in December 1829
that federal policies toward natives had largely failed.
Indians making way for whites by heading to new lands
“should be voluntary,” he stated, “for it would be as cruel
as unjust to compel the aborigines to abandon the graves of
their fathers and seek a home in a distant land.

But they

should be distinctly informed that if they remain within
the limits of the states they must be subject to their
laws.”119
Jackson’s administration offered Indians no real
opportunity to remain “within the limits of the states.”
Forcible removal became the federal government’s policy,
and it was largely accomplished by the mid-1830s.
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areas between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River and
eastern Iowa were cleared of Indian title, resulting in
millions of acres of land suddenly opened to settlers and
the creation of Iowa and Wisconsin Territories.

Countless

acres in several southern states were cleared of natives
and opened to white farmers as well.

The West and South

considered Indian removal a major victory and the
accomplishment of a goal both had long sought.

For the

Indians, of course, it was another in a long line of
travesties at the hands of the U.S. government.

The new

“Indian frontier” in the far west (much but not all of it
in what is now Oklahoma) was supposed to be permanent, but
one wonders how many of those removed truly believed that
the United States would honor its promise to leave them
alone “as long as the grass shall grow and rivers flow.”
Once the removal of Indians was considered complete, strong
demand arose for rapid surveys of the newly acquired lands
so that they might be opened for immediate settlement.

In March 1832, while Indian removal was still ongoing,
public land policy came to a head in Congress.

Western and

southern allies in the Senate referred measures on tariffs
and public lands to the Committee on Manufactures, chaired
by Henry Clay.

Their goal was to secure a reduction in the
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price of public lands.

Clay was immediately suspicious:

“A majority of the Senate referred a resolution concerning
public lands to the Committee of Manufactures!

Can you

conceive a more incongruous association of subjects?”

Clay

suspected that he was being set up and that this move by
his opponents “was to affect me personally by placing me in
a situation in which I must report unfavorably to the
western and southwestern states which are desirous of
possessing themselves of the public lands.”120

If his

enemies could not accomplish their goals through
legislation, they would try to shame Clay into giving them
what they wanted.
Clay did not take the bait.

His committee reported

that a price reduction was not advisable and that the
current pace of land sales proved that the price of public
land was not prohibitively high.

To reduce prices would

only result in acquisition of more land by speculators,
which would be no help to those hoping to settle in the
West. He called for a system of distribution of land
revenues among the states according to their number of
representatives in Congress.

The states would be free to

apply this money to education, internal improvements, debt
reduction, or other purposes.
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Thomas Hart Benton was outraged and became convinced
that Clay and his allies cared only for increasing the
federal government’s power over the individual states.
Benton and his Committee on Public Lands immediately
challenged Clay’s findings and objected to the Committee on
Manufactures’ right even to examine questions dealing with
the public domain.

(On this point, Benton might have

actually agreed with Clay, who wondered the same thing.)
Benton argued for a reduction in public land prices in
order to make more land accessible to more settlers.

The

public domain, he argued, should be used as a means of
building up individuals and communities, not a source of
revenue to the federal government or the individual states.
Andrew Jackson finally weighed in on this controversy
in his December 1832 Annual Message to Congress.

“The

wealth and strength of a country,” he wrote, “are its
population, and the best part of that population are the
cultivators of the soil.

Independent farmers are

everywhere the basis of society and the true friends of
liberty.”

Jackson went on to state that he believed that

the public domain should cease to be a revenue source for
the government and that residents of the West had paid more
than their fair share of taxes and land fees for which they
had thus far received little in return.

Jackson also
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reiterated his opposition to any federal funding for
internal improvements.121
Despite Jackson’s message, Clay’s distribution bill
passed the Senate in December and eventually passed the
House of Representatives as well.

Jackson pocket vetoed it

on the grounds that distribution in reality equaled federal
funding for internal improvements, no matter how indirectly
it proponents wished to characterize it.122

Clay called

Jackson’s veto unconstitutional and offered his opinion
that the president had “despotically” pocket vetoed the
measure.123

About five weeks after Martin Van Buren became the
eighth president, every bank in New York City stopped
specie payments, and the Panic of 1837 ensued.

Whigs were

quick to blame Jacksonian policies such as the denial of
re-chartering the Bank of the United States.

“The Hero of

the Hermitage,” wrote Clay, “has lived to hear himself
cursed as bitterly and as lowdly [sic] as any of his Class
of whom History treats.”124
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to Washington for a special session to deal with the
nation’s financial difficulties.
The panic was particularly felt in the West, where
banks crashed and the few ongoing internal improvement
projects ceased.

Several state legislatures passed laws

increasing taxes on lands, which caused many speculators to
sell quickly and cheaply.

In this way, settlers may have

actually benefitted from the nation’s financial chaos by
having an abundance of cheap lands made suddenly available.
Most of the settlers who acquired land at this time were
already in the West.

Despite the opinions of Horace

Greeley and others that the panic would actually spur
migration to the West, very few easterners could afford to
buy transportation there or, once arrived, the necessary
equipment and implements to establish a farm.
In Congress, the panic led to more sectional battles
about land distribution.

Thomas Hart Benton reintroduced

his graduation bill to reduce the price of public lands
proportional to how long they had been on the market.

Clay

opposed this, fearing it would drive land values down even
further.

Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina

presented a plan under which all federal land laws would
remain unchanged, the federal government would receive 12.5
percent of the proceeds of all state land sales, and all
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states would be required to receive congressional approval
before lowering the prices of their lands.

None of these

plans went anywhere in Congress.
Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi introduced a
preemption bill before the Senate on January 25, 1838.

He

argued that allowing preemption for actual settlers on
public lands would serve to increase the value of other
unsold property.

The bill was designed to “confine the

settler to the space he occupies, giving him preference in
the purchase, at the Government price, over the
speculator.”125 Providing this right to those living on
lands to which they had no legal title would add value to
nearby lands because, Walker said, “It is population in the
immediate neighborhood that gives value to the public
lands, which would otherwise bring little or nothing.”126
He decried the dishonest practices of speculators and
linked preemption with western expansion, stating, “God
grant they (settlers) may go on adding to this glorious
Republic State after State, until we have one long line of
States to the Pacific.”127
Walker’s bill disgusted Clay, who viewed preemption as
a reward for breaking the law.
125
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system is a violation of all law,” he told the Senate the
day after Walker introduced his bill, adding that the bill
was “an encouragement to persons to go on the public lands
and take the choicest portion of them.”128

Van Buren’s and

Benton’s support for the bill only made Clay’s opposition
more rigid and his belief that they were merely seeking
political popularity in the West more entrenched in his
mind.

Horace Greeley wrote in the June 23, 1838 issue of

The Jeffersonian that the preemption bill appeared to him
to be “calculated to set our western people hunting after
sudden fortunes in making a claim upon some choice tract of
land…instead of striving to improve their circumstances by
regular and patient industry.

It looks like a premium on

thriftlessness and gambling adventure.”129
The debate over preemption grew so contentious that
the Senate eventually dropped the Walker bill and elected
instead to concur in the passage of a watered-down version
that came out of the House of Representatives.

The passage

of this bill was an overwhelming victory for the Democrats;
even some western Whigs broke ranks and supported it.
Preemption continued to be debated for the next few years
in Congress, and everyone could see that western land
128
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issues would be of great importance in the upcoming 1840
presidential campaign.

In 1838, John C. Calhoun predicted

that the 1840 census would show the West had sufficient
population to control approximately five-twelfths of the
Electoral College.

If that were to be the case, according

to Calhoun, the candidate who best catered to the West
during the campaign would surely win the presidency.130
William Henry Harrison was that candidate.

The hero

of Tippecanoe was a former Democrat who had authored the
Land Bill of 1800, which had reduced the minimum amount of
land that could be purchased in the old Northwest, thereby
making more land available to more settlers.

Harrison

played to his western audience during the campaign by
reminding them of his role in devising the bill “which had
for its object to snatch from the grasp of speculation all
this glorious country which now teems with harvests under
the hands of honest, industrious, and virtuous
husbandmen.”131
Harrison portrayed himself as a hearty frontiersman
and his Democratic opponent, President Martin Van Buren, as
a wealthy eastern snob living richly at public expense.
Few were aware of Harrison’s own personal wealth; his “log
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cabin” image fascinated the public and helped him connect
with those suffering in the nation’s poor economy, which
the Whigs predictably and effectively blamed on Van Buren.
Harrison cruised to an electoral victory, proving the
validity of Calhoun’s earlier prediction about the growing
importance of the West.
In 1846, Representative Jacob Thompson of
Mississippi, during a speech on public lands issues,
explained Harrison’s appeal and the real reason for his
victory in 1840:
No one fact of circumstance had so powerful a control over
the minds of the great masses in the Mississippi Valley in
winning their affections to General Harrison as that he had
been a pioneer himself, a settler, in the western sense of
that term, had lived in a log cabin, and had favored all of
the laws which had tended to the protection and security of
the squatter. Here was the consideration which threw confusion into the ranks of the Democratic party. This was the
lever by which the Whig party raised themselves from a hopeless minority into an unexpected and triumphant majority.
The supposed sympathy of General Harrison, and the reputed
aversion of Van Buren for the poor man, for the humble citizen, is the true secret of the great and tremendous political
revolution of 1840.132

Thompson considered the 1840 election a “revolution”
because it represented what many believed would be the
culmination of two decades of sectional struggle over
public lands issues.

Conservative easterners tended to

look at the western states and territories as something
akin to colonies and treat them with paternalistic
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condescension.

They also preferred to view western lands

as sources of revenue for the national government.

Those

living in the West, however, wanted no part of a system
that viewed their region as good for little more than
raising money for the U.S. Treasury.

Land was the one

thing the West had in abundance, and westerners sought
legislation from Congress that would put that land into the
hands of settlers, not speculators.

Therefore, westerners

tended to favor enactment of a preemption system. Their
most vocal champion during the 1830s and 1840s was Thomas
Hart Benton.
Easterners, however, feared that preemption would
result in massive population losses for the old states if
young men and their families bolted for cheap western
lands.

These same easterners also feared the potential

agricultural power of the West, which could threaten the
farms and farm products of the Atlantic states.

They

tended to favor the distribution system, which disavowed
preemption, continued the sales of public land, and then
distributed the proceeds among all states according to the
numbers of their congressional representatives.

This was

Clay’s preferred system, and his support of it brought him
no small measure of grief from westerners.
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Many inhabitants of the West believed their moment had
arrived with the election of Harrison.

Land debates,

however, would only increase in frequency and intensity
during the decade.

Calhoun opposed Clay’s distribution

system because he feared it would mean the return of a high
tariff, always political anathema to the South and other
proponents of states’ rights.

Calhoun presciently foresaw

that the election of 1840 was not even close to the end of
the rancorous debates over distribution of public land.

“I

regard the question of public lands, next to that of the
currency, the most dangerous and difficult of all which
demand the attention of the country and government at this
important junction of our affairs,” he told the Senate on
January 12, 1841.133
President Harrison’s death after just one month in
office complicated land matters further.

Vice President

John Tyler of Virginia assumed office upon Harrison’s
death.

Like so many vice presidential candidates, Tyler

had been selected to provide geographic balance on the
ticket in 1840.

Neither Harrison nor anyone else expected

the former Democrat Tyler ever to occupy the White House.
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In fact, according to historian George M. Stephenson, “The
victory of the Whigs proved to be their undoing.”134
Tyler was an extreme proponent of states’ rights who
had little in common with Harrison and other northern Whigs
except opposition to Martin Van Buren.

He had been placed

on the ticket merely to appeal to those Whigs who had been
so horrified and frustrated by what they viewed as the
monarchical attitude of Andrew Jackson and his successor,
Van Buren.

Like Harrison, Tyler had said little about

public land issues during the campaign.

In fact, the Whig

party seemed to have no real plan for public lands. What
Harrison had said about them during his presidential run
had been geared specifically toward the audience he
addressed.

No one really knew what course Harrison would

pursue toward the public lands as president.

When he died

and Tyler assumed office, most said the same of Tyler.
Fellow Whig John Quincy Adams thus assessed Tyler’s fitness
for office and likely course of action: “Tyler is a
political sectarian, of the slave-driving, Virginian,
Jeffersonian school, principled against all improvement,
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with all the interests and passions and vices of slavery
rooted in his moral and political constitution.”135
When Tyler sent his first message to Congress and came
out in favor of distribution, most Democrats assumed that
Henry Clay—whom many referred to as the “Acting President”—
was calling the shots for Tyler.

Tyler, however, was not

so easily influenced by Clay, with whom he sometimes agreed
but just as often disagreed.
bills Clay supported.

Several times Tyler vetoed

When westerners again began to force

the issue of a stronger preemption bill, Clay naturally
assumed that the Congress’s Whig majority would follow his
lead and oppose it.
However, proponents wisely and shrewdly combined the
preemption bill with a distribution amendment, which
included a proviso that the distribution law would be
suspended when the rate of tariff duties was above twenty
percent.

Though westerners were the only group universally

pleased, Tyler signed the bill into law.

It provided

settlers the opportunity to purchase land on which they
lived without legal title before it was offered for public
sale.

The distribution provision stated that after

December 31, 1841, ten percent of the proceeds of public
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land sales in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Michigan would be
returned to those states.

The remainder of public land

proceeds (less the expenses of surveys and administration)
would be divided among the other states and territories
according to representation in Congress.136
In August 1842, both houses of Congress passed a
tariff measure raising the duties to about the twenty
percent level, effectively killing the distribution side of
the combined preemption-distribution bill.
preemption law remained active.

Hence, only the

This was a major and

somewhat unexpected victory for the West.

Under the 1841

preemption bill, an individual was free to move onto a
tract of surveyed public land up to 160 acres in size and
stake a claim that, so long as he paid the government
minimum price of $1.25 per acre, no one else could take or
purchase out from under him.

The preemptive settler had to

be at least twenty-one years old or, if younger, the head
of a family, and had to be either a U.S. citizen or have
filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen.

The

settler was not permitted to own more than 320 acres of
land in any state or territory.
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The Preemption Act of 1842 recognized four general
principles that later came to be associated with the
Homestead Act: settlement of the public domain was more
preferable than public lands generating revenue; Congress
intended that the benefits of the law apply to those who
had little or no land already; small farms were preferable
so that as many as possible could benefit from the law; and
settlers should be free from intrusion and have sufficient
time to gather the required sum to purchase the land (or,
later, make improvements to it).137
The Preemption Act did not, of course, end the debate
over land distribution.

If anything, it hardened the

resolve of politicians from various sections of the country
to either expand or destroy it.

The law was, however,

something of a victory for the West over the traditionally
conservative interests and political figures of the East.
It was, at the time, the most important, far-reaching land
law Congress had passed in the history of the country.
Almost immediately, though, westerners began to sense their
own power and began clamoring for more: specifically, a law
that would grant public land for free.
Shortly after the passage of the Preemption Act, many
easterners sensed and feared the West’s growing power and
137
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influence.

In an effort to check this development, some

Whigs attempted to bring back their distribution plan,
which had been automatically repealed in 1842 when the
tariff was raised above twenty percent.

New York Tribune

editor Horace Greeley, a loyal Whig, attempted to ensure
that the land issue would be at the forefront of the
upcoming 1844 presidential election.

In his words,

distribution was “a measure of strict justice to the
states, of relief to the impoverished and bankrupt, and of
encouragement to education and internal improvement.”

He

feared that the next Congress would “feel the influx of an
enormously increased proportion of Representatives of the
squatter interest, clamorous for spoliation of the Old
States altogether, by measures of graduation, loose
preemption, or direct cession of these lands.”138
Greeley also worried that “one year of prosperous
industry will lead to heavy purchases of public lands; then
comes an excessive revenue, next a reduction of the tariff
in the midst of good prices, next excessive importations
followed by derangement, bankruptcy and distress.
of American industry!

Stand by the land distribution!

is the sheer anchor of our safety!”139
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To Greeley and many
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other Whigs, going against distribution would clearly lead
to a slippery slope of moves that would eventually result
in the destruction of the American economy.

Democrats,

including Van Buren, believed that income from the public
domain would be better used for the benefit of the entire
nation if placed into the general treasury.

Southerners

naturally agreed with Van Buren since this would ensure a
lower tariff.
Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi introduced
another graduation bill in the Senate on December 11, 1843.
Walker had, in 1838, also proposed a preemption bill.

In

his 1843 measure, he sought to graduate the price of public
lands in order to aid settlers and cultivators, making
public land prices dependent upon the land’s quality rather
than making all land available at the same price per acre
regardless of its suitability for cultivation.

Still

hoping to make land policy a large issue for the 1844
campaign, Horace Greeley responded: “We must watch and foil
the demagogues who are incessantly trying to squander the
public lands by reducing their price….

The public lands

are the great regulator of the relations of Labor and
Capital, the safety valve of our industrial and social
engine; and woe to this people should they by any cheating
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pretense of favoring ‘poor settlers’ be alienated, or
suffered to be absorbed by the few.”140
Public land policy did not ultimately become a major
issue in the 1844 campaign, though western expansion did.
Perhaps most notably, Walker of Mississippi, nearly as
vocal an advocate for graduation as Thomas Hart Benton, was
named Secretary of the Treasury in the new James K. Polk
administration.

President Polk, a southern Democrat, was

also an outspoken supporter of reducing land prices.

In

his December 1845 message to Congress, he stated that, “By
adopting the policy of graduation and reduction of prices
these inferior lands will be sold for their real value,
while the States in which they lie will be freed from the
inconvenience, if not injustice, to which they are
subjected in consequence of the United States continuing to
own large quantities of the public lands within their
borders not liable to taxation for the support of their
local governments.”141
Horace Greeley responded in his newspaper’s pages.
“If ever there was a scheme,” he wrote of Polk’s stance on
graduation, “full of mischief and injustice, this is one.
It ought to be entitled ‘A bill to discourage and prevent
140
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all payment for the public lands, and enable speculators to
get them ultimately for a song.’”142

Greeley’s strong

stance against graduation or any price reduction on public
lands makes his eventual support for homesteading—giving
those lands away for no monetary cost—curious and subject
to charges of being either politically expedient or
politically brilliant.
As the population and political influence of the West
began to grow, the Whig view of the proper use of public
lands looked more and more unrealistic.

Jacob Thompson of

Mississippi pointed this out in a speech in the House of
Representatives on July 9, 1846.

He blasted the Whigs in

general and Henry Clay in particular.

Clay’s stance

“always lost him the vote of the new states, and it must
and will be the fate of all those who follow in his
footsteps.”

Easterners would “never learn that

distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public
lands among the States is an exploded, an ‘obsolete idea,’
condemned by the people, unauthorized by the Constitution,
and founded in injustice and a false economy.”

According

to Thompson, Clay’s boldness and eloquence should have won
him the loyalty of westerners, but his stands against
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preemption and for distribution made them “turn away with
odium and disgust.”143
Another graduation bill came before Congress in the
summer of 1846, passing the Senate by a party-line vote but
being tabled in the House of Representatives.

Greeley, for

one, saw the writing on the wall and finally seemed to
admit that the Whig view of the public lands would never
pass and had to change.
hope left.

There was, he stated, “but one

That rests on the principle of freedom of the

lands in small tracts (not over 160 acres) to actual
settlers only, each paying the sum adequate to the cost of
survey, etc. for the right of occupancy only… [and]
inalienable except by the free consent of the holder, and
not alienable then except to one who possesses no other
land.”144

In this passage, Greeley had not only outlined

the skeleton of the eventual Homestead Act but had
essentially challenged the Whigs to consider and adopt a
completely new way of thinking about the public lands.
real question was whether or not they would accept that
challenge.
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The mid-1840s through the end of that decade witnessed
a flurry of congressional activity on a number of homestead
measures.

Representative Felix McConnell of Alabama

presented a bill in March 1846, and Andrew Johnson of
Tennessee attempted to introduce another just three days
later.

Illinois Representative Orlando Ficklin presented a

bill that provided for homesteads of eighty acres and made
the land inalienable for debt for ten years.

To Greeley,

this was a positive step forward but one that did not go
far enough.

None of these bills went very far, and the

matter was temporarily shelved during the 1846-48 MexicanAmerican War.
During and especially after the war, those seeking
land reform turned their attention to the upcoming 1848
presidential campaign.

Many, including Greeley, were

disappointed in the candidates of both major parties.

The

Whig, General Zachary Taylor, was an avowed expansionist
who had played a major military role in acquiring vast new
territories during the recent war. Many feared the South
intended to attempt to populate those new territories with
pro-slavery settlers.

Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, the

Democratic nominee, had in the past speculated extensively
on land in the West.
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The Free Soil Party nominated former president Martin
Van Buren.

This pleased Greeley, despite that party’s

platform not containing a plank supporting homesteads.

“If

I could make Van Buren president tomorrow, I would,” wrote
Greeley.

“I do like the principles he now embodies—Free

Soil and Land Reform….

The Free Soil party is the only

live party around us.”

Greeley also pointed out, however,

that the Free Soilers, in their lack of stated support for
homesteading, “missed a great opportunity of drawing in a
large western vote.”145

Eventually, however, Greeley

returned to the Whigs, who needed his public and vocal
support in the pages of The New York Weekly Tribune.

He

likely realized privately that no third party had a real
chance of winning, and the Whigs made it hard for him not
to return to the fold when they nominated him to fill an
unexpired congressional term.

As the 1840s came to an end, vast economic and
industrial changes were taking place in America that would
eventually increase public support for the “free land”
idea.

Immigration, especially from Ireland and Germany,

provided a labor supply for eastern manufacturers.

The

growing factory system allowed for increased production and
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wider, more diverse markets.

Canals and railroads linked

together the East and West like never before.

All that

remained was to increase the number of farms and farmers in
order to maximize agricultural production, and the huge
expanses of the West presented the opportunity to do just
that.

“Every smoke that rises in the Great West marks a

new customer to the counting rooms and warehouses of New
York,” Greeley wrote in an effort to link western
agriculture to the economic success of the East.146

“Even

to those workers who will never migrate, free land at the
West would be a great and lasting benefit.”147

Finally,

Greeley appealed to his readers’ religious sensibilities,
quoting the book of Leviticus: “The land shall not be sold
forever; for the land is mine; for ye are strangers and
sojourners with me.”148

In other words, selling the land as

a mere commodity was not only bad policy, but also a sin.
Thanks to the Whigs who wanted The New York Weekly
Tribune on their side during the 1848 campaign, Greeley
became a member of Congress during the short session that
convened in December 1849.

He immediately announced his

intent to introduce a homestead bill, which he did, but the
bill went nowhere and died in February.
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brief tenure in office, this was the extent of Greeley’s
efforts to make homesteading a legislative priority for
Congress.
In the Senate, luminaries such as Stephen A. Douglas,
Sam Houston, and William Seward introduced their own bills
designed to distribute free land to citizens.

Even Daniel

Webster put forward a measure that pleased many, including
Greeley.

However, none of these came close to having the

support needed to pass.
In the House, Andrew Johnson, never able to get the
Committee on Public Lands to endorse his homesteading
vision, issued a report from his Committee on Public
Expenditures that seemed to do just that.

The House

refused to take up the measure, however, noting that it had
nothing to do with public expenditures.

He tried again on

February 25, 1850, reintroducing a homestead bill and again
seeing it referred to the Committee on Public Lands, which
meant the bill’s certain death.

He introduced it yet again

on June 4, and maneuvered it to the Committee on
Agriculture, which reported it favorably and thus allowed
it to be debated.

Still it went nowhere, facing opposition

from such old states as Virginia and Pennsylvania, whose
representatives argued that they had equal rights in the
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public domain that the bill all but forfeited to the newer
western states.149
Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin introduced a version
of the homestead bill in January 1852.

It was voted down,

which brought a strong rebuke from Greeley and The New York
Weekly Tribune: “Land Reform was slapped in the face…by
that illustrious body, the United States Senate, among whom
only seven members could be found to sustain Mr. Walker’s
proposition to give a quarter section to each landless
improver and occupier….Of course, after voting that the
settlers shouldn’t have land free, the Senate proceeded to
vote that the speculators in Bounty Warrants should go at
it with a perfect looseness henceforward.”150
Johnson was still undaunted, and in March 1852 his
homestead bill again passed through the Committee on
Agriculture and came up for debate on the House floor.
Among those speaking in support of his measure was Galusha
Grow of Pennsylvania, who stated that, “The two fundamental
rights of man are Life and Happiness….

For the only true

foundation of any right to property is man’s labor.

That

is property, and that alone which the labor of man has made
such.

What rights, then, can the Government have in the
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soil of a wild and uncultivated wilderness?”151

Grow was

emerging as an articulate and consistent pro-homesteading
voice.
Still, many old-state representatives continued to
oppose the homestead measure.

New York Democrat Josiah

Sutherland feared that the bill would “take labor from the
manufacturing states to the land states—from the
manufactories of the East to the farms of the West—and
thereby increase the cost of labor and the cost of
manufacturing.”152

Again Johnson answered, telling his

colleagues that opposing the bill based on Sutherland’s
arguments was essentially telling people, “Do not go away;
stay here in your poverty; do not go and settle upon the
new, rich, fertile lands of the West, but stay here,
linger, wither, and die in your poverty…where the only
inheritance you can leave to your children is your
poverty.”153
Fayette McMullen of Virginia summed up the concerns of
many from the North and East: “They fear that the laborers—
the manufacturing hands—will leave the manufacturing
districts and go to the West, and that, in consequence of
the diminution of laborers, the wages of labor will advance
151
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among them….

Sir, I say let these men go to the West, and

emigration invited from abroad to fill their places—the
foreigners will take their positions in the manufacturing
districts of the North.”154

Many of McMullen’s fellow

southerners still had reservations about the homesteading
idea, however, due to concerns that free land meant less
money for the treasury and a correspondingly higher tariff.
Richard Bowie of Maryland, a Whig, estimated that at least
one twenty-fifth of government revenue would disappear if
the homestead measure became law.155
The homestead measure passed the House in May 1952.
Historian Roy M. Robbins observed that, “The cleavage
between the old and new states was clearly portrayed, but
it is impossible to estimate the effect of the slavery
issue…since the South Atlantic States would be opposed to
free land on either basis.”156

For his part, Greeley noted

that more southerners voted for the bill than against it,
but Robbins raises an interesting question: “Should
Tennessee, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi be
classified at this time as ‘Southern’ or were they still
‘Western?’…
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failed to sense the rising alliance between the Upper
Mississippi Valley and the North Atlantic States.”157
This version of the bill, which came before the Senate
in August, was negatively reported by the Committee on
Public Lands.

Nothing was done.

In the next Congress,

debates over free land regularly drifted into arguments
over the questions related to Kansas and Nebraska.

As the 1850s progressed and sectional arguments over
slavery became more pronounced, there could be no doubt
that states like Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi
considered themselves “Southern.”

Sectionalism—old states

versus new, North against South—held sway over the
political debate on homesteading for decades.

As the years

advanced and the slavery issue became the nation’s primary
concern, the sections hardened their stances on the
distribution of free land.
The national debate on land distribution emerged in
the 1820s and was a major issue in Congress for the next
three decades.

The arguments shifted and matured over the

years, and as the nation’s politics moved toward civil war,
a new party, emerging from the ashes of the old Whigs,
embraced both the restriction of slavery and the
157
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implementation of homesteading.

The decades-long fight

over land distribution, then, can be said to be a prime
reason behind the creation of the Republican Party and,
eventually, the onset of the Civil War.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:
RISE OF THE REPUBLICANS
“The Republicans,” stated Carl Schurz in May 1860,
“stand before the country, not only as the anti-slavery
party, but emphatically as the party of free labor.”

A few

weeks later, Illinois Republican gubernatorial candidate
Richard Yates declared that, “The great idea and basis of
the Republican party…is free labor.…To make labor honorable
is the object and aim of the Republican party.”158
Republicans often made such lofty statements during
the party’s early days, regularly extolling the virtues of
free labor and free soil.

To Republicans, the best labor

was so-called “free labor,” which equated to an independent
worker reaping the benefits of his own toil, be it at an
industrial vocation or a farm.

Support for free labor

naturally coincided with support for free soil, which
called for the establishment of farms to be worked by
landowners, not slaves.

It was only natural, then, that

those favoring free labor and free soil would eventually
ally themselves with the Republican party.
But how and why did the Republicans form in the 1850s,
and what role did their support of a homestead measure play
158
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in their rapid rise to national promise?

To understand

this, it is important to look back to the land reform
movement and Free Soil party of the 1840s and early 1850s,
the collapse of the Whigs, and the national debate over
slavery expansion.

The year 1854 opened with Senator Stephen Douglas of
Illinois introducing a bill to organize the Nebraska
Territory, which later was divided into the two territories
of Kansas and Nebraska.

Many southern Democrats were

already angry with the Franklin Pierce administration’s
friendly overtures toward northern free soil Democrats, and
they told Douglas that they would not support a Nebraska
bill that barred slavery from that territory.

Douglas

acquiesced and used his influence with Pierce to ensure the
administration’s support for a bill that amounted to a
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

Northern Democrats and

free soilers were understandably upset, seeing this as
their own party establishing a litmus test on slavery.
Gideon Welles, a Connecticut Democrat, complained that,
“The administration has identified itself with this new
test and, wielding the power and patronage of the
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government, it assumes an attitude of open hostility to any
democrat who does not conform to its views.”159
Another Democrat, Montgomery Blair, saw the repeal of
the Missouri Compromise as just another example of the
South dominating both the Democratic party and national
politics.

If the Democrats could not obtain votes based on

their ideas, they would acquire them by forcing northerners
who sought higher office to cater to southern demands.
Blair also foresaw the political storm the repeal would
cause: “We are to have a renewed contest for the ascendancy
of slavery over freedom.”160
While most Whigs were naturally disaffected with the
Kansas-Nebraska bill, the issue also drove many northern
Democrats from their own party.

“We have submitted to

slavery long enough,” wrote an Ohio Democrat.
catching negroes for the South.”

“I am done

A Republican later

asserted that, “Radical and Jackson Democrats…were the
first to aid in organizing the Republican party, especially
in the West.”161
On January 19, 1854, several abolition-minded members
of Congress printed a manifesto containing the seeds that
soon sprouted into the Republican Party.
159
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Independent Democrats, as it became commonly known,
implored readers to take heed of dangerous developments in
Congress pertaining to the West.

The specific bill in

question focused on the proposed Kansas and Nebraska
Territories: “…a new Nebraska bill has been reported by the
Senate Committee on Territories, which, should it unhappily
receive the sanction of Congress, will open all the
unorganized Territories of the Union to the ingress of
slavery.”162

Published under the heading, Shall Slavery be

Permitted in Nebraska?, the Appeal listed a number of
arguments against the extension of slavery to the western
territories. By permitting popular sovereignty on the
slavery question in the new territories, many northerners
feared the bill would repeal the Missouri Compromise and
potentially open the West to the possibility of slavery.
In addition to a condensed history of American
westward expansion, the document also touched on a number
of western issues that proved important to Republicans over
the next decade and beyond.

The Appeal dealt with the

population and agricultural potential of the West, proposed
mainly by a homestead bill: “If slavery be allowed there,
the settlement and cultivation of the country must be
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greatly retarded.…The homestead law, should Congress enact
it, will be worthless there.”163

The document also

mentioned the negative impacts of territorial slavery on
the proposed transcontinental railroad: “What will be the
effect of this measure…upon the proposed Pacific
Railroad?...The enhanced cost of construction, and the
diminished expectation of profitable returns, will present
almost insuperable obstacles to building the road at
all.”164
The Appeal concluded by asking readers to consider the
geographical consequences of allowing slavery in Nebraska:
“We beg you…to observe that it will sever the East from the
West of the United States by a wide slaveholding belt of
the country, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to British
North America.

It is a bold scheme against American

liberty, worthy of an accomplished architect of ruin.…The
first operation of the proposed permission of slavery in
Nebraska will be to stay the progress of the free States
westward, and to cut off the free States of the Pacific
from the free States of the Atlantic.”165

Thus was

encapsulated an argument against the expansion of slavery
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and for the improvement of the West that would soon lead to
the creation of the Republican Party.
Of course, many who would become Republicans did not
claim to be abolitionists; rather, they hoped to see
slavery contained in the South instead of eliminated
altogether.

The January 20 edition of the New York Daily

Times called the Nebraska bill “so clearly regardless of
Northern sentiment, and so bare-faced a bill for Southern
votes that it must disgust a large portion even of those
who are supposed to be especially benefited by it.”166
Fearing that approval of the bill would drive northern
moderates to become abolitionists, however, the same
article speculated on “a storm of indignation in the North”
that would “give that section completely into the hands of
GIDDINGS, GERRITT SMITH, CHASE, SUMNER, and their political
friends.”167

Claiming that “the cause of human freedom is

the cause of God,” Giddings, Smith, Chase, and Sumner all
signed the Appeal of the Independent Democrats, along with
Representatives Edward Wade of Ohio and Alexander DeWitt of
Massachusetts.168

All, including the westerners Chase,

Giddings, and Wade, eventually became Republicans.
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By mid-1854, the need for a new political organization
to combat the extension of slavery was obvious. Southerners
dominated the Democratic Party, and the Whigs hovered
perilously close to dissolution and were unable to mount
any meaningful response to the proposed Kansas-Nebraska
bill.169

The passage of the bill and subsequent approval of

it by President Franklin Pierce in May 1854 “obliterated
old party lines in the North completely, and left
disorganized groups of anti-Nebraska Whigs, anti-Nebraska
Democrats, Free-soilers, Abolitionists, and Know-Nothings,
all of whom represented every extreme of the Northern view
of slavery.”170

As one Free Soiler-turned-Republican put

it, “The dispersion of the old parties was one thing, but
the organization of their fragments into a new one on a
just basis was quite a different thing.”171
John D. Long, an early historian of the Republicans,
called the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the upheaval it
unleashed “a new phase of an old subject.”172

There is

little dispute among historians that the idea of slavery’s
extension into unsettled American territories necessitated
the creation of the Republican party.
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evidence also shows that as early Republicans fought to
exclude slavery from the West, they simultaneously pursued
an aggressive agenda designed to rapidly settle, improve,
populate, and manage the western states and territories.
In short, the Republican party was, from its earliest days,
a party of the West and westward expansion.
The selection of the name “Republican” was no
accident.

Organizers purposely chose the moniker to

connect themselves to the political tradition of Thomas
Jefferson:

“Tying the new party to the framer of the

Declaration of Independence underlined the commitment of
northerners to doctrines of political equality and
expanding economic opportunity.”173

(These early

Republicans must have chosen to overlook Jefferson’s status
as a slave owner.)

Even in 1854, Americans revered

Jefferson, so Republicans must have recognized that
claiming to be his political descendants would lend weight
to their cause and organization as well as help
recruitment.
Though he never traveled beyond the Alleghenies, the
West had fascinated Jefferson.

The third president was

long dead before states like Wisconsin and Michigan
existed, but the first Republicans were aware of his
173
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interest in their part of the country.

This may have given

them additional motivation to connect their new movement to
him.
Jefferson’s influence on the West was undeniable.

In

1785, he co-authored the bill creating the rectangular
survey system.174

Many also considered him the intellectual

originator of the free land idea that eventually culminated
in the Homestead Act of 1862 (driven through Congress by
the Republican Party).

“Whenever there is in any country

uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that
the laws of property have been so far extended as to
violate natural right,” Jefferson wrote on August 13, 1776.
“The small land holders are the most precious part of a
state.”175

Finally, Jefferson was also an early proponent

of peaceful displacement of American Indians in order to
make room for American settlers and farmers.

Historian

Stephen E. Ambrose wrote: “In Jefferson’s view, the transMississippi western empire could serve as a vast
reservation for Indians displaced from east of the river.
There they could learn to farm and become civilized, so
that they could be incorporated into the body politic.”176
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Later, both during and particularly after the Civil War,
politicians and soldiers, many of them Republicans, became
advocates of forcibly removing or exterminating Indians to
make room for homesteaders and other settlers.

They would

have done well to remember Jefferson’s 1785 statement, “I
believe the Indian then to be in body and mind equal to the
white man.”177
After the party’s somewhat humble beginnings in
Michigan and Wisconsin, Republicanism began to spread.
While some national political figures of several different
parties—many of them abolitionists—immediately converted,
others held back their support until they could gauge the
party’s chances of success.

Experienced politicians had

seen a number of regional antislavery parties rise quickly
and disintegrate quicker.

No one with any serious

political ambitions wanted to have a record of jumping from
party to party for their opponents to exploit.

Abraham

Lincoln was among those that resisted immediately jumping
to the Republicans.

As historian Lewis L. Gould noted,

“Until Lincoln and men like him were sure that the Whigs
were indeed doomed, they kept their political options
open.”178
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Salmon P. Chase of Ohio was one who almost immediately
cast his lot with the Republicans.

He was also one who had

belonged to seemingly every antislavery party that had
risen and fallen over the years.

He had been an

abolitionist since at least the mid-1830s and had over the
years been a Whig, a member of the Liberty Party, and a
Free-Soiler.179

Later in life, he was a Democrat as well.

(Chase yearned to be president of the United States and was
willing to ally himself with nearly any party whose
presidential nomination he thought he could capture.)

A

Free Soil party U.S. Senator in 1854, he fiercely opposed
the Kansas-Nebraska Act and became an organizer of Ohio’s
Anti-Nebraska party, which soon morphed into the Republican
Party.

In July 1855, Chase became the Republicans’

candidate for governor of Ohio.

In his acceptance speech

for that nomination, he stated, “The spread of slavery,
under all circumstances and at all times, must be
inflexibly resisted.

Slavery in the Territories must be

prohibited by law.…Side by side with all men who are
willing to unite with me for the defense of freedom, I am
ready to contend to the last for the rescue of the
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Territories from slavery.

I would do no injustice to the

slave states.”180
Like many early Republicans, Chase was a native
easterner who early in life migrated west and came to
identify with western issues and concerns.

As a Whig

during his early political career, he championed a national
bank and internal improvements.

During his 1849-1855

Senate term, he even introduced a bill to construct a
transcontinental railroad.

In commemoration of the

groundbreaking on the Union Pacific line in Nebraska
Territory in late 1862, he wrote, “It is among my most
pleasing recollections of service as a Senator from Ohio,
that the first practical measure looking to the
construction of a Pacific Railroad, which received the
sanction of Congress, was moved by me.”181
George Washington Julian of Indiana was another early
western convert to the Republicans.

Julian had been an

anti-slavery Whig until 1848, when his party’s presidential
nomination of slaveholder Zachary Taylor led him to abandon
the party.

He then joined the Free Soilers and was their

vice presidential nominee in 1852.

He wrote of “the

sacredness of the bargain of 1820” and described efforts to
180
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repeal it as “the cold-blooded conspiracy to spread it
(slavery) over an empire of free soil.”182

Julian also

favored passage of a homestead law and wrote of “the need
of great highways to the Pacific.”183
Like his fellow Ohioan Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin
Franklin Wade was born in the northeast but moved west as a
young man, leaving Massachusetts for Ohio in the early
1820s.

By the upheavals of the mid-1850s, he was a Whig

member of the U.S. Senate and was recognized as the leader
of a small but very vocal anti-slavery group.

He lobbied

against the Kansas-Nebraska Act and in favor of both a
homestead bill and a land grant college policy.

Opposing

slavery and slaveholders, however, became his life’s work
in the Senate.

During the slavery debates of the 1850s,

members of Congress from North and South denounced one
another’s views and engaged in particularly vicious
personal attacks.

At one point, Wade and two other like-

minded northerners created, “A league by which we bound
ourselves to resent any repetition of this conduct by
challenge to fight, and then, in the precise words, the
compact to ‘to carry the quarrel into a coffin.’”184
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Born and raised in Indiana, James Henry Lane served as
a colonel in the Mexican-American War.

He was then a

Democratic lieutenant governor of Indiana and a member of
the House of Representatives during the Thirty-third
Congress (1853-55).

While in the House, he voted for the

Kansas-Nebraska Act, a vote that was to haunt him the rest
of his political life.
a pro-slavery man?

An early biographer wrote, “Was he

The ultra-abolition type of agitators

regarded him in that light.…He was, however, no more proslavery than Pierce, Buchanan, Douglas, Logan, and Grant.
He believed in what they called the ‘compromises of the
Constitution.’

He was no more a pro-slavery man than Henry

Clay, who said he would rather be instrumental in relieving
his country of the great stain of slavery than to be a
conquering hero.”185
After finishing his congressional term in 1855, Lane
migrated west to Kansas Territory.

He arrived in the midst

of the struggle between pro- and anti-slavery forces to
dominate the territorial government and determine if the
Kansas constitution would allow or prohibit slavery.
Though never an overt abolitionist, Lane allied with the
free state forces and was eventually recognized as an
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impassioned, radical leader.

When Kansas finally obtained

statehood without slavery in 1861, the legislature rewarded
his leadership by electing him one of the new state’s first
U.S. senators.
In contrast to Lane, Kansas’s other initial senator
lived and worked most of his life in the east and returned
there later in life.

Samuel Clarke Pomeroy was born in

Southampton, Massachusetts, attended Amherst College, and
later moved to New York to teach school.

He returned to

Massachusetts and served in the state’s legislature in
1852-53.

He was also active in the New England Emigrant

Aid Company, an organization formed to transport emigrants
to Kansas to ensure the territory’s new government would be
of an anti-slavery persuasion.

Of his desire to go to

Kansas, he wrote, “I am anxious to have the right impetus
given to its early settlement.

That the best principles of

our resting fathers, may be transplanted there!

And that

thus our untold domain may be saved from the blighting—
withering—deadening—damning—influence of American
slavery!”186

Pomeroy traveled to Kansas in 1854, settling

in Lawrence and eventually moving to Atchison.

After

serving as mayor of Atchison in 1859 and as a Republican
186
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convention delegate in both 1856 and 1860, the free soil
legislature he had helped organize selected him to serve in
the U.S. Senate in 1861.
James W. Grimes was born in New Hampshire but later
moved west to Iowa.

He twice served in the territorial

legislature (1838-39 and 1843-44) and was the state’s Whig
governor from 1854 to 1858. In 1859, he was selected to
serve as one of Iowa’s U.S. Senators.
Republican.

He was by then a

His Iowa Senate colleague, James Harlan, was a

native of Illinois and a former member of the Free Soil
party.

Harlan served in the Senate as a Free Soiler from

1855 to 1857 before being ejected for “irregularities” in
the process that elected him.

He ran as a Republican in

1859 and was re-elected to the Senate.
Abraham Lincoln of Illinois was a lifelong Whig and
had served in the Illinois legislature in the 1830s and
‘40s.

On March 3, 1837, he co-authored a protest of

slavery to the Illinois House of Representatives in which
he and his co-signer, Dan Stone, agreed that “the
institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad
policy, but that the promulgation of abolition doctrines
tends rather to increase than to abate its evils.”187
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was a one-term member of the House of Representatives in
1847-49.

He was little-noticed during that single term

except for his scathing critique of President James K.
Polk’s rationale for pursuing war with Mexico from 1846 to
1848.

“The war with Mexico was unnecessarily and

unconstitutionally commenced by the President,” Lincoln
told the House on January 12, 1848.188

He also called Polk,

“a bewildered, confounded, and miserably perplexed man.”189
Like many future Republicans, Lincoln was enraged by
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

“It is argued that

slavery will not go to Kansas and Nebraska, in any event.
This is a palliation—a lullaby.

I have some hope that it

will not; but let us not be too confident.…Equal justice to
the south, it is said, requires us to consent to the
extending of slavery to new countries. That is to say,
inasmuch as you do not object to my taking my hog to
Nebraska, therefore I must not object to you taking your
slave. Now, I admit this is perfectly logical, if there is
no difference between hogs and negroes. But while you thus
require me to deny the humanity of the negro, I wish to ask
whether you of the south yourselves, have ever been willing
to do as much?”190
188
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While members of Congress, Whigs, Democrats, Free
Soilers, and, eventually, Republicans, made arguments both
for and against homesteading on the House and Senate
floors, in the press, and in political gatherings, an
organization called the National Reform Association (NRA)
sought agrarian reforms, including homesteads, amongst the
public and in the press.

The NRA had actually existed for

decades by the time the homesteading argument reached its
fever pitch in the 1850s.

In fact, the NRA was a critical

factor in bringing together groups of homestead seekers,
abolitionists, and laborers and convincing them to work
together for their common interests.

These interests

eventually culminated with the creation of the Republican
Party.
The NRA was born of trade unions and related
workingmen’s associations in eastern cities such as New
York, Boston, and Philadelphia.

These groups were

responsible for a great deal of labor organizing among the
eastern working classes beginning in the 1840s.

They

appealed to both skilled and unskilled workers, landless
laborers, and even small-scale farmers.191
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Members of the NRA (and other similar organizations)
believed that the republic’s health and success depended on
the broadest possible distribution of land ownership among
various classes of people.
for accomplishing this.

The NRA had a three-point plan

First, they urged state

governments to end the seizures of land for debts in order
to defend the small family farm and decrease speculation
and concentrations of land ownership.

Next, the NRA

advocated a homestead measure to permit the free and widescale settlement of the public domain.

Lastly, NRA members

sought to limit the amount of land any individual could
own, arguing that limitless ownership of a finite resource
actually reduced the number of property owners.192
The NRA headquartered itself in New York City, and its
leaders found a sympathetic and influential friend in
Horace Greeley of the New York Weekly Tribune.

His

newspaper columns spoke often of the need for agrarian
reform and allowed the NRA’s ideas to reach a very large
audience.

He explained the organization’s principles as

such in an 1852 edition of the Tribune:
Land reformers do not complain of the present minimum price
of Public Lands as too high. On the contrary, if they are
to be sold evermore to whoever shall see fit to locate and
pay for them we would far sooner see the price enhanced
than reduced.…What we do ask…is simply that our Public Land
System be so modified that every person needing Land may
192
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take possession of any quarter-section not previously
located, and that none other than a person needing
land shall be allowed to acquire it at all.…No public
Lands to be sold to a Speculator. This is the essential
matter—all else is but subsidiary.…We are confident the
Government would permanently increase its Revenue by
giving a modicum of wild land to everyone who requires
it, and looking to Duties on Imports alone for Revenue.
Every new clearing in the West, every new wheat- or cornfield cut out of the Prairies, is a new source of Federal
income. Every breaking-up team is a feeder to the Customhouse.…It should be the policy of a wise government to
encourage the settlement of new farms by every means in
its power. The fact that a man wishing unappropriated
wild land is unable to pay for it affords the very best
reason for letting him have it.193

The leaders of the NRA were mostly disgusted with the
inaction of both major political parties on land
distribution issues.

Alvan Bovay, the group’s secretary,

slammed Congress by saying that “both parties are in favor
of selling the fertile soil to mercenary wretches who might
as well traffic in the life’s blood of the poor.…The right
of man to the soil is so obvious and clear a right.…
Probably the discovery will soon be made that if a man has
a right to life, he has, by inevitable consequence, the
right to the elements of life, to the earth, the air, and
the water.”194
Many among the NRA’s membership feared the United
States had an oversupply of labor in the East and sought to
encourage emigration to the West in order to reduce the
strains of overpopulation and unemployment.
193
194

Horace Greeley, The New York Weekly Tribune, January 24, 1852.
The Workingman’s Advocate, September 14-21, 1844.

This thinking

141
eventually led to the idea of the West being the nation’s
“safety valve,” an area that could be opened to free
homesteading for those seeking to leave the East to escape
overcrowding, poverty, and poor work opportunities.

(It is

important to note that many historians of the West,
including Paul Wallace Gates and others, have questioned
this “safety valve” theory and debated whether or not it
actually made any significant impact on reducing
unemployment and labor surpluses in the East.

However, it

was a popular and predominant theory among the NRA’s
membership and other land distribution advocates in the
1840s and 1850s.)

By the end of the 1840s, the NRA had

grown influential enough to see over two hundred newspapers
endorse a homestead bill.195
During the late 1840s and early 1850s, the NRA also
found itself drawn into antislavery politics.

In October

1847, the Massachusetts chapter of the NRA held its state
convention, during which it approved a platform that
advocated both land reform and abolition.

The platform

called slavery “a crime against Humanity…to be abolished
immediately” and urged all who agreed to “adopt the
Measures and Political Action that shall secure to every
disenthralled slave, whatever their complexion…the
195
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peaceable and immediate possession of a sufficient quantity
of Land to enable them to procure the necessary means of
subsistence whenever their liberation is achieved.”

The

NRA here took the radical step of endorsing not only
abolition, but also black land ownership.

“If some solicit

your aid in the protection of the rights of the white man—
if others ask your assistance in alleviating the
oppressions of the colored man—we entreat you to cooperate
with US in the protection and security of all men in the
full possession and free exercise of every natural
right.”196
In New York in 1847, the NRA made nominations for
state offices in common with organized abolitionists.
Statewide, NRA-backed candidates won nearly 2,000 votes and
outpolled Whigs in a few areas.

The Independent Liberty,

Antirent, and National Reform tickets statewide polled over
15,000 votes.197

The confusing jumble of small parties

served to deny Democrats and Whigs majorities in a number
of races but, more critically, demonstrated that a fusion
of agricultural reformers and abolitionists, if properly
organized, could make a legitimate impact in electoral
politics.
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The 1848 presidential election served as the first
real test of the NRA’s power in a national contest.
Strongly allied with the National Industrial Congress
(NIC), the National Reform Association’s members argued
among themselves about their candidate of choice.

Some

favored a practical choice that might actually influence
the election’s outcome, while others wished for a candidate
with ideological purity above anything.

The so-called

“Liberty League” had already nominated Gerritt Smith and
Elihu Burritt; the NIC eventually agreed with Smith’s
nomination but substituted William S. Wait for vice
president.

Eventually, both Burritt and Wait declined

their respective nominations, and Michigan’s Charles C.
Foote, a vocal abolitionist, became the vice presidential
candidate.
The wild card, however, was the emergence of the Free
Soil party and its nomination of former president Martin
Van Buren.

While some NRA members grudgingly supported the

Whig candidate Zachary Taylor (and a few the Democrat,
Lewis Cass), the Free Soilers sought to bring NRA members
into their fold.

Though many NRA proponents expressed

dissatisfaction with Van Buren’s candidacy, NRA members
attended the Free Soil convention in August 1848 as
delegates from Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Ohio,
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Illinois, Indiana, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.
Van Buren did not win the presidency, of course, but the
Free Soil party gained about five times more votes than the
earlier Liberty Party had ever received by attracting and
mobilizing those who believed that “free soil” meant both
land reform and antislavery.198

Many Whigs who were

inclined to agree with the Free Soilers’ stance on several
issues remained loyal to their original party, however, and
backed Taylor.

Included among these were many future

Republican leaders like William H. Seward and Abraham
Lincoln.
Even among vocal antislavery politicians, party
loyalties often took priority over their antislavery
ideals.

When the Free Soil party captured about fourteen

percent of the popular vote in 1848, many enthusiastic
antislavery men hoped this new party would become a
dominant political force in the North, especially
considering that even the staunchest Whigs by then
recognized their party was significantly weakened by its
inability to develop a cohesive national position regarding
slavery.
The hoped-for rise of the Free Soilers did not occur.
Like Seward and Lincoln, too many northern abolitionists
198
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still preferred to fight for slavery restriction and land
reform within the confines of the existing parties.
Another important reason for the fall of the Free Soil
party was the fact that most of its power was concentrated
in New York, and many Democratic “barnburners” there had
bolted to the Free Soilers more to defeat their political
rivals than to truly serve the antislavery or homesteading
causes.

Once the rival faction was defeated, many

barnburners, led by Martin Van Buren’s son John, simply
returned to the Democratic fold.199
Both parties—the Whigs and Democrats—faced a quandary.
To win nationally, they both needed Free Soil support in
the North but also proslavery support from the South.

But

how could they cultivate one without alienating the other?
Put simply, they could not.

Any hope of avoiding a purely

regional party alignment all but evaporated by the national
election of 1852.

Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire,

elected president that year, was the last pre-war
presidential candidate to win the popular vote in both
sections.

He was a nationally (albeit slimly) elected

president, trouncing the Whig Winfield Scott in the
Electoral College as well.
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But if the Democrats were relatively united behind
Pierce in 1852, the Whigs were just as divided.

They were

leery of Scott, a southern-born military hero like Zachary
Taylor in 1850.

Southern Whigs did not fondly remember

Taylor, a slaveholder who southerners felt sure would
protect their interests as president.

When Taylor turned

out to be too independent for their taste and threatened to
personally lead the army against them to enforce the law,
southern Whigs became enraged.

They feared that nominating

Winfield Scott would lead to another politically
disappointing Whig presidency.
It was an unfounded concern.

Scott carried only four

states in November 1852: Vermont, Massachusetts, Kentucky,
and (barely) Tennessee.

The Whigs lost twelve

governorships; they won less than a third of seats in the
House of Representatives.

Even before the election,

Charles Francis Adams had lamented, “The moral tone of the
Free States never was more thoroughly broken.”200

After the

election, William H. Seward was asked by a prominent New
York Whig, “Was there every such a deluge since Noah’s
time?”201
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Scott had made a minimally respectable showing in the
North, but the results from the South troubled the Whigs.
While Zachary Taylor had garnered about half of the popular
vote in the Deep South in 1848, Scott only received about
35 percent and carried just two slaveholding states.
Southern Whigs were in trouble, and the 1852 election
resulted in a nearly solid Democratic South.

Even more

critically, the 1852 results led to increased southern
dominance of the Democratic party.

These factors, plus the

June and October deaths of Whig giants Henry Clay and
Daniel Webster, respectively, did not bode well for the
Whig party’s survival.

Conversely and just as importantly,

however, the Democratic party was reduced to a minority in
the North.

Disaffected Whigs, Free Soilers, Democrats, KnowNothings, and independents formed the Republican party in
1854 as a direct response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

As

members of the new party began meeting across the country,
they continued to rail against the expansion of slavery but
began discussing other issues as well.

Among these were

free labor and land distribution, two issues near and dear
to many of them and especially to Horace Greeley.
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In Greeley’s mind and his conception of free labor,
every worker’s goal was to acquire capital and, eventually,
economic independence.

He vigorously opposed strikes by

industrial workers on the grounds that they halted
production and prevented other laborers from working.

If a

worker viewed his pay as too low, Greeley encouraged him to
either take another job or move to the West.

(In all

likelihood, this is the basis for the attribution to
Greeley of the phrase, “go west, young man.”)

Homestead

legislation was needed, however, to allow such workers to
settle in the West, and Greeley’s New York Weekly Tribune
became a powerful advocate for free land beginning in the
1840s and continuing into the Civil War.

“Unappropriated,

unimproved Public Land,” Greeley wrote in 1852, “is by the
law of Nature and of Social Right the portion of those who,
claiming no other portion of Man’s heritage, are willing to
improve and cultivate.”202
Favoring homesteading and opposing speculation were in
line with Greeley’s other ideas of social equality and
justice, but such positions were also somewhat politically
mainstream by the 1850s everywhere except the South.
Providing land to the landless and keeping it out of
speculators’ hands appealed to many people’s sense of
202
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fairness but also harkened to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian
nostalgia.

Suspicious of high finance, land monopolies,

and speculation, those favoring a homestead bill could
claim complete faith in the yeoman farmer—the backbone of
the Jeffersonian ideal of small, independent landowners.
Like many National Reform Association members before
them, new Republicans clung to the “safety valve” theory
that the West could relieve overcrowding in the East if
only some measure to freely distribute western lands could
pass Congress.
The Panic of 1857 only increased Republican support
for homesteading, allowing Republicans to blame the lack of
a free land law for massive urban poverty and unemployment.
There was, according the Cincinnati Gazette, “an abundance
of land to be possessed” in the West.203

Orville Browning

of Illinois agreed, telling a gathering of Republicans, “In
many of the free states, population is already pressing
hard upon production and subsistence, and new homes must be
provided, or the evils of an overcrowded country
encountered.”204
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The homestead issue became increasingly sectional in
the 1850s as the country argued more regularly and
violently over anything that could be even peripherally
related to the expansion of slavery.

Republicans came to

see homesteading as not only a necessity for their
conceptions of free labor, but also as a way to create a
western bulwark against slavery expansion.

In fact, by

1860, the Republican Party was so dedicated to the idea of
homesteading that it inserted a plank into its national
platform calling for immediate passage of a homestead act.
Conversely, fearing that a homestead bill would forever end
the possibility of slavery in the West, southerners became
increasingly opposed to any form of homesteading.
The 1850s, rising sectional tensions, and the creation
of the Republican party were all major milestones on the
road to the Civil War.

Land distribution in general, and

homesteading specifically, played large roles in all of
these events and therefore must be considered when
assessing the North’s and South’s actions and motivations
in the decades before the war.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE HOMESTEAD ACT
Land policy was one of the early republic’s most
persistent arguments.

From the differences between

Hamilton and Jefferson to the differences of the Jacksonian
era, debates over how best to distribute the federal
government’s land were common in the halls of Congress.
Like other issues of the day, disagreements over land
policies eventually assumed a sectional dimension.
Northerners, southerners, and westerners all had different
ideas about which land policies would best serve the
nation’s interests—and their own.

This was particularly

true starting in the 1820s and moving forward.
Beginning then, the West sought accelerated
development and a liberal land policy.

The Northeast hoped

for expanding markets for its goods, so it maintained an
interest in a high tariff and cheap labor.

The South,

meanwhile, wanted a low tariff and therefore maximum
revenue from sales of the public domain.

The tariff was

one of the major issues of the day and therefore drove the
arguments over which land policies the federal government
should pursue.
Beginning in the early 1840s, however, it became clear
that the government was moving away from trying to raise

152
revenue from western land sales and toward some policy that
would result in actual western settlement.

Though a few

major political figures still argued for policies that
would theoretically create revenue from western land sales,
most began instead to lean toward policies that would make
western lands more available to real settlers.

A homestead

bill was among these policies.
The homestead idea came into its own in the mid-1840s.
The idea was not new or even exclusively American; both the
French and Spanish had at various times offered free land
to stimulate settlement.
measure for years.

Many had already sought such a

The bill introduced on March 9, 1844 by

Alabama’s Felix G. McConnell was the first American
legislation to specifically call for land grants to
settlers who had performed no governmental service.

Its

leading advocates were westerners, of course, and eastern
workers, most of whom had accepted the conventional wisdom
that western lands served as a safety valve to reduce the
oversupply of eastern workingmen by encouraging emigration
to the West.

Many also supported it because it required

actual labor on the land and not merely cash on hand.

It

would also theoretically limit the amount of land one
person (or speculator) could acquire.

Despite these

attributes, however, McConnell’s bill never left committee.
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In fact, the legislation languished for several more years,
superseded by other concerns.
Representative Andrew Johnson of Tennessee wrote a
homestead bill in 1852 that managed to pass the House but
never reached a vote in the Senate.

Johnson tried again in

1854, and a southern majority in the Senate suppressed the
bill, which again never received a floor vote.

Galusha

Grow of Pennsylvania tried again in 1859, and his bill
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate by the tiebreaking vote by Vice President John C. Breckenridge of
Kentucky.

Why did the South so consistently oppose

homestead legislation?

Southern members of Congress had many reasons for
opposing the passage of a homestead bill.

They of course

considered the effects of such legislation on their
constituents—many of them (but certainly not all)
slaveholders.

Later, though, southern opposition to the

bill seems to have been grounded more on ideological
grounds than practical ones.

Simply put, homesteading

became intertwined with sectional disputes over the
expansion of slavery into the western territories and,
eventually, the differing northern and southern views of
the right course for the nation’s future.

Most southern
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congressmen eventually came to believe that the approval of
homesteading would be counterproductive to the interests of
slaveholders—and, therefore, their own interests in
remaining in office and securing the survival of the
South’s “peculiar institution.”

This came about largely

due to the rise of political parties that supported
homesteading legislation—Free Soilers, Free Soil Democrats,
and, eventually, Republicans.
One major problem slaveholding southerners foresaw was
just how little land would be available to them to carry
slavery westward.

Plantation agriculture simply could not

thrive on the 160-acre farms envisioned by the homestead
bill.

Senator James Mason of Virginia acknowledged as much

on April 10, 1860, when he stated that the North’s true aim
in permitting homesteading in the West was “planting a
population there from the free States, and excluding the
slave population.”205
It is accurate to state that many southern reasons for
opposing a homestead bill had much to do with the survival
of slavery.

While a relatively small percentage of whites

in the South owned slaves, a large percentage of southern
whites did view as sacred the RIGHT for whites to own
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slaves.

Historian Roy M. Robbins wrote that eventually,

“the slavery issue had gained the ascendancy over
agrarianism and over protection (tariff) and had become the
most important of the new conditioning arguments against
homesteading.”206

Historian Benjamin Horace Hibbard went a

step further than Robbins, pointedly stating that “free
homesteads became a part of the anti-slavery struggle.…Had
it not been for this complication, the South would
evidently have favored it.”207
Regardless of whether abolitionists created the
homesteading idea, the South feared that passing a
homestead bill would lead to marked increases in free
western farms.

Simply, slavery would be given little

opportunity to expand.

Free land meant free soil.

soil meant southern opposition.

Free

By 1850, the South had

become openly hostile to the image of the yeoman farmer
promoted by homestead advocates because that image was
being used to combat the spread of slavery.208

The brave,

bold yeoman on a small farm in a western territory like
Kansas or Nebraska would not be a practitioner of slavedriven plantation agriculture and was therefore an enemy to
the politicians of the South.
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By 1850, congressmen from both North and South judged
most legislation on its possible effects on slavery.

Many

southerners may well have supported a homestead bill had it
not by then become so strongly intertwined with
abolitionism.

The idea that homesteading meant more free

western states and territories and, therefore, eventually a
minority in Congress, made it completely unpalatable to the
South.

One Arkansas Senator went so far as to refer to

homesteading as a bonus designed to induce settlers “to
emigrate to the Territories on condition that aid societies
will pay their expenses to get there.”209
Much of the South’s opposition came from its distaste
for the new Republican Party, whose overt support of free
soil equaled support of the homestead bill.

Before the

Republicans existed, Free Soil Democrats had included a
pro-homestead plank in their 1852 platform.

By the mid-

1850s, many former Free Soil Democrats allied themselves
with the Republicans.

When the Republicans ran their first

national ticket in 1856, they did not include a prohomestead plank in their platform.

However, the party made

a concentrated effort to expand its agrarian appeal (and
therefore attract more immigrants, especially Germans), and
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incorporated a call for a homestead bill in its 1860
platform.
In the context of the continuing debate over slavery,
homesteading became an important campaign issue during the
1860 election cycle.

The homestead bill became one of many

so-called “Black Republican” ideas demonized by the South;
many in the North praised homesteading as a way to build a
buffer against southern encroachment into the West.

Never

before had the homestead bill been so openly and frequently
discussed and debated, both in the halls of Congress and in
the press.
The anti-homesteading stance of the southern states,
however, far pre-dated 1860 and was more than merely guilt
by association with the Republican Party.

The successful

passage of a homestead measure would unquestionably lead to
a major increase in the number of free farms while
providing little opportunity for slavery to expand.
“Southern leaders,” noted historian Henry Nash Smith, “were
eventually forced to recognize that the notions of the
course of empire and of the coming dominance of the West
were implicitly free soil.”210
To slaveholders, the main problem with homesteading
was that the bill would open very little land to which they
210
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could emigrate with their slaves.

Senator Robert W.

Johnson of Arkansas openly acknowledged this problem during
a homestead bill debate in 1854, noting that as long as the
Missouri Compromise remained effective, southerners could
carry no slaves into new territories.

Therefore, in

Johnson’s mind, the homestead bill had to be delayed until
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which would effectively
repeal the Missouri Compromise and open the door for
slavery’s expansion westward.211
Regardless of the Missouri Compromise, however, the
South faced a number of limitations on expanding its
slavery-based agricultural empire.

Foremost among these

was a lack of good land to which southerners could
emigrate.

Much of the best land in the Southwest “had been

taken up by 1837, and it was now a process of consolidating
the holdings into cotton or sugar plantations.”212

The

massive state of Texas contained no public domain lands
because it had not been formed with federal land.

Due to

climate, land acquired from Mexico was clearly not fit for
plantation (i.e., slave) agriculture.
Even had there been abundant arable land in the
Southwest, the small quarter-section (160 acres) farms
211
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envisioned under the Homestead Act were simply not
sufficient for the plantations that dominated the southern
agricultural system.

Therefore, in the minds of many

northerners and southerners alike, the free farms offered
by the Homestead Act constituted a very real barrier to
slavery’s expansion.

Republicans recognized this and used

it as a selling point for their support of the Act.

In

1859, the party published a circular entitled “Lands for
the Landless” that bluntly stated that “slavery cannot
exist at the same time with a system of small freeholds.”213
Virginia Senator James Mason acknowledged that a
homestead law would prevent slavery from moving into the
West, calling it “a scheme…for the purpose of planting a
population there from the free States, and excluding the
slave population.”214

By the early 1850s, in fact, the

South was openly hostile to the Jeffersonian ideal of
small, independent, yeoman farmers since that very symbol
was by then being used by antislavery forces to combat
slavery’s western expansion.

Since homesteaders would not

engage in slave-driven plantation agriculture in the West,
a homestead bill had to be opposed by southern congressmen.
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The South’s greatest (and justified) fear was that an
influx of homesteading farmers to the West would eventually
lead to the creation of more free states that would
obviously send antislavery representatives to Congress.
Southerners realized they would soon be overwhelmed in
Congress and feared that a large Northern majority would
eventually legislate slavery out of existence.

“Do not let

the Government destroy us of the South,” said Congressman
James Letcher of Virginia in 1854, “by holding out
stimulants to the encouragement of northern Territories,
the propagation of northern sentiment, and the
multiplication of northern representatives here and in the
Senate.”215
Many southerners also opposed the immigration to the
United States they feared a successful homestead bill would
cause.

While some of this opposition may have been

nativism for its own sake, southerners also realized that
Republicans were tailoring their agricultural message
specifically to encourage Germans, Irish, and other
Europeans to come to America to seek free homesteads.
Logic led the South to fear that a great number of
immigrants receiving homesteads would become Republicans
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and populate free territories that, with sufficient
population, would eventually become Northern states with
antislavery congressional representatives.

Southern

newspapers like the Richmond Enquirer helped many readers
come to this conclusion with fiery anti-homestead articles
and editorials.

The Enquirer summed up the Southern

argument well in 1854, when it stated that a homestead bill
would be “an extraordinary stimulus to immigration and
would speedily subject the South to the irresistible
preponderance of the North.”216
Another southern concern was the effect the Homestead
Act might have on non-slaveholding whites in the South.
Though a relatively small percentage of whites owned
slaves, it was critical for non-slaveholding whites to
support the slave system.

Many in the South feared a

homestead bill would entice whites without slaves to flee
the South for the freesoil West.

Comments from northerners

like Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin served to justify
these Southern fears and encourage opposition to any
homestead measure.

Doolittle praised the homestead bill as

a law that would “allow poor nonslaveholding men of slave
states to escape.”217
216
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Rather than directing American expansion westward,
some in the South preferred to spread further south.

Many

prominent southerners envisioned a tropical Atlantic empire
in places like Cuba, where the climate favored agriculture
and crops similar to those in the southern states.

The

famous Ostend Manifesto of 1854 was part of this southern
plan to expand southward.

The manifesto was an American

diplomatic document that formally explained the United
States’ desire to acquire Cuba.

The manifesto expressed a

desire to purchase Cuba from Spain but also a willingness
to take the island by force if Spain refused to sell.
Ironically, the Ostend Manifesto listed as one reason
the U.S. must own Cuba as this: “…humanity may in vain
demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the
island.… The Spanish government at home may be well
disposed, but experience has proven that it cannot control
these remote depositaries of its power.”218

Better to let

the United States (and, especially, the South) control the
importation and uses of slaves to Cuba from North America.
The Richmond Enquirer agreed wholeheartedly.

“If we

hold Cuba,” read an 1854 editorial, “in the next fifty
years we will hold the destiny of the richest and most
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increased commerce we can hold.

Give us this, and we can

make the public opinion of the world.”219

Here was the

South attempting to turn the old idea of an American
“Manifest Destiny” on its head.

Since the South could not

take slavery from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it would
instead take its “peculiar institution” to the Gulf of
Mexico and the Caribbean.

Northerners and abolitionists

cried foul; Wisconsin’s James Doolittle called the Ostend
Manifesto and southern expansion into the tropics a
“fanatical solution.”220
Southerners faced a perfect storm in 1859 when a Cuba
annexation bill and homestead bill were simultaneously
before the Senate.

Many feared that the long-argued

homestead measure would overshadow debate about expansion
to the tropics.

Robert Toombs of Georgia revealed that

southern anxiety when he asserted that the homesteading
ideal of “’Land for the Landless’ most exercises the
patriotic bosoms of Free Soilers…the very moment that a
question comes up which they [are] afraid to meet.”221

In

other words, Toombs argued that many supposedly prohomestead northerners used debate on the homestead bill as
a means of avoiding debate on other issues.
219
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homestead acts had been proposed and debated for decades;
apparently, Toombs and other southerners speculated that
northerners cared little for the bill on its own merits but
brought it up for debate anytime a bill that could benefit
the South and slavery expansion came before Congress.

To

Toombs and many of his southern colleagues, debate on the
homestead measure was simply a delaying action.
Benjamin Wade of Ohio thundered a response.

“When you

come to niggers for the niggerless,” he said, “all other
questions sink into perfect insignificance.”

Wade railed

against the purchase of Cuba, asking his southern
colleagues, “Are you going to buy Cuba for land for the
landless?

What is there?

You will find three quarters of

a million niggers, but you will not find any land; not one
foot, not an inch.”222

Wade seemed to understand that the

South’s true interest in Cuba was to continue and expand
slavery, not provide land for actual settlers (unless they
happened to be slaveholders).
Along these lines, it can be definitively stated that
the net effect of the Kansas-Nebraska Act on southern
attitudes about homesteading was to encourage further
opposition to the “free land” idea.

While passage of the

Kansas-Nebraska bill eased Arkansas senator Johnson’s fear
222
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that the Missouri Compromise would prevent slaveholders
from benefiting from the homestead measure, it also ended
any efforts to avoid strict sectionalism that many members
of Congress made after the Compromise of 1850.223

In fact,

after passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, sectionalism
became much more pronounced and overt in Congress.
According to historian Roy M. Robbins, this was
understandable because, “For the first time, the slaves
states west of the Appalachians joined with the South
Atlantic States in the attempt to open up the West to
slavery.… All of the important interests of the North,
incongruous as they may have been, were immediately arrayed
against the slavocracy.”224
Like many northerners, Horace Greeley was enraged by
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

Unlike most of his like-minded

brethren, however, Greeley had the power of the press
behind him.

Shortly before the act came to a vote in

Congress, Greeley attempted to rally his antislavery
readers, writing “If slavery is determined upon the
conquest of free territory it will inevitably be resisted
and paid in kind.… Let but the sentiment gain foothold, and
seize and appropriate whatever it can wrest from the hands
223
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of free labor, and the banner of reclamation will be
raised.”225
The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had two major
implications on the homestead question.

First, by

increasing sectionalism, it became much more difficult for
southerners in Congress to consider any homestead bill on
its own merit.

From 1854 forward, most southerners refused

even to entertain thoughts of approving a homestead measure
and began simply to vote with their section against the
bill.

Secondly, it brought together the laboring interests

in the East and the agricultural interests in the West to
form the Republican party.
Powerful southerners clearly saw how detrimental to
their own interests a homestead bill would be, including in
the rapid build-up of free soil interests in the West.
Admission of new free states, paired with the expected rise
in immigration a homestead bill would bring, would increase
the North’s—and the Republican party’s—political power.
This was dangerous to the existence of slavery because a
Republican majority might very well attempt to outlaw
bondage.
In addition, the South feared that increased northern
power would have economic consequences by making potential
225
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slave buyers less confident about the institution’s future
and therefore more conservative with their purchases of
slaves. In other words, the value of the South’s massive
stock of human capital would be decreased.
Andrew Johnson, by then a rare pro-homestead
southerner, argued that western expansion under the
Homestead Act would increase demand for southern goods and,
therefore, actually create northern dependence on slavery
and a de facto endorsement of the South’s institution.
“The time will come,” stated Johnson, “when the Northern
man will see it to be his interest to stand by the
institution of slave labor [and] the Southern man will see
it to be his interest to stand by the Union, to stand by
the agriculturists, and by the manufacturer.”226

This

reasoning is questionable at best and likely reflects
Johnson’s desire to have his cake and eat it too, by having
both slavery and a successful homestead bill.
Apart from slavery interest, however, southern members
of Congress had other reasons for opposing the homesteading
idea.

Many of these additional reasons went far beyond the

explanations that continually recurred in debates and were
at least partially intended for public consumption by their

226

Speech of Senator Andrew Johnson, May 20, 1858, in Congressional Globe, Senate, 35th Congress, 1st
Session, p. 2,272.

168
constituents.

In fact, southern opposition to homesteading

was often a case of many major political figures concealing
their true motivations from one another and their
constituents.

Two of these focused on the questions of

equity and constitutionality of the homestead bill.

These

were important and powerful arguments in their own right as
well as rationalizations that many southerners came, over
time, to believe.

The question of equity constituted many different
factors but basically boiled down to a fear that the
homestead measure would reward the undeserving and
speculators.

The Richmond Enquirer agreed when it stated

in 1854 that a homestead bill “asserts it to be the duty of
the government to supply the wants of the lazy and
improvident.”227

The Senate Public Lands Committee in 1850

issued a report describing the homestead bill as un unfair
tax on those who could not move west and take free land and
an unwarranted help for the undeserving.

The report also

expressed a fear that homesteading would reduce land
values.228
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Some press organs of the Democratic party also allied
themselves against homesteading based on the equity
argument.

The New York Courier and Enquirer called the

measure a philanthropic bill, not a political one, and
stated that the South was right to oppose it since the
North and West “embrace nine-tenths of the needy
population.… The South…to our mind correctly denounces it
as a fraud, and as a scheme that could proceed from no
other source than demagogism [sic] itself.”229
Many considered free gifts of land (or anything else)
to the poor to be damaging to the “national morale.”
Others worried that homesteading would create a thriftless
population that expected the government to provide them
everything the needed to thrive on their free farms.
Finally, many considered that providing free homesteads
constituted discrimination against earlier settlers who had
paid full price for their lands and against railroads and
veterans who had received land bounties.

The legendary

sense of southern chivalry may have at least partially
contributed to the South’s desire for fair play and its
distaste for gifts to those deemed undeserving.

Southern

pride may have contributed to that region’s image of itself
as being above the need for governmental charity.
229
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it is difficult to imagine these abstract concepts
contributing but so much to sectional unity during votes in
Congress.
The same might be said of southern opposition to the
Homestead Act based on hatred of land speculators.

There

is no doubt that speculation was a major problem in the
West.

Many worried that a homestead measure might very

well encourage, not reduce, speculation by permitting “a
rich millionaire to pick out of the gutters men who could
be induced to take up land on the share-basis” and then
sell it to a speculator for a small sum.230

Southern

opponents of homesteading were bolstered by an 1852 report
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office that called
homesteading wasteful and likely to foster speculation.
Despite these arguments, it is difficult to see how a
homestead bill could have been any worse in regard to
speculation than was the existing system.

Speculation was

already rampant in the West, and speculators could buy
nearly unlimited numbers of acres with discounted warrants.
Ironically, many of the largest and most successful
speculators were, in fact, southerners.

The southern land

speculation tradition extended back to George Washington
and beyond.
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Based on these factors, it seems likely that southern
opposition to homesteading based on the fear of land
speculation was, in sectional terms, an argument that was
deployed after the main battle lines had already been
drawn.

Fear of speculation does not seem to have had quite

as much bearing on how and why those lines were drawn in
the first place.

Many southerners also objected to the homesteading
idea based on issues of constitutionality, particularly
questioning Congress’s power to give away lands and, more
generally, the government’s power to deal with the public
lands at all.

The latter argument was based in large part

on the increasing states’ rights sentiments of the 1850s.
Many in the South, including Texas senator Louis T.
Wigfall, feared that a homestead bill would make settlers
indebted to the federal government for their lands and
livelihoods, thus weakening the power and rights of the
individual states.

The states, according to Wigfall,

should manage their own public lands.231

Debate on this

perspective of homesteading seems to have been more
concerned with the merits or detriments of centralized
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government than with the actual constitutionality of a
homestead bill.
The former issue, however—Congress’s authority to
grant free public land to settlers—was a genuine
constitutional question.

The real problem was in

reconciling two principles that produced opposite
conclusions when applied to the homesteading idea.
Congress had an explicit constitutional right to dispose of
the public domain.

The general belief existed, however,

that Congress had no such right to give away money, and
this led many to imply that as long as public lands
generated even minimal revenues, Congress had no right to
dispose of them.
Senator Andrew Johnson, a southerner, saw a difference
in Congress’s powers regarding appropriation of land as
opposed to money:
The Congress of the United States has power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare. I believe it
has the power to lay and collect duties for these legitimate
purposes; but when taxes have been laid, collected, and paid
into the treasury, I do not think it has that general scope
or that latitude in the appropriations of money that it has
over the public lands.… I am very clear on this point, that in
the disposition of the public lands they should be applied to
national purposes. If we grant the public lands to actual settlers so as to induce them to settle upon and cultivate the
public lands, can there be anything more national in its character? What is the great object of acquiring territory? Is it
not for settlement and cultivation?232
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President James Buchanan disagreed, vetoing a
homestead bill sponsored by Johnson in 1860.

Buchanan

argued that Congress held the public lands as a trustee for
the American people, and he considered the payment of
twenty-five cents per acre (a feature of Johnson’s bill)
much too low to constitute a sale.

Buchanan believed that

giving away land purchased with tax dollars was no
different—and no less unconstitutional—than giving away tax
revenues.233
Congressional authority to grant free land was also
challenged on the basis of the original state land cessions
to the federal government.

Many southerners argued that

their states had ceded lands after the Revolution for the
common good of the states.

Virginia, according to the

Richmond Enquirer, gave land for the purpose of raising
revenue and would “prefer less tilt in favor of
settlement.”234
Southern leaders succeeded in raising a somewhat
plausible constitutional objection to homesteading.
Whether or not their true opinions centered on the bill’s
constitutionality or other motives is unclear; they likely
chose to view the Constitution from whatever perspective
233
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necessary to ensure a bill they feared went against their
interests would not pass.

Historian David Potter noted a

similar case in which Texas (unconcerned about homesteading
since it had no public lands within its borders) suddenly
became a vocal proponent of preserving Indian land claims
in order to prevent approval of a northern route for a
transcontinental railroad.235
Southerners’ motives for raising constitutional
objectives to the homestead measure were certainly
insincere, especially considering that region did not
oppose liberal land policies that helped it.

While the

unconstitutionality of a homestead law provided a southern
argument against homesteading, it was likely not a real or
major reason for opposition.

Rather, it provided

southerners a way of arguing against a homestead law
without admitting publicly or privately that their
objections had everything to do with the expansion and
survival of the institution of slavery.
Closely related to the constitutional argument was the
assertion that homestead bills were class legislation.
President Buchanan argued in his 1860 veto message that the
bill discriminated in favor of farmers, calling it “a boon
exclusively conferred upon the cultivators of the soil.…
235
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There should be no new legislation which would operate to
the injury or embarrassment of the large body of
respectable artisans and laborers.”236

Others felt the

homestead bill too heavily favored urban laborers by
providing them a means to escape the drudgery of life in
eastern cities by moving westward to start over as farmers.
Andrew Johnson rebutted, arguing that the bill was not
agrarianism but should be supported as a means to prevent
cities from controlling the federal government and reduce
poverty, saying of paupers: “Interest them in the country;
pin them to the soil, and they become more reliable and
sustain themselves, and you do away with the pauperism in
this country.”237

Johnson’s statements aside, the rural

South continued to oppose homestead bills, often labeling
them as socialist.
Certainly any homestead bill would affect workers in
the urban East by providing them with an option to move
westward rather than continue on in their respective
cities.

Some historians have speculated that free land

laws actually did nothing to assist eastern laborers
because most could not afford transportation to the West
and did not possess the initial capital required to make a
236
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new homestead operational. While these assertions are
certainly somewhat correct, it cannot be said that all
eastern laborers were unable to take advantage of any
homestead law.

Small artisans, for example, whose

businesses were declining, could travel west rather than
becoming part of the working class, increasing poverty and
putting downward pressure on wages.

Easterners could also

look for opportunities to assume ownership and control of
small farms in Midwest states like Ohio and Indiana when
those farms’ original owners went farther west to claim
homesteads.

Either way, it is important to avoid making

blanket statements that a homestead bill would have no real
effect on eastern workers.

The important fact here is that

any homestead bill was viewed by many as a benefit to those
urban workers and was therefore opposed by many as being
class legislation.
Class arguments understandably resonated with eastern
capitalists that relied on poor workers for labor in their
factories.

However, why did the homestead idea arouse such

ire in the rural and elite populations of the South?

As

time went on, one reason might have been not so much what
homesteading truly was, but rather who supported it.
example, the National Reform Association (NRA), with
outspoken leaders like George Henry Evans and Horace

For
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Greeley, vocally favored homesteading.

The NRA and

Greeley’s newspaper were both identified with “isms” the
South considered very dangerous: unionism, socialism, and
particularly abolitionism.

Conservative southerners were

not above opposing anything advocated by “radical” groups
like the NRA.
It is possible that much of the South’s opposition to
the homestead bill was, in fact, largely a reaction against
change in general.

Antebellum southern society was

somewhat backward-looking.

While northern capitalists

sought the building of a vast economic empire founded on
western agriculture and eastern industry bound together by
railroads and canals, southern planters often reminisced
about the bygone days of Washington, Jefferson, and
plantations along the Potomac.

The cotton empire was at

its peak in the 1850s, and many southerners saw no need for
change.

This mentality—and their concerns over slavery’s

future and expansion—led them to oppose homesteading long
after many in the North conceded that it was all but
inevitable.
The social upheavals of the 1840s also increased
resistance to change in the South and other regions.
Changes to land policies had to overcome a great deal of
inertia in any case because, in historian Benjamin Horace
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Hibbard’s words, “inertia works just as powerfully in
keeping a force in operation as in holding a body at
rest.”238

In other words, many sought to implement

homesteading to bring about change while others fought
against it to prevent any change from occurring.

Many

southern planters and politicians resisted any homestead
law because it threatened to change their stable way of
life.

When coupled with real and exaggerated claims about

the bill’s threat to slavery, southern opposition to it
became as inevitable as many in the North thought a
homestead act to be.
Another factor contributing to southern opposition to
homesteading was the reason historically most important to
southern hostility to liberal land policies in general:
concerns about tariffs.

Besides slavery, the tariff was

perhaps the most important and persistent political issue
of the second half of the nineteenth century.

Tariffs

often had profound influence on federal land policies.

The

South was an active exporter and a tax-bearing importer
with no real manufacturing sector a tariff could protect.
This meant the South received little benefit from a high
tariff but bore most of its burden.

Since tariffs and land

sales made up two principal sources of government revenue,
238
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southerners (and others who supported low tariffs)
regularly pushed for maximum land sale revenue to decrease
the need for higher amounts of tariff revenue.239

The

homestead measure was the ultimate example of low land sale
revenue, and many believed that even if land given away
under the bill would not have been sold, it could still
have been put to better use by being held to guarantee the
public debt.
If the tariff issue was still important to southerners
in the 1850s, then the land sales revenue argument may well
have been quite influential in forming southern opposition
to homesteading.

Many historians, however, have minimized

the tariff’s role in the political environment encountered
by proposed homestead bills.

For example, two preeminent

historians of federal land policies, Benjamin Horace
Hibbard and Roy M. Robbins, agreed that the goal of
obtaining revenue from public lands gave way to the goal of
settlement of public lands as early as the 1841 passage of
the Preemption Act.240

Others argued that by the time of

the Preemption Act, the South was complacent about the
tariff and viewed land policies strictly through the lens
of the extension of slavery.
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However, such absolute judgments are difficult to
make.

Since slavery and tariff concerns pulled in the same

direction with respect to land policy, it is impossible and
incorrect to select a specific date on which one became
more important than the other.

Surely many southerners

still had legitimate concerns about the tariff throughout
the 1850s, even as slavery expansion became the nation’s
preeminent issue and the source of public friction between
North and South.

Whether southern tariff concerns at this

late period were rooted in decades-old habits or because
the South was relatively prosperous during the 1850s, it is
ludicrous to claim that the issue no longer mattered.
President Buchanan touched on the issue in his 1860
Homestead Act veto, decrying the unfairness of the loss of
revenue the bill would mean for the older states.241

Though

the tariff issue was certainly less important by the 1850s
than it had been in previous decades, and the slavery
factor was correspondingly more important, it was still an
active component of southern opposition to homesteading.
Many homestead law opponents also feared that
homesteading would not only financially harm land grant
recipients in new states, but would lower land values in
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old states as well.

If the theory that a homestead measure

would lead to emigration from old states to the West proved
true, then a lower rural population in the old states would
mean less demand for land and declining land values in the
East.

A homestead law’s potential effects on the values of

their own lands was something property owners in many areas
of the country had to consider, and this was another issue
Buchanan addressed in his veto, stating, “The offer of free
farms would probably have a powerful effect in encouraging
emigration especially from states like Illinois, Tennessee,
and Kentucky, to the west of the Mississippi, and could not
fail to reduce the price of property within their
limits.”242

Fear of lost land values and revenues could be

a very powerful factor in homestead opposition.
The negative effect on land values may have been even
more so in the South if a homestead measure had expanded
cotton lands.

The South had such a large share of the

world’s cotton production that international cotton prices
were determined there.
exporters.

Also, the West and South were bulk

Increased food production in the West meant

higher international freight rates; these increased
shipping costs were not offset by lower food prices because
the South was mostly self-sufficient in food production.
242
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Therefore, even apart from its potential harm to
slavery’s existence and expansion, southerners believed
that western homesteading had the potential to cause them
great economic harm.

Southern pride and prestige were on

the line as well, since many saw the rising fortunes of the
West as resulting in declining importance for the South.
One historian even went so far as to speculate that much of
the South’s opposition to homesteading flowed from outright
feelings of jealousy and helplessness.243

The South, stated

historian George M. Stephenson, feared isolation from the
Union’s main economic, cultural, and demographic flows.
The North and East did not have such fears since they would
always be connected to the West by investment and market
ties.
In other words, the West was linked with expanding
capitalism and development, not decaying plantations and
morally questionable domestic institutions. East-West
connections grew stronger as railroads developed, and
western trade shifted over time from flowing south on the
Mississippi to New Orleans to heading directly west via
canals and, later, railroads.

If southern prestige was a

contributing factor to that region’s opposition to a
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homestead law, then a trade shift away from New Orleans was
surely another blow to that prestige.

Inferiority complexes aside, the South clearly had a
number of reasons to oppose any homestead law.

Though

concerns about the equity and constitutionality of the
measure appear to have been more talking points than actual
factors that could lead to unified southern opposition,
general southern conservatism and resistance to social and
economic change did contribute to anti-homestead feelings
below the Mason-Dixon Line.

The view of homesteading as

class legislation that would benefit the urban poor played
into southern fears.

Other economic concerns, especially

the fear that homesteading would lead to higher tariffs and
lower land values in the older states, also set many in the
South against the “free land” idea.

Apprehension that

expansion to the West meant decreased economic
opportunities and southern prominence were prevalent as
well.
These considerations, when combined with the
preeminent fears of what homesteading would mean to the
backbone of southern life and economy—slavery—led many
southerners to fight tooth and nail against any
homesteading measure.

For decades, the South successfully
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prevented any homestead act from advancing in Congress.
When one finally made it through the national legislature
to the White House in 1860, a northern-born president who
feared angering the South over any issue because he did not
want a civil war to erupt during his administration vetoed
the measure.

Only after the North-South relationship had

broken down completely and that war began could the
Republican party advance the Homestead Act of 1862 and
place it on the desk of a much more sympathetic president
than James Buchanan.
That North-South relationship was always strained, but
it deteriorated quickly during the 1850s.

Politicians in

both sectors but especially the South began to adopt
sectional rather than national outlooks during this decade.
Many in the South began to view their region as united on
every major issue (including homesteading) and having a
purpose and destiny apart from the North’s. Southern
prospects of any meaningful alliance with the West
diminished as economics and transportation bound that
region with the North and East.

Southerners had realized

for years that if they could not expand their trading
routes and opportunities with the West, that region would
become tied to the North.

When this occurred, the South

had little choice but to retreat into arguing against land
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distribution laws that would lead to expanded settlement in
the West and increased political and economic power for the
North.

The homesteading issue, then, was clearly a factor

in the South’s adoption of a “states’ rights” and
constitutional minority rights mentality.
There is no doubt that southerners had many of what
they viewed as legitimate reasons for opposing the free
land idea that eventually culminated in the Homestead Act.
Those reasons may all be boiled down to the simple fact
that many southerners believed that a homestead bill would
run counter to the interests of slaveholders and cause
economic ruin to their region.

Anything that threatened

the existence, expansion, and future of slavery was a
potential economic disaster for the South since that
institution was the backbone of the southern economy.

That

the homestead idea was eventually championed by the hated
Republican party merely confirmed to southerners that free
land was an abolitionist scheme meant to harm the South
politically, socially, and economically.
When viewed from the South’s point of view, opposition
to homesteading was completely rational because it
threatened the very fabric of southern society.

The idea

of a homestead measure existed in the world of politics,
and in that world, those in power must look after their own
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interests and those of their constituents.

Though many

poor, non-slaveholding southerners may very well have
benefited from homesteading, they did not hold political
power.

Southern politicians opposed homesteading for years

based on their own understanding of what was good for the
South and would guarantee that region’s economic and
political survival.
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CHAPTER SIX
REALIZATION: 1860-1863
On February 29, 1860, Pennsylvania Representative
Galusha A. Grow gave a lengthy speech on the House floor
extolling the virtues of a homestead bill.

He provided a

short history of federal land policies back to the
Revolution and rejected outright the notion that the
government should forgo a homestead law because of any
sizeable revenue generated by land sales.

Comparing the

present system of land distribution to “feudalism,” Grow
sounded downright Jeffersonian when he portrayed man’s
right to farmland as a gift from God: “Since the hour of
the primal curse, ‘In the sweat of the face shalt though
eat bread,’ man has been forced to the cultivation of the
soil to obtain subsistence for himself and the means of
promoting the welfare of the race.”

What right did the

government have to prevent man from tilling the soil when
the directive to do so came from God?

In Grow’s view, the

government had only to make the country’s abundant land
available to those willing to farm it.
Building on his characterization of the existing
system as feudal in nature, Grow launched a scathing attack
on land speculation and speculators.

He portrayed them as

preying on poor settlers who wished only to have a small
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farm and a home and blasted his congressional colleagues
for perpetrating a system that favored the strong over the
weak.

“It is a struggle,” he dramatically stated, “between

the bones and sinews of man and dollars and cents.”

In

Grow’s estimate, many poor farmers paid speculators three
or four hundred percent for a piece of land.

He concluded:

“Why should not the legislation of the country be so
changed as to prevent for the future the evils of land
monopoly, by setting apart the vast and unoccupied
territories of the Union, and consecrating them forever in
free homes for free men?”244
Grow’s support of homestead legislation is telling for
a number of reasons.

First, he was a Republican.

As shown

in previous chapters, the young Republican party sought a
homestead bill from its earliest days and, in fact, formed
in the West as a coalition of those who hoped to restrict
the spread of slavery and make land available to settlers.
As Grow made his speech, the party was less than three
months away from its nominating convention, at which it
would write its 1860 national platform and select its
presidential candidate.

The party would surely debate

homestead legislation at its Chicago convention and seek to
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include a plank favoring it in its platform.

The candidate

selected would have to demonstrate support for a homestead
bill or, at the very least, be able to live with running
his campaign based on a platform that included advocacy of
such a bill.
Grow’s speech is also noteworthy in that it
demonstrated how his party’s vision of homesteading had
evolved over the years.

In its earliest days and, to some

extent, even at the beginning of the 1860s, Republicans
viewed homesteading strictly as a critical tie to their
own—and the nation’s—Jeffersonian past.

Later, they added

the incentive of providing free lands as a cure-all for
urban poverty and overcrowding.

Now, however, their

argument had evolved into an attack against land monopolies
and speculators.

As historian Heather Cox Richardson

stated, “Republicans believed that speculators blocked
settlement, as well as squeezed capital from settlers.”245
Passage of a homestead bill helped Republicans promote
agriculture in the Jeffersonian tradition while building a
national system of capital and commerce.

It was no

coincidence that Republicans sought simultaneously to
advance homesteading, a transcontinental railroad, land
grant colleges, new taxes and tariffs, and a national
245

Richardson, The Greatest Nation of the Earth, p. 142.

190
banking system.

While the benefits and virtues of farming

for its own sake were real enough to Republicans, they
regarded as critical to the country’s advancement the
construction of a truly national system that would provide
for commerce, communications, education, agriculture, and
finance.

In this way, Grow and his fellow Republicans saw

the homestead bill as not only a long-cherished goal, but
also as a critical piece of building the nation and
securing its future success.
Galusha Grow’s longtime support of homesteading
legislation was based on his own personal history and
geography.

His life began in a poor farming community in

Connecticut.

His father died when Grow was young, leaving

the family in dire financial straits.

The family moved

west to Pennsylvania for better opportunities and prospered
there.

Grow had personally seen how transformative

westward migration and access to prime farmland could be,
and he sought to extend that opportunity to all via
homesteading.

Many early pro-homestead Republicans had

similar life histories of westward movement.

These

experiences likely influenced their advocacy of homestead
legislation.246
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Just

a

week

after

Grow’s

impassioned

speech,

Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois, himself a strong
believer in the homestead idea, reported another piece of
homesteading legislation from the House Committee on Public
Lands.

Six days later, after surprisingly little debate,

the House passed the bill by a 115 to 65 vote. Just one
negative vote came from a free-state representative; just
one positive vote came from a slave-state representative.247
Senator James Mason of Virginia made clear that
opposition to the homestead bill was a sectional issue,
saying that Republicans supported the bill because “the
great feature of this policy is…by means of the gratuitous
distribution of the public lands, to preoccupy the
Territories by population from the free States, and thus
incidentally, but of necessity, to exclude slavery.”248
Mason and many other southerners saw homestead legislation
as an overtly political ploy by Republicans to keep slavery
out of the territories.
In this assessment, he was not necessarily wrong.
While many Republicans truly believed in the virtues and
advantages of a homestead bill, their party had, in fact,
been founded on the single-minded purpose of prohibiting
247
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the spread of slavery to the western territories.
homestead act was one way to do just that.

A

If it pleased

the many advocates of free land among their ranks and made
them more loyal Republicans, so much the better.
Despite the protests of Mason and other southerners, a
compromise homestead bill passed both houses of Congress in
May 1860.

It was not the perfect bill for which many

advocates had so long argued.

It provided land only to

household heads and imposed an up-front price of 25 cents
per acre.

For those who saw no constitutional right for

the government to distribute free land, this provision
assuaged their concerns by requiring settlers to pay at
least something for the property.
In the Senate, future vice president and president
Andrew Johnson was a key player in securing passage of this
compromise.

In the pages of the New York Daily Tribune,

longtime homestead advocate Horace Greeley offered measured
praise: “The House of Representatives has finally consented
to take a half loaf rather than no bread with regard to the
Free Homesteads.… We do not object to taking this as an
installment.… But, understand that this half loaf is
accepted only for what it is, and that the friends of the
Free Homesteads principle will not rest till their whole
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object is attained.”249

Greeley saw the compromise bill as

a better-than-nothing proposition that would still reduce
land prices and take important steps toward reducing land
speculation.
Despite homestead advocates’ joy at finally passing a
bill through both houses of Congress, they were well aware
that President James Buchanan, a Pennsylvania Democrat, was
unlikely to sign it.

The Senate version of the legislation

went to the president on June 19; he returned a veto
message on June 22.

In it, he expressed his personal doubt

that Congress had the constitutional power to grant free
land to settlers. Despite the nominal land price listed in
the bill, Buchanan characterized the law as “an absolute
and unqualified gift.”250
He also worried that homesteads would prove injurious
to veterans holding military land bounties and provide
farmers with an unfair advantage over those in other lines
of work.

“The mechanic who emigrates to the West and

pursues his calling must labor long before he can purchase
a quarter acre of land, whilst the tiller of the soil who
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accompanies him obtains a farm at once by the bounty of the
Government.”251
Finally, Buchanan worried that land speculation would
increase exponentially, not decrease, when lands were
available for just 25 cents per acre.

“Men will not pay

$1.25 for lands,” he wrote, “when they can purchase them
for one-fifth of that price.”

He concluded his message by

stating his belief that homestead legislation would go far
toward undermining American individualism and its “noble
spirit of independence” and lead to “pernicious social
theories which have proved so disastrous in other
countries.”252

Though he never mentioned slavery or

sectional concerns, many felt sure he issued the veto in
deference to his southern allies in the Democratic party.
Horace Greeley and other longtime homestead supporters
were enraged but not surprised.

“The Northwest was already

so unanimously averse to him that he could only intensify
its dislike into hatred; but that seems an object worthy of
his ambition,” Greely wrote three days after the veto.

“So

the last hope of obtaining any good from this Congress or
this administration has vanished.
like again?”253
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Republicans met in Chicago in May 1860 to select their
presidential candidate and write their campaign platform.
Sectional concerns ruled the convention, and issues of land
distribution in the West, though secondary, received much
attention as well.

Many Republicans stood firm in their

desire to pass homestead legislation and viewed it as a way
to keep southerners from carrying slavery into the West.
Republicans also rejected any characterization of
settlers taking advantage of a homestead bill as beggars or
paupers.

Many homestead opponents had publicly stated over

the years that anyone looking to obtain free land under a
homestead act must be poor or lazy.

Republicans instead

chose to view those willing to journey onto the frontier to
establish small farms as rugged, noble yeoman in the
tradition of Thomas Jefferson.

When the delegates

completed the party’s platform, the thirteenth plank
affirmed: “That we protest against any sale or alienation
to others of the Public Lands held by actual settlers, and
against any view of the Homestead policy which regards the
settlers as paupers or supplicants for public bounty; and
we demand the passage by Congress of the complete and
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satisfactory Homestead measure which has already passed the
House.”254
The platform also contained measures supporting
federal creation of a transcontinental railroad and
national funding of harbor and river improvements.

In this

platform, the Republican party reached back to its Whig
roots to support internal improvements, promote commerce,
and create agricultural opportunities.

They rejected

outright anyone’s right to extend slavery into the western
territories.

Plank eight asserted that “the normal

condition of all the territory of the United States is
freedom.… We deny the authority of Congress, of a
territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give
legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United
States.”

The platform also condemned the reopening of the

African slave trade, demanded immediate admittance of
Kansas as a free state, and called the Democratic belief
that the Constitution provided for slavery in the
territories “dangerous political heresy.”255

Finally, the

Republicans selected Abraham Lincoln as their presidential
candidate.
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The Democrats, meanwhile, met in Baltimore a few weeks
after the Republicans and adopted a platform that did not
address the homestead issue.

Democrats expressed support

for a transcontinental railroad and called for immediate
acquisition of Cuba.

They agreed to abide by any future

Supreme Court decision on the right to carry slaves into
the territories and called the actions by several state
legislatures to avoid enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law
“subversive of the Constitution and revolutionary in their
effect.”256
As the sectional crisis worsened during Lincoln’s
campaign, Republicans paid less attention than usual to the
homestead issue.

Lincoln himself never mentioned it in any

writings or speeches after he became his party’s nominee.
Yet some continued to raise the issue.

Horace Greeley kept

the push for a homestead bill at the forefront in the New
York Daily Tribune, and some notable Republicans mentioned
it in speeches and letters.

Carl Shurz, a prominent German

immigrant soon to become a Union general, addressed a St.
Louis crowd and pointedly linked the slavery and land
distribution issues in the mocking voice of a southerner:
“We want the Negro in the territories.… Slavery cannot
256
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exist except with the system of large farms, and your
homestead bills establish the system of small farms with
which free labor is inseparably connected.

We are,

therefore, obliged to demand that all such mischievous
projects be abandoned.”257
Although the homestead bill received less attention
during the 1860 campaign than it might have otherwise due
to rising sectional tensions, the decades of agitation both
for and against it contributed to those very tensions.
Lincoln’s election to the presidency and the subsequent
disappearance of southern Democrats from Congress seemed to
guarantee that a new homestead bill would sail through the
national legislature and be quickly signed into law.

In

reality, it was not quite as easy as many Republicans
assumed it would be.

However, as historian Benjamin Horace

Hibbard noted, “The project of free land was, after March
4, 1861, in the hands of its friends.”258

President Lincoln called Congress into special session
on July 4, 1861 to deal with the secession and rebellion of
southern states.

During that special session, Republican

Representative Cyrus Aldrich of Minnesota introduced yet
257
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another homestead bill, which the House quickly referred to
the Committee on Agriculture.

No further action was taken

on it until the start of the next session of the 37th
Congress.

Aldrich’s introduction of the bill during the

special session called specifically to discuss raising
troops and destroying the rebellion demonstrates just how
serious many Republicans and westerners were about the
issue.

They simply would not let such an optimal moment

pass—one in which their party firmly controlled Congress
and the presidency and during which no real southern
opposition was present to block the legislation.
On December 4, 1861, just two days after the second
session began, Owen Lovejoy reported the homestead bill
from the Committee on Agriculture to the full House of
Representatives.

According to House procedure, he did so

erroneously and improperly.

Several members of the House,

including the “Copperhead” Clement Vallandingham of Ohio,
called him on it.

Vallandingham served on the Committee on

Public Lands, which was also at that moment crafting its
own homestead measure.

While Lovejoy was in the wrong when

he claimed to present the bill on behalf of the Agriculture
committee, Vallandingham likely opposed him specifically to
give his own committee more time to draft a bill to its
liking.

Lovejoy may, in turn, have acted as he did to
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stall Vallandingham’s bill.

Lovejoy and his ally in the

homestead movement, Galusha Grow, now Speaker of the House,
worried that Vallandingham and his committee would allow in
their bill cash bounties for military members instead of
the opportunity to claim homesteads after the war.

This

would surely be unpopular with congressmen who worried
about the government’s already shaky financial status and
might make them less likely to approve homesteading
legislation.
Vallandingham called for Lovejoy’s bill to be referred
to the Committee on Public Lands for further consideration.
Naturally, Lovejoy objected.
vote on the bill immediately.

He demanded that the House
Representative John Potter

of Wisconsin, a Republican who was also a member of
Vallandingham’s committee, publicly scolded Lovejoy: “I am
surprised that the gentleman from Illinois should have
taken the course he has, and I hope that any motion to
refer the bill to the Committee on Public Lands
prevails.”259

As a last-ditch effort, Lovejoy proposed that

the bill be returned to his Committee on Agriculture, but
he did not succeed.

The proposed legislation was instead

sent to the Committee on Public Lands.
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A week later, Potter reported the bill from the Public
Lands Committee.

It was nearly identical to several that

had passed the House in previous years.

The bill offered

160 acres of unappropriated public land worth $1.25 per
acre (or less) or 80 acres in areas where land was worth
$2.50 per acre.

Small administrative fees aside, the land

was cost-free.

The claimant needed only to stay on it and

improve it for five years to obtain title to the land from
the government.

Additionally, homestead lands could not be

considered assets against any of the claimant’s debts until
the title was earned.
As Lovejoy, Grow, and others feared, however, the bill
included the cash bounty provision for military service,
offering $30 to any man who served three months or more
during the rebellion crisis.260

Lovejoy rose before the

House on December 10 to ask Potter once more to substitute
the old bill for the new, noting that the old version was
the true bill the Republicans supported and “without being
pledged to which, the Republicans never could have elected
their President.”261

Potter refused, and the Speaker of the

House ended the debate.
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The issue arose again on December 18 when
Representative William S. Holman of Indiana spoke in favor
of land bounties for soldiers rather than the cash bounties
guaranteed them in the Potter version of the Homestead Act.
Ohio’s Vallandingham, a Democrat, voiced his opposition to
Holman’s idea and demanded immediate action on the current
version of the bill.

“The effect of the homestead policy

may, indeed, be to diminish the sales of those lands, and
thereby the revenue,” Vallandingham told the House.

“But

the answer to that is that the settlement of the lands
increases their value, brings in a larger population,
extends the basis of taxation, gives greater wealth, and
thereby increases the resources of the state, and in this
way returns to the Treasury, a much larger sum than would
otherwise be received from the sale of the land.”262
Surprisingly, Vallandingham sounded positively Republican
as he urged a vote on the bill.
Holman, Vallandingham, and others entered into a
lengthy discussion about the bill on the House floor.

The

Ohioan expressed opposition to offering both land and
monetary bounties to soldiers and worried that, as often
happened with soldier land warrants, speculators would
gobble them up from military members who had no intention
262
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of ever actually living on the granted land and instead
would be happy to unload them for a price.

Vallandingham

noted that ex-soldiers selling bounty warrants would be
lucky to receive twenty cents per acre from speculators,
while those same lands would increase in value ten times or
more for taxation purposes if homesteaded.

“Let them have

their bounty in money,” Vallandingham argued, “and then,
also in common with every citizen, a free homestead in
land.”263
Justin Morrill of Vermont rose to speak and proposed
postponing the entire homesteading debate.

Morrill still

viewed the public domain as a potential source of income
for the federal government and was not willing to see that
source given away just yet.

“It must be admitted,” he

stated, “that here at home…the public lands are a resource
that is relied upon as a security for the payment of our
public debt, and of the interest thereon.… It will be very
disastrous to our public credit to part with any portion of
our means at the present time.”264

Morrill was the long-

time champion of a land grant college bill, and many
believed he spoke against the homestead measure because he
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thought its approval threatened the chances of his pet
legislation passing Congress.
While some surely agreed with Morrill, the argument
that the public lands were an important revenue source for
the federal government was largely discredited or ignored
by the early 1860s.

As evidenced in the arguments of

several House members and senators, Republicans in
particular felt sure that the public domain’s real value
was in future tax revenues, not the few dollars per acre
settlers initially paid for the lands.

When coupled with

the Republicans’ strong interest in populating western
lands with anti-slavery homesteaders, it is clear why the
Homestead Act became a policy objective of the Republicandominated 37th Congress.
Representative George Julian of Indiana rose to
counter Morrill’s argument:

“It is shown by the report of

the Secretary of the Interior that these public lands have
paid but a few dollars more than the expense of keeping up
the land system.

And I believe it is true that, during the

last twelve or thirteen years, these lands have ceased to
be of any practical or substantial benefit to the country
as a source of revenue.

Our purpose is, or ought to be, to

have them settled and improved, and thereby made the
subject of taxation and the sources of wealth to the
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Government.”265

Julian expressed the views of most, but

certainly not all, Republicans.

He urged immediate action

on the bill.
Others who purported to favor homestead legislation
worried less about the bill’s provisions and more about its
timing.

John Covode of Pennsylvania argued that the bill

should not go into effect until one year after the end of
the Civil War.

He feared that passing the law immediately

would “give the persons who decline to go into the service
of the country an undue advantage over those who are now in
the service.

They would have the opportunity to occupy the

choice land, while the soldiers now engaged in the service
are not in a position to avail themselves of the same
privilege.”266
Thomas M. Edwards of New Hampshire worried about
weakening public credit in the midst of the war: “In the
present condition of the country, there is…a question which
takes precedence of this and of all other questions, and
that is, the question of finance.

That question, as it

controls the whole expenditure of money in this country
today, so it should control, in my judgment, any
disposition which should be made of the public domain.… If
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we do not fight the battles of the country and maintain the
integrity of the country and the continuance of the
Government, we shall have no lands to bestow upon
anybody.”267
Both Samuel C. Fessenden of Maine and William D.
Kelley of Pennsylvania fretted over disposing of public
lands which they thought might prove profitable at some
point in the future.

New York’s Roscoe Conkling wanted

more time to ponder a land bounty system and cash bounties.
“I think it will require an argument dexterous and strong
to convince this House or the country that the way to
improve our credit is to give away our property,” Conkling
said.

“I believe, sir, that land is the basis of credit,

and I believe…that at a period later than this we can judge
better than we can judge now what it is prudent to do, if
anything, in regard to the public domain.”268
John J. Crittenden, a Kentucky Unionist, advocated for
abandoning the homesteading debate altogether until the
successful conclusion of the war: “We are now engaged in a
war, the greatest war the world ever saw.

It is better for

these very men whom you desire to benefit that you should
reserve these lands and apply every dollar they can yield,
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and make them yield as many dollars as you can, for the
benefit of the Army.

They will be more benefited by that

than by any such measure as this.”269
Justin Morrill rose again and formally suggested
postponing debate on the homestead bill until February
1862.

Wisconsin’s John Potter was incredulous.

“I must

confess my surprise,” he stated, “at the apparent change
which has taken place upon the part of some gentlemen who
have hitherto supported the homestead policy.”

In Potter’s

mind, many of those now raising questions about the bill
had in the past concurred that homesteading was a wise
policy to adopt.

Why, he wondered, was the policy wise

before but not so now?

“Pass this measure now,” he argued,

“and before February next tens of thousands of these
acres…may be occupied and made to contribute thereby to the
aggregate wealth of the country from which the revenues of
the Government are derived.”270
Like Potter, Owen Lovejoy, who had labored so long for
passage of a homestead bill, was distraught.

He despaired

that postponing the bill would be its “final defeat.”

He

accused the opponents of proposing the bounty amendment for
that very purpose and seeking to be “courteous to kill it
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indirectly than vote it down directly.”

To those with

concerns about the effects the bill might have on the
public credit, Lovejoy proclaimed that “everyone knows that
cultivated real estate is a better basis of credit than
uncultivated, and we shall derive more by that means than
we can hope for from the sale of the lands if this bill is
voted down.”271
The House voted on Morrill’s postponement motion.

To

the dismay of Potter, Lovejoy, and others, the motion
carried, 88 to 50.

Congress shelved further debate on the

Homestead Act until February 1862.
Almost all of the Representatives seeking to amend the
homestead bill or avoid voting on it altogether were
eastern Republicans, yet all worried over various aspects
of approving homestead legislation.

Any Republicans who

felt confident that their domination of Congress and
control of the presidency would make passage of a homestead
bill easy were clearly mistaken.

While many House members

agreed with Potter, Lovejoy, and others that immediate
passage of the homestead bill was good policy for the
nation, they must also have worried about the political
consequences of the delay.

If the bill could be pushed

aside in the name of concentrating on the war, it was
271
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conceivable that it could be postponed indefinitely—or at
least until the Union won the war.

Once the war ended,

would a homestead bill be a high priority for a rebuilding
nation?

By putting off the bill, were the Republicans

squandering the advantage they held in Congress?

If

homestead legislation could not pass now, could it ever?
Why did a surprising number of Republicans oppose the bill?

The House of Representatives resumed consideration of
the Homestead Act on February 21, 1862.

House Speaker

Galusha Grow, a longtime champion of the bill, took an
unprecedented and dramatic step: he summoned Elihu B.
Washburne of Illinois to the Speaker’s chair and descended
to the House floor to speak in favor of the bill.

Grow

reminded his colleagues that the bill had been discussed
for years and approved by many different groups, including
both houses of Congress, state assemblies, and national
conventions.

“There has never,” he stated, “been a measure

before Congress so emphatically approved by a majority of
the American people.… I am aware that it was never very
popular with the Representatives of that portion of the
people now in rebellion.”
To defuse the argument of those who still sought
profit from the public domain, Grow quoted the Secretary of
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the Interior as saying that the public lands no longer
generated significant revenue for the government.

He also

attempted to counter those seeking a bounty provision for
soldiers, noting that Congress had already legislated cash
bounties of one hundred dollars for Union troops at the end
of their service.

“Whatever benefit the Government would

confer upon the soldier, let it be made in a way to be a
substantial advantage to him without being of lasting
injury to anyone else.”
Finally, Grow compared the noble yeoman farmer to the
Union soldier in the field, calling them “the grand army of
the sons of toil, whose lives, from the cradle to the
grave, are a constant warfare with the elements, with the
unrelenting obstacles of nature, and the merciless
barbarities of savage life.

Their battlefields are on the

prairies and wilderness of your frontiers; their
achievements…smoothing the pathways of science and
cultivation in their march over the continent.”

Would it

not serve the best interests of the nation, Grow argued, to
make as much of the public domain as possible available to
these hearty souls that would simultaneously create
millions of acres of new farmland as well as millions of
acres of taxable property, saving them from “the grasp of
speculation?”
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Grow’s brief but dramatic speech concluded with a
final plea on behalf of those would-be homesteaders.

“I

submit…that the best disposition that can be made of the
public domain is to set it apart and consecrate it forever
in homes for freemen relieved from the burdens of unjust
legislation, and secure in all their earnings with which to
develop the elements of a higher and better
civilization.”272

Here he harkened back not only to his own

pro-Homestead Act speech from February 1860, but also to
Thomas Jefferson’s statements on the nobility of yeomanry
from nearly a century before.
With his grand gesture of descending from the
Speaker’s chair and his evoking of Jeffersonian vision,
Grow undoubtedly hoped to inspire other members of the
House to support the homestead bill when it came back up
for debate.

His words must surely have been aimed

particularly at fellow Republicans who had wavered in their
support two months before.

Grow would only have to wait a

week to determine the effect of his words and years of
labor in the service of the homestead movement.
The House resumed consideration of the bill on
February 28.
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rose and spoke at length about the lack of a land bounty
provision in the current version of the bill.

He pledged

his “unqualified support” of the homesteading idea but
still felt compelled to speak up for the bounty provision
as a just reward for those defending the Union on the
battlefield.

He viewed soldier bounties as an investment

in the future survival of liberty, saying that the children
of those granted bounty lands “will become the noblest
defenders of the Republic, because the soil on which they
were reared was the gift of the Republic as the reward of
the patriotism and valor of their fathers.”273
In this speech, Holman also did a passable job of
summing up opposition to homesteading of the southerners
who were no longer in Congress to argue against it:

the

Homestead Act would bring “new States into the Union,
founded on the idea of free labor, and thus increase the
preponderance of that form of labor in the control of the
Federal Government, and because the revenue derived from
the public lands diminished the duty on foreign imports,
which the South, as a producing people, regarded favorable
to their interests.”274
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Another Indiana representative, James A. Cravens, also
spoke in favor of the bounty amendment for soldiers.

Like

Holman, Cravens professed his support for the homesteading
idea:

“A homestead bill, well guarded, I think is a

measure which involves more the prosperity of the western
country than any measure that can be adopted by this
House.… In southern Indiana…they believe that to be the
wisest policy…which will bring into settlement and
cultivation at the earliest practicable period all the
uncultivated lands of the West.”275

Like Holman, Cravens

professed to believe that those serving in uniform for the
Union deserved some extra measure of consideration above
the liberal provisions of the current version of the
Homestead Act.
William Windom of Minnesota responded to Holman and
Cravens with a lengthy speech detailing the long and
tortured history of the homestead bill in Congress.

He

rejected the logic behind the soldier bounty amendment.

He

pointed out that the current version of the bill made
homestead lands available to both citizens and soldiers,
and that those in military service for the Union would also
receive a cash bounty of either thirty or one hundred
dollars, depending on when and for what duration they
275
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enlisted.

Therefore, according to Windom, the government

was already pledged to “giving to all our soldiers a farm
of one hundred and sixty acres, and the means of going to
it and partially improving it.”276
Providing additional bounties or warrants to soldiers
was, in Windom’s assessment, unwise.

Most soldiers would

likely seek to sell their warrants, and the current rate
for such lands was usually less than fifty cents per acre.
“What will they sell for when you issue 100,000,000 acres
more?” Windom asked rhetorically.

With little or no

additional demand and an increased supply of over one
thousand percent, the warrants would rapidly lose value,
and the soldiers to whom they were issued would get nothing
for them.

Windom argued that this would help no soldiers,

but only speculators.

“I am not willing,” he declared,

“for the sake of making a pompous show of regard for the
soldier, thus to inflict upon him an actual injury.”277
Windom spoke at length and quoted numerous statistics
to show that adopting a homestead policy without any
additional land warrant or bounty provisions would actually
increase the funds in the federal treasury more than sales
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of public lands ever could.

He finished with a dramatic

flourish worthy of Thomas Jefferson and Galusha Grow:
Beyond the Mississippi—stretching away toward the setting
sun, lies the most magnificent public domain on earth.
Slumbering in its bosom is a giant energy of productiveness,
which, if roused by the hand of industry, would pour the
wealth of empires at our feet. In our own country and among the oppressed of Europe are millions with strong arms
and brave hearts, who would gladly perform this task for
you. They need your lands, but have not the means to purchase them. Your lands demand their industry, and the Government wants the wealth which their toil would produce.
Remove the barrier which a mistaken policy has interposed,
and a wilderness transformed into teeming farms and thriving
cities, a Treasury replenished, and the gratitude of loyal
millions will be your reward.278

Wisconsin’s John Potter took the floor after Windom
and offered his agreement with the Minnesotan’s sentiments.
Potter expanded on the issue of the homestead bill’s
potential appeal to European immigrants and argued for the
most liberal version of the bill possible, which he hoped
would “induce the emigrant to seek a home here, and invest
his capital and direct his labor to the development of the
now unproductive resources of the country.”279
The House of Representatives then voted on the current
version of the Homestead Act, which included the thirty
dollar cash bounties for soldiers, and approved it by an
overwhelming majority of 105 to 16.
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Republican voted “yea.”

Those voting “nay” were either

Democrats (seven) or Unionists (nine).280
After the February 28 vote, the House version of the
bill went to the Senate on March 3.
to the Committee on Public Lands.

There it was referred

James Harlan of Iowa

chaired that committee, which also included Andrew Johnson
of Tennessee, a longtime supporter of homestead
legislation.

The bill seemed sure to sail through the

committee and head to the full Senate for a vote.

However,

President Lincoln soon appointed Johnson as military
governor of Tennessee, so a sure “yea” vote disappeared.
Unionist Senator Joseph Wright of Indiana replaced Johnson
on the Committee on Public Lands.281
The Senate committee held onto the bill for three
weeks and appears to have heavily debated the cash bounty
provision.

When the committee reported the bill to the

full Senate on March 25, the soldier bounties had been
deleted.

The Senate took no action on the bill until April

30, when Benjamin Wade of Ohio moved that the bill be
considered immediately.

However, after realizing that

Senator Harlan, chair of the Committee on Public Lands, was

280
281

Roster of votes in Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1,035.
Curry, Blueprint for Modern America, p. 106.

217
not present, Wade suggested postponing the debate until
Harlan could attend.282
The Senate took up debate on the bill on Friday, May
2.

The bill was read, and the members approved several

minor amendments affecting the wording of the legislation
that the Committee on Public Lands recommended.

It was

here that the provision was inserted preventing anyone who
had borne arms against the United States from taking
advantage of homesteading.

The full Senate also agreed to

the Committee’s recommendation for removing the thirty
dollar cash bounties for soldiers.283
Unionist Senator John S. Carlile of Virginia then took
the floor to oppose the homestead bill.

“I am opposed at

all times,” he said, “and particularly at a time like the
present, to disposing of the public domain of this country
without adequate consideration.

I do not think it wise,

when we rely upon loans for the means to defray the
expenses of the Government, that we should dispose of any
of the available property…out of which means could be had
to enable us to repay those loans.”

Carlile worried that

disposing of the public domain would eventually lead to tax
increases on Americans.284
282

He clearly counted himself among

Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1,871.
Ibid., p. 1,915.
284
Speech of John S. Carlile, Ibid., p. 1,916.
283

218
those who believed that land sales still amounted to a
significant amount of the federal government’s income.
Republican Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas requested time to
speak on the homestead bill, which he received on Monday,
May 5.

Pomeroy began by acknowledging the feeling among

some of his fellow senators (not to mention House members)
that it was not an opportune time to give away public lands
due to the revenue they supposedly generated for the
government.

He quickly eschewed that notion and noted that

the funds the government generated from land sales were not
even sufficient to cover the operating expenses of the land
offices.

“What has been will be, as a general rule,” he

told the Senate, and argued that the public domain would
not in the future produce any significant profits for the
federal government.

Besides, he argued, he did not believe

the government should make profit from selling land any
more than it should from “a sale of the air, or the
sunshine.”285
As Pomeroy continued, he railed against the
speculators who sprang from indiscriminate land sales and
called non-resident and non-occupant owners of lands “the
greatest curse to a new country.”

The Homestead Act, he

argued, would transfer land to actual settlers and
285
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therefore discourage and prevent speculation.

“With one

hundred and sixty acres of God’s free earth under a man in
his own right, and genial skies above him, he shall not
want.”

286

Pomeroy then turned his attention to the place of
slavery in the homesteading debate, something that few of
his counterparts in either the House or Senate had done
during this round of debate on the bill.

Coming from

Kansas, Pomeroy was uniquely situated to discuss this
aspect of the bill’s potential impact on American life.

He

lamented the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its implicit
repeal of the Missouri Compromise: “We soon witnessed a
country containing land enough for an empire of itself, and
as rich as the valley of the Nile, having been consecrated
to freedom for more than thirty years by positive law, at
once opened to the blighting influence of human slavery.”
Like many of his Republican colleagues, he idealized
the yeoman farmer and his role in the settlement of Kansas.
“Freedom was secured in Kansas,” he told the Senate, “by
being planted in the soil, set to growing upon each quarter
section of land that we were able to hold.… Hence it is
said that I would rather have the ‘free homestead bill’ as
a measure to secure freedom to the Territories than the
286
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reestablishment of the compromise line of 1820, or even the
ordinance, reenacted, of 1787.”
speech, he concluded.

Finally, after a long

“Having been occupied almost

exclusively with matters pertaining to the war, I think we
should not be insensible to the requirements of peace!”287
In Pomeroy’s view, opening the public domain to
homesteading was one such requirement.
The next day, Tuesday, May 6, the Senate voted on the
Homestead Act and passed it by a margin of nearly five to
one.

As in the House, all Republican members voted for it.

Just four Democrats and three Unionists voted against it.
The Senate sent its version of the bill back to the House,
where it was opened for debate again on May 12.
Potter of Wisconsin moved that the House refuse to
concur with the Senate’s amendments to the bill and called
for a conference committee with the Senate.

Speaker of the

House Galusha Grow placed Potter himself, Republican Cyrus
Aldrich of Minnesota, and Unionist Edwin Webster of
Maryland on the conference committee.

The Senate agreed to

the committee, and President Pro Tem Solomon Foot named
Republican Senators Harlan of Iowa, Daniel Clark of New
Hampshire, and Unionist Joseph A. Wright of Indiana to the
committee.
287
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After three days of meetings, the committee’s
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recommendations were reported to Congress.

Nearly all of

the Senate’s stated changes—including the deletion of the
soldier cash bounties—remained.288

Both houses agreed, and

Congress finally passed the Homestead Act.

President Abraham Lincoln signed the Homestead Act
into law on May 20, 1862.

It was the culmination of nearly

a century of debate and agitation.

Strangely, for all of

the newspaper ink spilled over those many decades arguing
either for or against it, the bill’s passage attracted
little attention from the national press.

Dispatches from

the battlefields of the eastern and western theaters of war
dominated the news as usual.

Many Republicans in Congress

quickly moved on to other pressing business and spent no
time gloating over the victory or even thinking much about
the bill one way or the other.

Little could they know just

how strongly their approval of the Homestead Act would
affect the future course of the nation in ways both good
and bad.
The Act went into effect the following January 1 and
remained active for the next 123 years.

Few pieces of

legislation ever passed by Congress have lasted as long or
impacted so many people and aspects of American life.
288
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Historians today continue to debate the positive and
negative aspects of the Homestead Act, as well as its
overall success as a national policy.

However, while few

consider it unimportant in American history, until now even
fewer have recognized it as a major issue in the decadeslong sectional disputes that culminated in the Civil War.
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CONCLUSION
Neither Abraham Lincoln nor any of his Republican
colleagues had any idea how long the Homestead Act would
remain in effect or how influential it would be.

In fact,

on January 1, 1863, when the Act became effective, it was
barely front page news.

Instead, the long-awaited

enactment of the Emancipation Proclamation dominated news
coverage that day, as did continued casualty lists from the
recent Union defeat at Fredericksburg.

The Emancipation

Proclamation changed the course of the Civil War and
American society, formally establishing the abolition of
slavery as a Northern war aim.

Its importance cannot be

understated, either in 1863 or in the nearly 150 years
since.
The Homestead Act, while perhaps less newsworthy at
the beginning of 1863, remained in effect for the next 123
years, ending only with the 1976 passage of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act.

(The law included a

special 10-year extension on homesteading in Alaska.)
Thirty of the nation’s fifty states eventually had
homestead lands within their borders.

According to U.S.

Department of the Interior figures, homesteaders made two
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million claims and acquired 270 million acres of land.289
This equals the settlement of about ten percent of the
total land area of the United States.
The Homestead Act represented unprecedented
opportunity in many different ways.

It meant land and

farms for the poor that could not afford them otherwise.
It represented small steps toward social equality for women
(who could acquire and own land in their own names under
the law) and African Americans, be they former slaves or
not.

Immigrants from nearly anywhere could come to the

United States and acquire homestead lands even before
becoming American citizens.
Of course, the Homestead Act was not perfect.

It

openly discriminated against Chinese immigrants and,
initially, American Indians.

Congress eventually amended

the law to open homestead lands to natives, but doing so
basically constituted just one more way to force them to
become white Christian farmers and take back reservation
lands.

The Homestead Act was a lose-lose for American

Indians.
Still, the Homestead Act has gotten a bad rap over the
years.

289
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failure based simply on the fact that only about forty
percent of those who claimed homesteads completed the fiveyear process and earned title to their land.

Does the

success rate of homesteaders constitute the only measure of
the Act’s success?

This is purely subjective.

Did more

than half of all homesteaders fail to “prove up” on their
claims?

They did.

Did the law fail to meet some of the

Republican Party’s settlement and political objectives?
did.

It

Did homesteading represent yet another in a long line

of lies and disappointments to American Indians?

It did.

The Homestead Act succeeded in other ways, though.

It

was an issue around which early Republicans could coalesce
at a time when they did not always agree on the proper
course to deal with slavery.

Later, when Republicans held

both Congress and the White House, they viewed the Act as a
way to direct the future course of settlement in the West
and, in tandem with other legislation, forever alter the
American economy, development, education, and commerce.
As demonstrated in this work, the idea of free land
distribution by the United States government existed from
the nation’s earliest days.

It had been a major political

issue since the American Revolution.

Ideas about the

proper way for the government to distribute land changed
and evolved as the country acquired more territory and
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began to discuss and disagree about slavery.

Homesteading

eventually became a key component of Republican ideology,
though Southern secession was required to finally ensure
the passage of the bill.

This is fitting since the debate

over homesteading had caused so much contention in the
halls of Congress over the years and had become so linked
with the arguments about the westward expansion of slavery.
From the time of the Missouri Compromise forward, land
distribution, slavery expansion, and homesteading were all
related and debated simultaneously.

These debates

increased over the next forty years, until blood was
finally shed.

The Homestead Act’s role in bringing about

the Civil War has been mostly ignored or downplayed until
now.

However, it can no longer be denied that the “free

land” idea was a contributor to the long national debate
about slavery, the creation of the Republican Party and,
consequently, the onset of the Civil War.
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